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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
Abstract 
A Comparative Econometric Analysis of South African and New 
Zealand Wineries’ Grape Sourcing Strategies  
 
“Towards a Multi-Paradigm Exchange Protection Framework” 
 
by 
Monnane Mokaedi Monnane 
 
The Transaction cost economics (TCE) incomplete contracting framework exposes exchange 
relationships to trading partner(s)‟s opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Despite this limitation, 
incomplete contracts are still widely used (Dawes, Murota, Jera, Masara, & Sola, 2009; 
Fraser, 2005). However, TCE does not provide a theoretical reason why companies use 
contracts even though they expose transactions to exchange hazards. It is against this 
background that this research has developed an exchange protection framework that protects 
exchange relationships better than TCE incomplete contracts. The new framework is multi-
paradigm in nature and integrates the exchange protection qualities of incomplete contracting 
(Transaction cost economics theory), monitoring and incentives (agency theory), relational 
norms (relational exchange theory) and the legal system. The framework has also been used to 
explain the use of contracts despite their vulnerability to opportunism. The explanation is that 
companies complement incomplete contracts with other exchange protection frameworks such 
as monitoring, incentives, norms and the contract enforcement mechanism of the legal system. 
These other exchange frameworks provide added safeguards to incomplete contracts and 
hence their continued use.  
Insights from the multi-paradigm exchange protection framework developed for this research 
have been used to make managerial and theoretical contributions. For example, managers 
have been advised to complete their contractual relationships by building norm based 
relationships with their trading partners and clients, providing necessary incentives and 
 iii 
relying more on mutual obligation monitoring, and to consider giving priority to building 
exchange relationships with partners operating in strong legal systems if they happen to 
engage in cross-border trade. From a theoretical perspective, the research has developed a 
multi-paradigm theoretical framework that is believed to offer better exchange protection than 
any theory in isolation. This notwithstanding, the current research has some limitations. These 
include among others, the focus on only one part of the value chain (grower-winery) and the 
generalisation problems arising from the fact that the research focused on only one sector 
(wine industry). These limitations helped shape the direction of further research which 
includes applying the multi-theoretical framework to different industries.   
Keywords: Transaction cost economics, Agency theory, Relational exchange theory, Legal 
system, Bounded rationality, Opportunism, Trust, Monitoring, Incentives, Contracts. 
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     Chapter 1 
Thesis Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) exchange protection framework is based on 
incomplete contracting. However, there are limitations to this framework. It makes two main 
behaviour assumptions, opportunism and bounded rationality (Williamson, 1985). 
Opportunism implies that given the opportunity, actors will take advantage of their trading 
partner‟s vulnerability and bounded rationality means that principals cannot anticipate future 
contingencies as they design contracts, which exposes them to opportunistic tendencies of 
agents who may wish to re-negotiate the contracts as the future unfolds. The TCE contracting 
schema therefore exposes transactions to opportunism since it allows for contract re-
negotiations. This suggests that transactions are not adequately protected under the TCE 
incomplete contracting framework because opportunistic actors are most likely to take 
advantage of their trading partners. As such, the theory fails to offer complete contractual 
protection to exchange relationships, the result of which is expected to be vertical control. 
This notwithstanding, contracts are still widely used to coordinate exchange relationships 
(Dawes et al., 2009; Goodhue, Heien, Lee, & Summer, 2003). This raises the question of why 
the TCE incomplete contracts are widely used despite their obvious limitation of exposing 
exchange relationships to opportunism. The theory does not have a credible explanation as to 
why incomplete contracts (arising from bounded rationality and opportunism) are used despite 
their vulnerability to holdup.  
 
The key objective of this research is therefore to develop an exchange protection framework 
that offers better exchange protection than the TCE incomplete contract. The other key 
objective is to use the new exchange protection framework to explain the continued use of 
incomplete contracts despite their vulnerability to holdup. The new framework will be 
developed by integrating different exchange protection mechanisms into TCE incomplete 
contracting schema with the objective of developing an improved multi-paradigm exchange 
protection framework. It is important to note at the very onset that a number of studies that 
have employed the multi-theoretical approach have already been undertaken. These studies 
can be divided into two main streams. The first group has largely focused on the differences 
of these theories in dealing with exchange problems. These include Kim and Mahoney (2005), 
Tiwana and Bush (2007) and Kochhar (1996) who integrated TCE with agency theory as well 
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as Mudambi and Pederson (2007) who integrated agency theory with the resource dependency 
theory. Another group of studies has sought to identify and exploit the exchange protection 
qualities of the theories, but the studies have largely focused on integrating TCE and 
relational exchange theory. These include Lui, Wong & Liu (2009) and Somogyi, Gyau, Li 
and Bruwer (2010).   
 
The current study differs from previous literature in two main ways. (a) Unlike previous 
studies that sought to compare the perspectives of different theories about a given phenomena 
or identify and exploit the exchange protection qualities of the theories, this research will 
endeavour to capture both the disparities and complementarities of selected theories, the key 
objective being to develop a more improved exchange protection framework. (b) The current 
study will integrate the exchange protection qualities of the legal system into a multi-
paradigm exchange protection framework. Specifically, the research will integrate the TCE, 
agency and the relational exchange theories as well as the efficacy of the legal system in 
protecting exchange relationships. The integrated framework will be used to explain why 
transacting parties use incomplete contracts despite their vulnerability to opportunism. To the 
best knowledge of the researcher, no study has ever integrated these four exchange protection 
mechanisms.   
1.2 Theoretical Background  
This research draws its theoretical base from TCE, agency theory, and relational exchange 
theory. The common thread between these theories is that they are concerned with trading 
relationships between partners. That is, they are exchange theories. Thus non-exchange 
theories such as resource theories (Penrose, 1959) and social network or cluster theories 
(Homans, 1961) are not considered as suitable for this type of research. Resource/knowledge-
based theories of the firm tend to be inward looking and do not see exchange between two 
firms as a means of encouraging firm competitiveness. However, this research notes that 
Resource theory does provide justification for firms to engage in exchange relationships, 
primarily to secure scarce resources, but this is only one reason for what are complex socio-
economic arrangements. In addition, social exchange or cluster based theories such as social 
network theory are concerned with group based firm relationships while the current research 
is focusing on dyads. The exchange theories identified for the current research will be 
supplemented by the contract enforcement mechanism of the legal system, primarily because 
the legal system also provides protection to exchange relationships but has not been integrated 
into a framework such as the one this research proposes before. 
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1.2.1 The TCE Theory  
The TCE (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 2008) posits that in the absence of specific assets, 
transactions should be undertaken within the spot market. Once specific assets are involved 
and there are no costly contractual hazards, contractual relationships are recommended. In the 
event of contractual hazards, the theory argues that transactions should be internalised. The 
theory further argues that business actors are opportunistic and that it is impossible to capture 
all possible future contingencies in a contract. Hence contracts are incomplete. Since actors 
are opportunistic, as new information unfolds following the signing of a contract, they may 
wish to re-negotiate for new contractual terms that are based on the new information and this 
may create opportunities for hold up (Baker & Krawiec, 2006). The combination of 
opportunistic actors and incomplete contracts implies that while TCE contracting provides 
some form of exchange protection, it fails to adequately protect transactions against 
opportunism. However, despite this limitation, contracts are still widely used as a 
coordination mechanism (Bogetoft & Olesen, 2002; Fraser, 2005). The question then is; why 
are contracts still used despite this limitation, especially given the TCE supposition that 
transactions would be internalised once they are exposed to contractual hazards? Why is it 
that transacting parties do not always take advantage of each other‟s vulnerabilities even when 
incomplete contracts offer them the opportunity to do so? This research is of the view that 
while it is not feasible to capture of every future contingency in a contract, contracts are not as 
incomplete as the TCE envisages. This research argues that in addition to a TCE contract, 
exchange protection mechanisms offered by agency theory, relational exchange theory and 
the legal system also help reduce exchange partners‟ levels of opportunism. It is against this 
background that this research has integrated these exchange protection mechanisms into a 
single theoretical framework.  
1.2.2  Agency Theory 
Agency theory controls for opportunism by designing a contract in such a way that agents are 
provided with incentives (outcome based contract) not to behave opportunistically or/and 
monitored (behaviour based contract) to ensure that they behave in line with the expectations 
of the principal (Turner, 1994). Behaviour based contracts control the actions of the agent 
through investing in systems aimed at monitoring the activities of the agent and reward the 
agents based on their observed actions. But the principal bears all the risk because regardless 
of the outcome, the agent gets their rewards. Outcome based contracts on the other hand are 
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tailored in such a way that agents are rewarded or penalised on the basis of the realised 
outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory is therefore of the view that monitoring the 
behaviour of the agents together with providing them with incentives motivates them to 
behave in line with the interests of the principals and hence does away with the need for 
renegotiations. Contractual completeness is assumed because negotiations are made ex ante, 
resulting in goal alignment and thus no need for ex post contract re-negotiations (Furlotti, 
2007).  
 
However, the literature points to some limitations of the goal alignment strategy. On 
incentives, Hart (1988) observes that agency theory has been loath to come to terms with the 
problem of bounded rationality, which renders all contracts incomplete (including the agency 
contract) anyway. Drawing from TCE, humans lack cognitive ability to capture all future 
states of the world ex ante. Since all contracts are incomplete, ex post re-negotiations of 
incentives and even the degree of agent monitoring is a possibility that could lead to hold up. 
Therefore, while agency theory provides some degree of exchange protection, as with TCE, it 
does not adequately address the problem of opportunism because contrary to the theory‟s 
assumption that goal alignment would prevent re-negotiations, this does not seem to be the 
case in reality.  
 
Perhaps due to TCE and agency theories inability to provide adequate exchange protection, 
both theories have been criticised for overstating the desirability of contracting and vertical 
integration (in the case of TCE) in hazardous exchange settings; and paying little or no 
attention to the role of norms in safeguarding exchange relationships (Macaulay, 1963).  It is 
due to such criticisms that this research incorporated the norm based relational exchange 
theory into its theoretical framework. This follows, among others, Semogyi et al.,  (2010) and 
Sutton-Brady (2008) who have acknowledged and studied the importance of relational   
norms in protecting exchange relationships. 
  
1.2.3 Relational Exchange Theory 
The TCE and agency theories are based on the premise that economic agents are self-
interested and would act opportunistically if given the opportunity to do so. They therefore 
advocate addressing any threat of opportunistic behaviour through formal contracts that must 
be enforced by the courts to ensure that relationships work smoothly. However, proponents of 
the relational exchange theory (Macaulay, 1963; Uzzi, 1997) recognise that there exist some 
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exchange relationships that involve exchange hazards such as specific investments and yet are 
not subjected to vertical integration or formal contracting. According to these theorists, firms 
create close ties with their trading partner and transactions are not seen as discrete. 
Transactions are projected into the future on a repetitive basis (Macneil, 1978). The 
relationship between the exchange parties is sustained by the value of future transactions and 
interactions.  Unlike with both TCE and agency theories, opportunism can be dealt with by 
adopting a more social orientation to doing business (Podolny, 1994) rather than by formal 
contracting. That is, relational norms between trading parties are believed to discourage 
opportunistic behaviour as they lead to self enforcing anti-opportunistic behaviour that is less 
costly to govern and more effective than both contracts and vertical integration. However, 
while norms protect exchange relationships to some degree, the question of why contracts are 
still so prevalent despite the existence of the less costly option of norm based contracting 
remains. Like TCE and agency theories, relational exchange theory fails to adequately 
account for the use of formal contracts, especially that contracting is even more expensive 
than relational governance.   
1.2.4 The Institutional Environment – The Legal System 
Defined by Antia and Frazier (2001, p. 68) as “the severity of a principal‟s disciplinary 
response to an agent‟s violation of a contractual obligation”, contract enforcement is a key 
factor that influences exchange performance. This is so because contracts are a set of rights 
and obligations established between the transacting parties, but are meaningless without a 
mechanism to enforce them (Alisena & Giavazzi, 2008). That is why all contracts include 
provisions or mechanisms to support their implementation (Menard, 2000). Lack of contract 
enforcement or weaknesses within the contract enforcement framework exposes transactions 
to hazards. It motivates opportunism because exchange partners stand to benefit from 
dishonesty without any serious consequences.  
 
Contracts may be enforced by the parties themselves, and this is usually under states of 
normalcy, where there are no substantial deviations between the ex ante and ex post states of 
the world. This is however not always the case. In as much as contracts imply the intent of 
cooperation and consensus between trading parties, they also engender dispute and 
disagreements that may lead to substantial deviations between ex ante and ex post 
circumstances (Antia & Frazier, 2001). When such deviations occur, third party enforcement 
may be called in to enforce the costs of violation. Thus, one of the most important qualities of 
third party enforcers is that they must be able to induce performance from the parties that 
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otherwise would not perform if it were not for the enforcer(s)‟ imposition of costs or threat to 
impose costs in case of non-performance.     
 
Third enforcement party varies. It may be independent individuals, associations of companies, 
or the legal system of the state such as agencies, tribunals and various courts (Barzel, 2000). 
They also vary in terms of enforcement processes, with the legal system of the state following 
a formal or judicial enforcement while others predominantly follow informal mechanisms. 
The state‟s legal enforcement mechanism relies on the state apparatus to effectively enforce 
the costs, sometimes even using force to ensure compliance (Dhillion & Rigolini, 2006), 
while most other forms depend on relationally based threats such as excommunication and 
tarnishing the reputation of the violating party. Having touched on the relational approach to 
addressing opportunism in the above sub-section, the interest here is the role of the legal 
system in protecting exchange relationships.  
 
The state‟s legal system ensures contract enforcement by clarifying threat points in the 
contract and enforcing such threats in the event of default (World Bank, 2004). It therefore 
helps facilitate transactions between anonymous parties and provide enforcement of contracts 
(Kahkonen & Meagher, 1997). This reduces any opportunistic incentives for exchange parties 
because they know that there are consequences to be borne in the event of an opportunistic 
indulgence by the offending party. While it is evident that the legal system does protect 
exchange relationships, the World Bank (2010) makes it clear that a strong or efficient legal 
system provides better exchange performance than a weak legal system. The World Bank 
(2010) measures the efficiency of the legal system through time, cost and procedural 
complexity of resolving a dispute between two domestic businesses. Based on this 
measurement, 183 countries are assessed for the efficiency of the legal system. The bank 
observes that the efficiency of the legal system or courts varies greatly around the world. It 
reports that enforcing contracts can take less than a year in countries with efficient legal 
systems such as New Zealand or Korea and take up to four years in countries at the lower end 
of the ease contract enforcement scale such as Bangladesh or Angola. Hence, a strong legal 
environment may discourage opportunistic behaviour better than a weak but functional legal 
framework. Even if the legal system is weak, its functionality needs to be emphasised because 
while it is not as effective as a strong legal system, it is better than dysfunctional legal system 
(Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2002).  According to the World Bank (2010) report, the 
New Zealand legal system is stronger than the South African legal system. Table 1.1 below 
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summarises the World Bank‟s (2010) assessment of the South African and New Zealand legal 
systems in terms of contract enforcement. 
 
Table 1-1: Contract enforcement comparison between South Africa and New Zealand 
 South Africa New Zealand 
Global Contract enforcement rank (out of 183 countries) 85 10 
Number of contract enforcement procedures 30 30 
Time required in days 600 216 
Cost as percentage of total claim 33.2 22.4 
Source: World Bank (2010) 
 
The above table shows that while the two countries have an equal number of contract 
enforcement procedures involved from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit until actual 
payment, it takes South Africa almost three times longer than New Zealand to enforce a 
contract. It is also about ten percent more expensive (as percentage of total claim) to enforce a 
contract in South Africa than it is in New Zealand. As a result, New Zealand is 75 places 
above South Africa in the global contract enforcement rankings (out of 183 countries). Hence 
on this basis, this research considers the New Zealand legal system stronger or more efficient 
than the South African legal system. Henceforth, reference to a stronger/efficient and 
weaker/less efficient legal system will mean the New Zealand and South African legal 
systems respectively. However, South Africa is 98 places above the country with the least 
effective contract enforcement system on the World Bank (2010) rankings. This suggests that 
while the country‟s legal system is weak relative to the New Zealand legal system; it still has 
a functional legal system that is better than many countries. The difference between the 
effectiveness in contract enforcement in these countries has therefore influenced this research 
to adopt a comparative approach where a country with a weak legal system such as South 
Africa will be compared to one with a strong legal system such as New Zealand. 
1.3 The Wine Industry 
TCE has wildly been applied to many industries such as electricity (Saussier, 2000), natural 
gas (Hirschman & Neumann, 2008), sales force (Tremblay et al, 2003), information 
technology (Tiwana & Bush, 2007) and automotive industry (Kingley & Fettulah, 2010). 
However, Fernandos-Olmos, Rossell-Martinez and Espitia-Escuer (2009) note the lack of 
studies that have applied TCE within the beverage industry including the wine industry. 
Given the lack of studies within the wine industry, the author felt that it was appropriate to 
apply the TCE framework in this industry. Hence, the current research focused on the wine 
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industry as a way of complementing Fernandos-Olmos et al, (2009)‟s efforts to derive greater 
insights into the TCE by analysing a new industry.  
1.4 Research Objectives and Questions  
This research aims to develop a multi-theoretical exchange protection framework that offers 
better exchange protection than any theory in isolation. The framework will then be used to 
explain why firms use incomplete contracts despite their vulnerability to hold up. However, 
before using the framework to explain incomplete contract use, the research will first have to 
establish the degree of contract use in both South African and New Zealand. The research 
objectives are therefore:  
 
(a) To integrate TCE, agency theory, relational exchange theory and the contract enforcement 
mechanism of the legal system into a multi-paradigm governance framework that is more 
effective in protecting exchange relationships than any exchange protection framework in 
isolation. 
 
(b) To use the multi-theory governance framework developed in (a) above to help explain 
why firms use incomplete contracts despite their vulnerability to ex post opportunism.  
 
(c) To investigate the structure of, and the differences between the South African and New 
Zealand wineries‟ grape sourcing strategies. 
 
These objectives will be addressed through the following research questions.  
 
(a) What governance strategies do firms in South Africa and New Zealand wine industries use 
to source their grapes? 
(b) Are there any differences or similarities between the South African and New Zealand 
grape sourcing strategies? 
(c) Can the continued use of incomplete contracts be explained through the theoretical 
underpinnings of TCE, agency theory, relational exchange theory and the efficacy of the 
legal system? 
1.5 Methods and the Philosophical Approach to the Research 
Because of the researcher‟s epistemological approach to research, which is essentially 
quantitative, this approach to hypotheses testing will be adopted to help address the research 
questions and objectives. According to Phillips (1987), epistemology concerns the current 
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body of scientific knowledge of a given phenomena. It is concerned with knowledge that has 
been generated through reliable scientific or quantitative processes. In particular, econometric 
analyses will be the dominant quantitative method used for the current study. This approach is 
the most appropriate for this research because as compared to the rival Structural Equation 
Modelling (SEM) approach, econometric analyses is less sensitive to sample size variations. 
For example, the research has a sample size of 111 for South Africa and 116 for New 
Zealand. In addition, there are 9 interactive variables. With 9 interactive variables, the 
effective use of SEM would require a minimum sample size of 500 (Hair, et al, 2010), while 
econometric modelling would only require a minimum sample of 30 (Zikmund, 2003). Thus, 
the choice of econometric modelling approach provides confidence in the interpretation of the 
results as 111 and 116 are well above the minimum threshold sample size required for the 
effectiveness and reliability of this approach. Further, while the phenomenological approaches 
such the case study provides in depth understanding of the phenomena because they involve 
gathering deeper information and perceptions through inductive, qualitative methods such as 
interviews, discussions and participant observations (Hycner, 1985), they will not be applied 
to the current study because population generalisations cannot be made from such studies. 
The current study is a comparative study and the findings from the sample results should be 
generalisable to the entire sector/firm population of the country so as to aid comparison 
between the two countries.      
1.6 Contributions of this Research 
This research will make a number of theoretical and managerial contributions to the exchange 
protection literature. From a theoretical perspective, this research will develop a multi-
theoretical framework perceived as offering better protection to exchange relationships than 
any theory in isolation (chapter three). This framework incorporates the exchange protection 
mechanisms of agency theory (monitoring and incentives), relational exchange theory (norms) 
and the contract enforcement mechanism of the legal system into the TCE incomplete 
contracting schema. The research will then use the multi-theoretical framework to explain 
why incomplete contracts are used despite their vulnerability to hold up. In particular, the 
research will undertake empirical research on the South African and New Zealand wine 
industries and the results will show support for the suggestion that the component parts 
(monitoring, incentives, relational norms and the contract enforcement mechanism of the legal 
system) of this framework provide added safeguards to incomplete contracts, allowing firms 
to use incomplete contracts with reduced fear of opportunism.  
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The research will also incorporate the legal system into the mainstream theoretical exchange 
literature. This means that the legal system will not be treated as a stand-alone exchange 
protection mechanism but as part of the multi-paradigm theoretical framework. As such, the 
removal of the efficacy of the legal system would weaken the multi-paradigm framework‟s 
ability to protect exchange relationships, and the legal system would also be less effective 
when isolated from the multi-paradigm exchange protection framework. 
 
From a managerial perspective, the research will advise that managers should make a 
deliberate effort to leverage the benefits associated with each of the three prevalent 
governance strategies of the spot market, contracting and vertical control (Scales, Crosser, & 
Freebairn, 1995). This advice will be informed by the research‟s findings that each of these 
three governance strategies has a unique role to play in a firm‟s overall exchange strategy.  
 
It has been noted that this research will make a theoretical contribution by developing a multi-
theoretical framework that highlights the importance of having an all encompassing 
theoretical approach to protecting exchange relationships from opportunism. On the basis of 
the framework, managers will be advised to complete their contractual relationships by 
building socio-economic relationships with their trading partners and clients, providing 
necessary incentives and relying more on mutual obligation monitoring to ensure 
performance, and to give preference to exchange partners operating in strong legal systems if 
they happen to engage in cross-border trade.   
1.7 Thesis Structure 
This chapter has introduced the current research, broadly outlining the research focus in terms 
of its objectives, theoretical background and the contributions to the exchange protection 
literature. Chapter two will review the literature relevant to this research. In particular, the 
TCE, agency and relational exchange theories as well as the role of the legal system in 
protecting exchange relationships from hold up will be reviewed.   
 
Chapter three will use these exchange protection insights to develop the theoretical 
framework for the research. In particular, it will use the TCE incomplete contracting 
framework as a base on which the new theoretical framework rests. The weaknesses of this 
theory in protecting exchange relationships will be identified and this will pave the way for 
strengthening the theory‟s exchange protection capabilities by introducing and incorporating 
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the exchange protection mechanisms from agency theory, relational exchange theory and the 
legal system to develop a new and improved multi-paradigm exchange protection framework.  
Based on this framework, the chapter will go on to develop the hypotheses for the study.  
 
Next, chapter four will discuss the methods employed in undertaking this research. This 
chapter will detail the development and validation of the instrument used in the research, data 
collection procedures as well as how the collected data will be analysed. Chapter five will 
present the data analysis for this research. The data analysis will start with an overview of the 
demographics of the respondent firms before reporting on the descriptive statistics of the 
research‟s major constructs and variables. It will then perform the validity and reliability tests 
of the instrument before testing the hypotheses. The hypotheses will be tested using the 
multiple regression analysis as well as the independent sample t-tests statistics. Finally, 
chapter six is the concluding chapter. It will discuss the results in detail and present the 
theoretical and managerial implications of the research. The chapter will then discuss the 
limitations of the study before mapping the future research agenda. 
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     Chapter 2 
Literature Review: Key Exchange Protection 
Frameworks 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter integrates the exchange protection frameworks of the TCE, agency theory, 
relational exchange theory and the legal system with the key objective of explaining the 
continued use of contracts despite their vulnerability to opportunism. The integration process 
also aims at understanding the grape coordination structures within the New Zealand and 
South African wine industries. Finally, the review process will aid in the development of a 
multi-theoretical framework that offers better protection to exchange relationships than any 
theory in isolation. In particular, this review will set out to identify the exchange protection 
qualities and limitations of each of these frameworks and how they complement each other in 
protecting exchange relationships. However, before the detailed review of the literature, it is 
important to discuss Lewis and Grimmes‟ (1999) metatriangulation theory building process as 
it will be used to guide the review process.    
2.1.1 The Metatriangulation Approach 
One of the key objectives of this research is to integrate four exchange protection frameworks 
and another is to develop a multi-theoretical framework that better protects exchange 
relationships against opportunism than any exchange protection framework in isolation. The 
multi-theoretical framework will be used to help explain the continued use of incomplete 
contracts despite their vulnerability to hold up. In order to achieve these objectives, this 
research has identified the relevant exchange protection frameworks that will be the focus for 
review. The review of these frameworks will help this research identify weaknesses and 
complementarities of the frameworks in protecting exchange relationships. Based on the 
review findings, proposals for remedies will be put forward in the latter chapters of this 
research. This requires the use of a process that will allow the research to study the 
differences and interplay of multiple paradigms with the objective of a better understanding of 
the protection of exchange relationships. 
  
The metatriagulation theory building process provides a theoretical lens that can help achieve 
such a task (Lewis & Grimes, 1999). This approach recognises the need for researchers to 
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appreciate and accommodate diverse paradigmatic insights in their theory building process 
(Gioia & Pitre, 1990). It recognises the need to explore the disparity and interplay of multiple 
paradigms, with a view to help arrive at an enlarged and enlightened understating of the 
phenomena of interest (Lewis & Grimes, 1999). This approach will help harmonise the 
exchange protection mechanics of the TCE, agency, relational exchange theories as well as 
the legal system with a view to developing a multi-paradigm framework (Chapter three). 
However, before reviewing these theories, it is instructive to briefly discuss how the neo-
classical treatment of the firm influenced TCE the resultant continuum of governance 
structures as these will occasionally be referred to as the theories are reviewed.  
2.2 The Neo-classical Theory, TCE and the Transaction 
Governance Continuums 
The principal activity of the neo-classical firm is to turn inputs into outputs through a 
formalised production function (Nicholson & Snyder, 2008). This is done to maximise profits 
subject to resource constraints (Kreps, 1990). The firm engages in market transactions to 
secure resources it requires for the production of goods and services it sells in the competitive 
market (Webster, 1992). The theory assumes perfect competition where production is directed 
by price movements (Cohen & Cyert, 1975; Hay & Morris, 1991). Each transaction is 
independent and is guided solely by the price mechanism as the firm seeks to buy resources 
for its production process at the lowest possible price (Webster, 1992).   
 
This notwithstanding, TCE argues that in addition to the costs associated with the price being 
paid for goods and services, there are transaction costs associated with the transaction itself. 
These include the costs of discovering what the relevant prices are, of negotiating and 
contracting and of monitoring the quality and quantity to the goods delivered (Coase, 1937). 
That is, there are costs associated with using the price mechanism. Making decisions in the 
real world involves transactions costs (Williamson, 1971) and these are ignored by the neo-
classical theory (Marks & Hooghie, 2000) because this theory treats the firm as an instrument 
for transforming market sourced inputs into outputs without any real economising within the 
firm (Williamson, 1991). In order to address this anomaly, Williamson (1971) made a 
distinction between competition in the neo-classical fashion and hierarchy (the firm) and 
argued that firms have an option of undertaking transactions through one of these 
mechanisms. His stance was that the firm (internal organisation) and market governance are 
substitutes. He states; “as the frictions associated with administrative coordination become 
more severe, recourse to market exchange becomes more attractive, ceteris paribus” 
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(Williamson, 1971, p. 113). However, this dichotomy came under heavy criticism, with 
Perrow (1986) arguing that it neglected power relations between firms and Granovetter (1985) 
asserting that it did not take into account trust between firms and their social imbeddedness 
within firm networks. This led Williamson (1991) to revise the “make or buy” dichotomy and 
conceptualised three generic forms of economic economisation of market, hybrid and 
hierarchy. The hybrid form falls between markets and hierarchy and while the parties 
maintain autonomy, they are linked through an elastic contracting mechanism. Franchise 
agreements are given as an example. The elastic nature of the contracting mechanism implies 
that disturbances may be dealt with through different means, ranging from doing nothing if 
the deviations are small and the benefits of adjustments are lower than the costs of 
adjustments to arbitration when the benefits of reconciliation outweigh the costs and finally 
litigation when the relationship has irretrievably been broken. Further, Ring and van de van 
(1992) identified non-formal cooperative arrangements based on trust as one characteristic of 
hybrids. They argued that by choosing governance structures solely on the basis of their 
ability to minimise costs, TCE failed to explore and exploit other available alternatives such 
as repeated transactions, and the key roles of trust and equity in-inter firm relationships. On 
these bases, a number of continua of governance structures have been developed. These 
include those by Peterson, Wysocki and Harsh, (2001), Lambert, Emmelhaiz and Garner 
(1996), Webster (1992), Wilson (1995) and Macneil (1980).  
 
Peterson et al.,’s (2001) governance continuum shows that firms may use an array of 
coordination measures ranging from spot markets at the one extreme to vertical integration at 
the other. In the middle are the following structures: Specification contracts, norm based 
alliances and equity based alliances. These are shown in Table 2.1 below. 
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Table 2-1: Control intensity across the coordination continuum 
Governance 
measure 
Spot market Specification 
contract 
Relational   
based alliance 
Equity based 
alliance 
Vertical 
Integration 
Intensity of 
control 
Low 
intensity 
(ex ante 
dominate) 
Moderately low 
(ex ante 
dominate) 
Moderate 
(mixed ex ante 
& ex post)  
Moderately 
high (ex post 
dominate) 
High (ex post 
dominate) 
Focus of 
control 
Immediate 
transaction 
Contract terms Relationship Property rights 
of stakeholders 
in limited joint 
entity 
Property rights 
of stakeholders 
in full entity 
Ex ante 
control 
process 
Price    
discovery   
 
Setting 
specifications 
 
Relationship 
building 
 
Negotiating the 
formal 
centralised ex  
Negotiating the 
formal 
centralised ex  
 Yes/no 
decision to 
transact 
Setting 
incentives 
Setting informal 
parameters 
post 
governance 
structure 
post 
governance 
structure 
Ex post 
control 
process 
Yes/no 
decision to 
repeat 
transaction 
Decision to 
renew/negotiate 
contract, or 
seek third party 
enforcement 
Mutual 
resolution or 
dissolution 
Execution of 
governance 
policies and 
procedures in 
the limited 
entity 
Execution of 
governance 
policies and 
procedures in 
the full entity 
Source: Peterson et al., (2001). 
 
Spot markets are characterised by low intensity of coordination. Under this governance 
structure, price is market determined and the only control the parties have is to discover the 
price level, decide whether or not to transact, and decide whether or not to transact again with 
the same party in future. Parties retain the right to walk away, and can easily do so if they 
wish. The next governance structure is specification contract. Here the level of control 
substantially increases over the spot market governance mode since conditions of the 
exchange can be legally enforced. The contracts include legally binding exchange 
specifications and terms, and the parties may seek third party enforcement if one of the parties 
fails to perform.  The main objective of contracts is to help the contracting party (principal) 
have control over the contracted party (agent), hence the principal-agent relationship which 
forms the cornerstone of agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Next, relational governance comes 
third in the continuum. This governance form is based on the need and will to adhere to social 
norms and expectations, especially norms of reciprocity, obligation to cooperate and fairness 
over and above any contract or agreement (Chiles & McMackin, 1996; Gundlach, Achrol, & 
Mentzer, 1995). Inter-firm relationships go beyond transactions to include sharing of 
knowledge, technology and even marketing strategies, each of the parties retain their separate 
identities.  
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The fourth governance mode on the continuum is equity based alliances, whereby partners are 
willing and motivated to collaborate and facilitate varying degrees of integration without a 
complete merger or a complete acquisition. Equity based alliances are characterised by shared 
equity capital between parties. These include partial acquisitions, cross equity transactions 
and joint ventures (Pekár & Margulis, 2003). Parties maintain their separate identities and 
they may sever ties with their trading partner(s) if the need arises, although joint ownership of 
assets makes it more difficult to walk away. Since there is common ownership of assets 
between the parties, the focus of control is defining the property rights of partners in the 
jointly owned entity. Finally, vertical integration is where control is centralised in one 
organisation through ownership. Vertical integration occurs when a single firm spans two or 
more stages of production. Backward integration occurs when a firm decides to integrate 
either partially or completely with its suppliers (McFetridge, 1994). Forward integration 
occurs when a firm integrates downstream with the marketing and distribution functions. 
Hence, vertical integration internalises market exchanges. Two parties to a transaction 
become one and hence complete hierarchy is achieved and the decision process is completely 
centralised (Peterson et al., 2001).   
 
A related governance continuum was developed by Webster (1992). This continuum provides 
the typology of the development of strategic relationships. It argues that at the beginning of 
relationships transactions are based on the neo-classical profit maximisation paradigm where 
social processes are not considered in the execution of transactions but rather each transaction 
is independent of other transactions, and firms want to buy at the lowest available price. This 
is in line with Williamson‟s (1991) three part governance continuum and Peterson et al.,‟s 
(2001) continuum, where the starting point is a price based market transaction between two 
actors. The next part of the continuum is repeated exchanges mainly due to the 
acknowledgement of brand quality. The repeatability of exchange does not imply the presence 
of any meaningful relationships except to appreciate the quality of goods or services offered. 
This is followed by long-term adversarial contractual relationships, where suppliers seek to 
buy products at lower prices. The fourth part of Webster‟s (1992) continuum is mutual, total-
dependence buyer-seller partnerships. The distinguishing feature of the relationships is cost 
reduction and quality improvement through the development of long-term mutually 
supportive relationships between partners. Unlike the long-term contractual relationships, 
these partnerships are not adversarial, but are rather based on the notion of mutual benefit of 
all partners through sharing of information, stability and longevity of the relationships as well 
the promotion of long-term growth policies. Next are strategic alliances, where relationships 
 17 
are started with the objective of helping each of the parties achieve their specific long-term 
goals. These objectives may include the development of new technologies, new products or 
new markets. This is followed by joint ventures, wherein a new firm that is expected to exist 
in perpetuity is created. Joint ventures help firms benefit from the competitive advantages and 
resources of their partners. The sixth part of this continuum is networks. These are complex 
organisational agreements and collaborations that may include, among others, subsidiaries 
and value added re-sellers. These must not be confused with alliances. Whereas alliances are 
agreements between firms, networks are characterised by confederation, or a flexible coalition 
that is managed from the centre. Alliances may therefore be part of, and managed by the 
network. Finally, vertical integration is the last part of the continuum.   
 
Another continuum was developed by Lambert et al.,(1996) and as with those already 
discussed, it starts with market based transactions. These are followed by three levels of 
partnership arrangements, type I, II and III. At the type I level, actors recognise each other as 
partners and coordinate their activities on a limited basis. These are generally short-term 
partnerships and are limited to mutual coordination of only a few activities. Type II 
partnerships consist of companies that have moved beyond simple coordination of activities to 
integration of activities. These are usually long-term partnerships though they are not 
expected to last forever. Finally, type III partnerships are characterised by sharing of 
significant level of strategic operation and with no limit to the length of the partnership. The 
last two stages are joint ventures and vertical control. Lambert et al., (1996) observes that it is 
common to have a firm with relationships spanning the entire spectrum. This view is shared 
by Wilson (1995) who developed a five stage relationship building process. This process 
integrates constructs (e.g. reputation, trust, mutual goals, cooperation) most often used in 
empirical research to study relationship development process, and entails partner selection, 
defining purpose of the relationship, setting relationship boundaries and value as well as 
relationship maintenance. The process suggests, among others, that reputation is most 
important at the partner selection stage, and trust is most important at the partner selection 
stage and purpose defining stages. The importance of mutual goals is said to span four stages 
of the development process (partner selection, defining purpose of the relationship and setting 
relationship boundaries and value). Wilson (1995) notes that constructs or governance 
mechanisms may be latent or active. An active construct is one that receives the manager‟s 
attention and the latent construct is one in which the main issues have been addressed to the 
manager‟s satisfaction and therefore does not require the manager‟s time and attention. Latent 
constructs are however equally important as active constructs in that they would remain latent 
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for as long as there is no incident or shock that would make them active again. The only 
difference is that they perform without the manager‟s attention since they have become “part 
of the operating environment” (p. 340). Thus, relationships characterised by latent constructs 
would most likely fall within Lambert et al.,‟s (1996) type II and II partnerships where 
companies have moved beyond simple coordination of activities to integration of activities or 
share a significant level of strategic operation and with no limit to the length of the 
partnership. These continuums show that there are over laps between coordination measures 
and companies may use all or a combination of them at a time. That is, the interaction 
between these governance structures is dynamic. This dynamism is also highlighted Macneil 
(1980) who argues that exchange partners give up their unilateral power and assume bilateral 
power (where each party has a say on the nature of the relationship) once they enter into a 
exchange relationship.  
 
The review of the governance continua above therefore suggests that firms have different 
coordination strategies available to them. In almost all cases, the beginning of exchange 
relationships is effecting transactions through the market. From there the intensity of the 
relationships, be contractual or relational increases with time and the level of interaction, with 
vertical integration representing the pinnacle of partnerships as at this level firms integrate 
into a single entity. Further, companies may use more than one governance mechanism at a 
time, suggesting dynamism in relationships and the use of different governance mechanisms 
when it is appropriate to do so. Governance structures may be active or latent depending on 
the stage of the relationship. These governance structures are useful in the following reviews 
as they are applicable in varying degrees to the exchange protection mechanisms under 
review.   
2.3 Review of Exchange Protection Theories/Mechanisms  
The TCE, agency and relational exchange theories all share a common goal of controlling 
trading partner‟s opportunistic behaviour. TCE uses ownership or vertical control and formal 
contractual arrangements. Agency theory uses formal contractual arrangements and relational 
exchange theory emphasises norm based relationships. However, these theories have 
limitations in protecting exchange relationships. This section reviews these theories with the 
objective of identifying their exchange protection properties, limitations and 
complementarities. The findings of the review process will be used to develop an improved 
multi-paradigm exchange protection framework in the next chapter. In addition, the legal 
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system will also be reviewed with the objective of identifying it‟s exchange protection 
qualities and incorporating them into the multi-paradigmatic framework.   
2.3.1 Transaction Cost Economics Theory 
2.3.1.1 Introduction and Background 
The origins of the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory can be traced back to Coase‟s 
(1937) seminal work on the Nature of the Firm. This paper‟s main thrust was to explain why 
firms exist. He reasoned that firms exist to provide alternative governance structures to 
markets as they have different transactions costs to market transaction costs.  He proposed 
that under certain conditions, the costs of organising transactions in the market may exceed 
the costs of internalising transactions. In particular, he suggested that transactions will be 
organised within the firm when the cost of organising them in-house is lower than using the 
market. Further work by Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985) gave credence to Coase‟s (1937) 
ideas and also provided some extensions, the product of which was the emergence of the TCE 
theory. The main thesis of this theory is that transactions should be governed through a 
governance mode that minimises transaction costs. Williamson (1991) has identified three 
alternative governance structures through which transaction costs may be minimised. These 
are market, hybrid and hierarchy, and preference is given to the governance mode that 
minimises transaction costs. These governance structures have since been refined and while 
the first stage is characterised by market transactions as initially indicated by Williamson 
(1971), the hybrid governance mode is shown to include an array of coordination measures 
such as quality enhanced repeated transactions, adversarial contractual relationships (Webster, 
1992), different types of alliances such as those based on the mutual benefit of buyers and 
sellers (Peterson et al., 2001; Webster, 1992) as well joint ventures (Lambert et al., 1996) and 
finally vertical integration (Williamson, 1991). Moving from market transactions to vertical 
control represents increased strength, long term orientation and level of involvement between 
parties (Knemeyer, Corsi, & Murphy, 2003).      
 
Williamson (1981) states that a transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across 
a technological separable interface. Regardless of the transaction governance form, the 
transacting process is not costless. It involves some transaction costs (Williamson, 1985) and 
these include: (a) information costs associated with seeking information about the potential 
exchange partner(s), (b) bargaining costs, which are costs associated with negotiating and 
establishing the contracts, and (c) enforcement costs, which are costs incurred in enforcing 
and controlling performance of the partners as well as conflict resolution and contract re-
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negotiations. The TCE therefore aims to minimise these transaction costs. That is, 
transactions should be governed through the least costly governance framework. In particular, 
it posits that when market uncertainties are high, or market transaction costs are high, it can 
be cheaper to internalise transactions (Williamson, 2008).  
2.3.1.2 TCE Theory Sources and Solutions of Exchange Hazards  
According to Williamson (1985), exchange hazards/transaction costs emanate from the 
transaction properties of: (a) asset specificity, (b) uncertainty and (c) frequency. These are 
compounded by the behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism. Before 
discussing how the transaction properties expose transactions to exchange hazards or lead to 
increases in transaction costs, it is important to first introduce the behavioural assumptions of 
bounded rationality and opportunism because these assumptions contribute to all three 
transaction properties increasing transaction costs.   
 
Bounded rationality refers to the fact that decision makers have constraints on their cognitive 
capabilities and limits on their rationality (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Dugger (1983, p. 101) 
lends support to this view: “people intend to be rational but their calculating and choosing 
capacities are finite, bounded”. Most transactions are therefore negotiated with limited 
information. Because of this, TCE argues that any contracts designed by humans are 
incomplete (Williamson, 1971). Due to bounded rationality, it is impossible for the parties to 
specify all possible future contingencies (Tirole, 2007),  because parties lack the knowledge 
and foresight to come up with an accurate prediction of, and plan for all the contingencies that 
may arise during the execution of the transaction (Macher & Richman, 2008). The second 
behavioural assumption is opportunism. Williamson (1985) posits that human beings are 
assumed to be self interested by nature and most will pursue their self interest with craftiness, 
shrewdness or guile. This view is supported by Wilson (1996) who views opportunistic 
behaviour as involving any act of commission or omission that knowingly and deliberately 
advances one‟s own position to the detriment of another. This implies that TCE assumes, that 
given the chance, exchange partners would make a deliberate effort to take advantage of their 
partners since they are assumed to act out of self interest (McIvor, 2009). Thus, opportunism 
implies that exchange partners will take advantage of their trading partners as and when the 
opportunity to do so arises.  
 
These behavioural assumptions have implications for the sources of transaction hazards 
associated with the transaction properties of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. 
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Considered to be the most important of the three transaction characteristics (Williamson, 
1989), asset specificity refers to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative 
use without loss of its productive value (Williamson, 1985). Four different types of asset 
specificity are identified: physical asset specificity (specialised machine or tool), human asset 
specificity (specialised learning process), site specificity (location advantage), and dedicated 
assets specificity (suppliers‟ investments to a specific transaction). When asset specificity is 
nonexistent, market governance is considered to be more effective than hybrid and hierarchy. 
Under market governance, the identity of the transacting parties is not important because there 
is no asset dependency between the parties. Parties retain the right to walk away from one 
another and can easily do so if they wish. However, once the relationship becomes asset 
specific, bilateral dependence develops and parties cannot easily walk away from each other. 
The hybrid governance mode is considered more appropriate when there is bilateral 
dependence arising from asset specificity because it makes it difficult for parties to easily 
walk away from each other and hence provides some exchange protection. This implies that 
while the trading parties are autonomous they are also dependent on each other to some 
extent. However, the hybrid governance mode‟s effectiveness largely depends on contractual 
performance. Any contractual misalignments would compromise the hybrid mode‟s ability to 
protect exchange relationships because this would open possibilities for contract re-
negotiations, which would in turn expose transactions to what has come to be known as the 
“holdup problem” (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978). For the holdups to arise, one of the 
parties to the transaction must commit investments to transact with the other, known as 
“relationship specific investments”. These kinds of investments are risky because they are 
locked into a particular relationship and are therefore of little value in any alternative use 
other than the extant relationship (Holmstrom & Roberts, 1998). Realising that the assets have 
no use outside the relationship and driven by selfish interests, the party that did not invest in 
the assets may demand new favourable terms from the party that invested in assets. Due to 
bounded rationality, the party that invested in specific assets would most likely not have 
incorporated the ex post demands of the party that did not invest in specific assets into the 
original contract. This may trigger a wave of re-negotiations and any renegotiation process 
would expose the specific investments to the exchange hazards. According to TCE, the 
solution to holdup associated with asset specificity, bounded rationality and opportunism is 
hierarchy or internalisation of transactions (Williamson, 1985). Thus, vertical integration 
should be more prevalent when it is difficult to write long term contracts between contracting 
parties (Acemoglu, Aghion, Griffith, & Zillibotti, 2004) as this would reduce or eliminate the 
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need for renegotiations. TCE therefore treats the firm as an avoider of risks associated with 
specificity, bounded rationality and opportunism (Hardt, 2009). 
 
The second most important transaction attribute is uncertainty and it is exacerbated by 
contract incompleteness emanating from bounded rationality and trading partners‟ 
opportunistic tendencies. Uncertainty may be divided into internal and external uncertainty 
(Shervani, Frazier, & Challagala, 2007). Internal uncertainty is a problem that arises due to 
the firm‟s inability to measure the performance of its trading partner (Williamson, 1981). 
Realising that the contracting party can not accurately measure performance, an opportunistic 
party may not operate as per the contractual agreement. Hence, internal uncertainty may lead 
to ex post opportunism  (Tirole, 2007). Under such circumstances TCE posits that firms could 
address internal uncertainty problems by relying increasingly on more integrated transactions 
(Shervani et al., 2007). External uncertainty is driven by the ever changing industry 
environment, making it difficult for firms to grasp and predict future outcomes (Williamson, 
1981). External uncertainty exposes transactions to opportunism because, as unexpected 
changes in the environment are realised, opportunistic trading partners may wish to re-
negotiate settlements or agreements to take into account the environmental changes that were 
not anticipated ex ante.  Bounded rationality dictates that the ex post environmental state of 
the world would not have been expected and most likely not included in the contract and this 
exposes the contracting party to exchange hazards associated with re-negotiations. This may 
lead to investment inefficiencies because faced with such uncertainties; investors may under 
invest as there is no guarantee or certainty that they will get the full return on their 
investments. According to TCE, vertical integration is therefore seen as one way of 
controlling for holdup resulting from external uncertainty because combined ownership of the 
investments in a fully integrated firm offers greater protection for specific assets and provide 
relatively efficient mechanisms for responding to change where coordinated adaptation is 
necessary (Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Ornelas & Turner, 2006). 
 
The third attribute of a transaction that may increase transaction costs is transaction frequency 
and it accounts for the transaction repetitiveness (Williamson, 2008). Recurring transactions 
require close and constant monitoring, while those that occur only occasionally need not be 
attended to continuously and do not merit the bureaucratic costs of establishing a hierarchy 
(David & Shin-Kap, 2004). Thus, in the presence of asset specificity, frequency also pushes 
transactions away from the market into hierarchy. This is so because it would not make sense 
to bring in-house the provision of a good or service that is very rarely used (Williamson 
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1985). It is therefore economical for firms to integrate in the face of more frequent 
transactions, as by so doing, the costs of frequent transacting including contract re-negotiation 
costs (financial and time) may be reduced by absorbing them into the hierarchical governance 
structures of the firm. Frequent transactions are better undertaken in house because sequential 
adaptations can be made with very “little need to consult, complete, or revise inter-firm 
agreements” (Williamson, 1979, p. 253).  
 
What emerges from the above discussion is that the TCE posits that the transaction hazards 
associated with the transaction properties of asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency and the 
behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism may be controlled through 
hybrid forms of governance when there is contractual performance and vertical control in case 
of contractual breakdowns. While this is a plausible argument, there are limitations to the 
argument, and these limitations are discussed below. 
 
2.3.1.3 TCE Limitations and its Empirical Evidence 
Two main limitations of the TCE contracting schema can be singled out.  First, the 
combination of the two assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism makes it tenable 
that exchange relationships would be exposed to hold up under the TCE framework. From a 
theoretical stand point, it is reasonable to assume that opportunistic agents will almost always 
take advantage offered by incomplete contracts. Therefore, under this theory‟s incomplete 
contracting framework, transactions are not adequately protected because opportunistic agents 
will most likely take advantage of their trading partners. TCE underpinnings therefore fail to 
fully control for opportunism because its incomplete contract expose transactions to the 
holdup problem due to potential ex post renegotiations. 
 
Second, despite the above limitation (contract incompleteness), empirical research has found 
contract use to be prevalent (D'Silva, Uli, & Samah, 2009; Dawes et al., 2009; Fraser, 2005; 
Goodhue et al., 2003) especially within the agricultural sector, and in particular the wine 
industry, which is the focus of this research. Frazer (2005) found that 85 per cent of growers 
in Australia had written contracts and 15 per cent had oral or handshake contracts with 
wineries; while Goodhue et al., (2003) reported a 90 per cent grape contracting by the 
California wineries. Further, reviews of TCE empirical studies (Carter & Hodgson, 2006; 
David & Shin-Kap, 2004) also found that despite contract incompleteness, asset specificity 
does not always lead to vertical control. This raises the key theoretical question that this 
research seeks to address, and that is:  
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What explains the fact that trading parties do not always take advantage of their 
partner(s)’vulnerability even though contract incompleteness offers them the opportunity to 
do so? 
 
This question arises because from a theoretical stand point, TCE fails to explain why contracts 
are still widely used despite the associated exchange hazards arising from bounded rationality 
and opportunism. The theory not only fails to offer adequate exchange protection due to its 
incomplete contracting framework but also fails to explain the continued use of contracts 
despite their vulnerability to hold up. Despite these limitations, TCE cannot be said to be a 
complete failure when it comes to controlling trading partners‟ opportunism. The limitations 
suggest that despite the theory‟s exchange protection qualities, opportunism remains a serious 
threat to exchange relationships. Empirical studies suggest that TCE does indeed provide 
exchange protection. However, these studies also exhibit the limitations pointed out by the 
theory itself.  
 
Saussier (2000) tested for the determinants of contractual relationships between French state 
owned electricity company (EDF) and its coal transporters. The study intended to find out 
why some contracts are more detailed than others, and why other contracts often leave 
contracting parties‟ obligations more vague than others. A database consisting of 29 contracts 
signed between 1977 and 1997 for the transportation of coal to EDF power plants was used 
for the study. The results showed that contracts characterised by high degree of asset 
specificity were likely to be more complete than those characterised by low degree of asset 
specificity. This was meant to protect the specific assets from opportunism, and this 
corroborates the propositions of the TCE. An interesting observation about this study is that it 
shows a positive and significant correlation between specific assets and contract complexity. 
But as has already been stated, contracts are incomplete and despite their complexity, the 
threat of holdup remains. In spite of this threat, EDF did not internalise the transportation 
services. This study, did not explain the reasons for EDF‟s continued use of contracts even 
though they exposed it to holdup by the opportunistic transporters. Hence, like TCE, this 
study did not shed light on the continued use of contracts regardless of their vulnerability to 
hold up. Hirschhausen and Neumann (2008) investigated the determinants of the duration of 
producer- importer contracts under changing technical, economic and institutional conditions 
(high environmental uncertainty) within the natural gas industry. They found out that duration 
of contracts involving asset specific investments extend, on average three years longer. What 
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is not explained by this study is why firms would expose transactions to risk for a further 
three years. 
 
Hence, what emerges from these studies is that they appear to overly rely on specific terms 
and conditions in the formal contract as a safeguard against opportunism. Bounded rationality 
implies that contracts are incomplete, and the current research is of the view that increasing 
the complexity of the contract on its own would not protect exchange relationships against 
opportunism. It is against this background that Baker and Krawiec (2006) argue that contract 
incompleteness may create opportunities for holdup leading to renegotiation as the future 
unfolds. As this happens, TCE suggests that firms will integrate their transactions as a way of 
protecting exchange relationships against opportunism (Lyons, 1995). But as already stated, 
contracts are still widely used. Therefore, like TCE, these studies do not provide an 
explanation for the continued use of contracts when it comes to exposing transactions to hold 
up. Therefore, there is a need to develop a theoretical framework that explains the continued 
use of contract despite their incompleteness. This research will develop a multi-paradigm 
framework that is believed to protect offer better protection to incomplete contracts and hence 
explain the continued use of such contracts. The premise for this framework will be that 
contracting parties do not take advantage of each other‟s vulnerabilities even when 
incomplete contracts offer them the opportunity to do so because other theoretical 
underpinnings and mechanisms such as relational norms, monitoring and incentives as well as 
the threat of litigation complement incomplete contracts and hence help explain the continued 
use of incomplete contracts. The framework will also help address TCE contractual 
inadequacies associated with bounded rationality and opportunism. 
 
In summary, TCE advocates for the adoption of a governance form that minimises transaction 
costs. In particular, it posits that market governance is an efficient governance mode when no 
specific investments are involved, while hybrid governance is best when transactions are asset 
specific and there are no costly contractual breakdowns. Once there are contractual 
breakdowns, TCE suggests that transactions are better protected by assimilating them into a 
unified structure. However, there are limitations or flaws to the logic informing the TCE 
exchange protection framework. First, given that agents are opportunistic and contracts are 
incomplete, transactions are forever exposed to hazards under the TCE framework. Hence, the 
theory fails to offer complete contractual protection to exchange relationships. Second, since 
the theory fails to provide adequate contractual stability, it is logical to expect no contractual 
arrangements in the face of contract incompleteness and the opportunistic agents. Instead, 
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vertical integration is expected to be the sole governance mechanism when exchange 
relationships involve specific assets (given the assumptions of bounded rationality and 
opportunism). However, this is not the case. Relationships continue to be protected through 
contractual relationships (Fraser, 2005; Goodhue et al., 2003). TCE therefore fails to explain 
why incomplete contracts are used despite their vulnerability to holdup.   
2.3.2 Agency Theory  
2.3.2.1 Introduction and Background 
Agency theory is concerned with addressing agency problems that arise in relationships or 
agreements in which one party (the principal) engages another party (the agent) to undertake 
some function(s) or action(s) on the principal‟s behalf (Bergen, Dutta, & Walker, 1992; 
Logan, 2000; Worsham & Gatrell, 2005). The ideas embodied within this theory can be traced 
to the writings of the early economists such as Adam Smith. Writing on the relationship 
between land owners and their tenants (farmers), Adam Smith (1776 (1869)) argues that the 
farmers have “a plain interest that the whole produce should be as great as possible, in order 
that their own proportion may be so” (p. 392).  This represents goal alignment between the 
farmer (agent) and the land owner (principal). However, Adam Smith‟s insights were 
forgotten for some considerable time and during this time the firm was perceived in neo-
classical economics terms, simply as a production function that explains the combination of 
capital and labour that could be used given some fixed technologies (Kiser, 1999). As 
discussed in section 2.2, the firm was modelled as “an entrepreneur who maximises profits in 
an environment in which all contracts are perfectly enforced at no cost (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). However, this view changed within the agency literature following the work of, among 
others, Ross (1973) on the economic theory of agency. These early works were then followed 
by the publication of a paper on the Theory of Firm by Jensen and Meckling (1976) which 
arguably gave prominence to agency theory.  
2.3.2.2 Agency Exchange Hazards/Problems 
Opportunism within an agency arrangement arises due to two main assumptions about the 
individual behaviour (Bergen et al., 1992). First, as with TCE, individuals are assumed to be 
self interested and this may compromise exchange performance in that the agents may, in the 
desire to satisfy their own interests, behave opportunistically by taking a course of action that 
satisfies their interests more than those of the principals, a situation referred to as moral 
hazard (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Second, the theory‟s conjecture is that agents have more 
information than the principals and this may adversely affect the principals‟ ability to monitor 
whether or not their interests are being properly served by the agents (Bergen et al., 1992). 
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Since principals do not have as much information as the agents, they may not know whether 
the agents‟ actions are in their (principals‟) best interests, a situation referred to as adverse 
selection (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The main objective of agency theory is therefore to 
reduce the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection through optimal contracting that 
allows for monitoring and incentive mechanisms that may control the actions of the agents 
and provide necessary information to the principals (Tate, Ellram, Bals, Hartman, & van der 
Valk, 2009).     
 
Adverse selection is mainly a pre contractual problem (Bergen et al., 1992). Key issues at this 
stage are whether in an attempt to win the contract, the agent is misrepresenting his skills and 
abilities. With adverse selection, opportunism arises because the agent may abuse their 
information advantage to mislead the principal about their capabilities. This opportunistic 
behaviour of agents is influenced by the fact that it is not practical and economical for the 
principal to obtain all information about what the agent can and cannot do (Aish, Wael, & 
Hassan, 2008). On the other hand, Moral hazard is concerned with the agent‟s opportunistic 
behaviour that arises after the principal has offered the contract to the agent (Bergen et al., 
1992). The problem of moral hazard arises because, given the assumption of information 
asymmetry, it is not only difficult but also expensive for the principal to know the real actions 
of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). For example, Basu, Lall, Srinivasan and Staelin (1985) argue 
that it is difficult to adequately reward the efforts of each salesperson because it is 
problematic to monitor the actual efforts of each sales person. Further, there is the issue of 
environmental risk. In addition to the agent‟s effort, outcomes may be influenced by 
environmental risk, which comes into play because there are other factors beyond the control 
of the agent, let alone the principal, that may determine the outcomes. These include, among 
others, market conditions, competitors‟ strategies and technological changes (Bergen et al., 
1992; Hornibrook, 2007). 
 
Agency problems therefore arise because since both the agents and the principals are self 
interested and have different profit maximising objectives, the risk-averse agents would prefer 
a more cautious approach and would seek guarantees that they would achieve any task they 
undertake. On the other hand, the risk-neutral principal is indifferent to guarantees of success.   
Despite these differences, the principal would like the agent to take a course of action that 
best suits the interests of the principal. Such course of action would be, and is often fairly 
costly to the agent in terms of time, effort and any other resources (Bergen et al., 1992). 
Hence, the agent may try to avoid the actions preferred by the principal, and this may result in 
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conflict between the two. The objective of agency theory is therefore to design mechanisms 
that efficiently align the interests of the agent with those of the principal (Turner, 1994), and 
thus help resolve potential conflict between the two (Tate et al., 2009). Details of how pre-
contractual (adverse selection) and post contractual (moral hazard) problems are addressed by 
agency theory are reviewed below. 
 
2.3.2.3 Theoretical Solutions to Agency Problems 
The literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hornibrook, 2007) suggests one pre-contractual solution to 
addressing adverse selection: investing in finding actual capabilities of the agent and two 
contractual solutions for addressing moral hazard: a behaviour based and outcome based 
contract.  
 
Addressing adverse selection requires the principal to invest in collecting information on the 
true capabilities of the agent before the agent is offered a contract (Bergen et al., 1992). 
However, this comes at some costs, that of gathering information about the capabilities, which 
in turn increases the hiring transaction costs. These costs are unavoidable because saving on 
them may result in the principal hiring the wrong agent due to lack of information, and this 
may lead to losses due to poor performance (Turner, 1994). Thus, the principal has to decide 
whether to opt to incur the costs of gathering pre-employment information to increase the 
probability of hiring the appropriate agent or to risk potential losses associated with hiring the 
wrong agent (Bergen et al., 1992). In most cases, the principal opts for pre-contract 
information gathering about the capabilities of the agent (Bergen et al., 1992). 
 
As for moral hazards, Bergen, et al., (1992) proposes that the principals may align the 
interests of the agents with their own through two types of contracts, the behaviour based and 
outcome based contract. The behaviour based contract requires the principal to collect more 
information about the behaviour of the agent by investing in systems aimed at monitoring the 
actions of the agent (Tate et al., 2009). This is expected to help the principal capture the 
behaviour of the agent and reward them on the basis of their observed behaviour. However, as 
with the pre-contractual solution, this is a costly exercise. On the other hand, an outcome 
based contract is designed in such a way that the agent is rewarded on the basis of the realised 
specific outcomes, such as sales volume (Ng & Ding, 2010). The principal‟s interest is not 
how and when the agent performs their functions, but rather whether or not the expected 
outcomes have been achieved, regardless of how the agent achieved them. For example, sales 
agents controlled through an outcome based contract would be rewarded based on sales 
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volume (Basu et al., 1985) as opposed to paying a salary to the agent regardless of the volume 
of sales as is the case with a behaviour based contract. For an outcome based contract, the 
rewards would be proportionate to the sales achieved. This is expected to motivate the agent 
to act in line with the principals‟ interests. Once again, this can only be achieved at a cost. 
These are the monitoring costs incurred by principals as they invest in and operate control 
systems to ensure that agents act and make decisions that are in the best interests of the 
principals (Ng & Ding, 2010; Tate et al., 2009). An example is fees of independent auditors. 
Without incurring audit fees, shareholders would never verify justifications for expenditures 
by managers (Islam, Islam, Bhattacharjee, & Islam, 2010). They also include incentive costs 
that are meant to reward agents as a way of encouraging them to direct their behaviours in line 
with the interests of the principals (Muller & Gaudig, 2010). Such reward systems may 
include executive share options and performance bonuses. They also include residual agency 
costs which are simply an admission that as long as there is an agent and principal, all other 
actions may only reduce the agency costs but will never eliminate them completely (Hueth, 
Ligon, Wolf, & Wu, 1999). It has been noted that outcomes may not be due to the agent‟s 
effort only but may also be due to environmental factors that are beyond the control of both 
the agent and the principal such as market conditions (Hornibrook, 2007). When 
environmental uncertainty is high, the agent is most likely to require the principal to pay high 
bonuses to induce the agent to accept the risk. This implies that the higher the environmental 
risk, the higher the reward needed to align the agent‟s interests with those of the principal.  
 
The focus of agency theory is therefore on designing a contract between the principal and 
agent that will optimally serve the interests of the agent and the principal by minimising 
agency costs (the cost of monitoring, motivating and ensuring the agent‟s commitment to the 
principal‟s course) while at the same time adequately rewarding the agent to help reduce their 
incentives to shirk (Nilakant & Rao, 1994). Thus the contract would entail monitoring devices 
to serve the interests of the principal and incentives to motivate the agent to behave in the 
interests of the principal. This being the case, the need for re-negotiation is, according to 
agency theory eliminated because agents have the incentives to behave in line with the 
expectations of the principals, and principals‟ information deficiencies are addressed through 
monitoring. On this basis, Furlotti (2007) argues that agency theory sees monitoring and 
incentives as principally the cure of conflicts of interest. Agency theory therefore assumes 
contractual completeness. This view emanates from the fact that negotiations are made ex 
ante, resulting in ex ante incentive alignment and thus no need for ex post renegotiation. The 
theory‟s exchange protection framework therefore helps address the TCE limitations. 
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Incentives (outcome based contract) and monitoring (behaviour based contract) help align the 
agent and the principal‟s interests, and hence protect exchange relationships. Therefore, 
agency theory‟s contracting framework drives TCE incomplete contract towards some degree 
of completeness. Thus, contracts specifying duties and obligations of each party (incomplete 
contracts) may offer better exchange protection when coupled with agency theory monitoring 
and incentive devices. 
2.3.2.4 Agency Theory Limitations and Empirical Evidence 
Despite strong theoretical arguments for the monitoring and incentives goal alignment 
strategy, agency theory has notable limitations. The first inadequacy of this theory has been 
observed by Hart (1988) who argues that agency theory has been reluctant to come to terms 
with the problem of bounded rationality, which renders all contracts, including the agency 
contract incomplete. Drawing from one of the basic premises of TCE, humans lack cognitive 
ability to capture all future states of the world ex ante. For example, an outcome based 
contract agreed upon now may need to be revised in the future because environmental 
circumstances influencing the outcomes over and above the agent‟s effort may turn out 
completely different from those expected at the contract signing period, prompting the agent 
to request for a new agreement that takes into account the realised levels of environmental 
uncertainty. Agency theory therefore unrealistically places too much faith in the ability of ex 
ante negotiations to result in perfect goal alignment, and hence no possibility of ex post goal 
alignment which is well known to expose transactions to hold up. Putting too much emphasis 
on ex ante incentive alignment as a solution to the holdup problem is therefore a limitation of 
agency theory in the sense that since all contracts are incomplete and contract ex post re-
negotiations cannot be ruled out with certainty. This view is also supported by Aish, Wael and 
Hassan (2008) who observe that despite the exchange protection capabilities of monitoring 
and incentives, there may still be some room for the agents to engage in adverse selection but 
on a lesser scale. This suggests that self-interested opportunism by the agent can never be 
completely resolved as long as there is delegation of responsibilities. This not only leaves the 
question of why firms use incomplete contracts still unanswered but also presents a challenge 
of developing a framework that would efficiently manage and minimise opportunism.   
 
A second limitation is related to the behaviour based interventions. Putting in place 
mechanisms to observe the actions of the agent is costly. For example, in the agricultural 
sector, this may mean extra costs of employing field persons to make periodic visits to the 
grower‟s farm to observe effort being put into the production process (Hueth et al., 1999). 
Third, from an outcome based contractual arrangement, it may also be costly to measure 
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outcomes. Hence investments have to be made to ensure that outcomes are appropriately 
measured. It also transfers the risk to the agent, as goal attainment does not depend entirely on 
the effort of the agent but also on the environmental factors such as government regulations 
and the overall business climate. Thus, while goal alignment reduces the need for ex post re-
negotiation and thus helps to address the holdup problem, environmental uncertainty poses a 
problem in that it increases the costs of goal alignment in addition to the costs of measuring 
outcomes.  For example, when environmental uncertainty is low, agency theory‟s incentive 
stance seems appealing because the agent will readily accept the risk, but when environmental 
uncertainty is high, it becomes increasingly expensive to shift risk to the agent despite the 
motivational appeal of such a move. Hence, in the face of high environmental uncertainty, the 
bonus required to appease the agent to accept the risk is bound to be sufficiently large (Miller 
& Whitford, 2007), hence increasing the transaction costs. From the above it seems that that 
the right mix of goal alignment will only last as long as the environment remains the same. 
Any change in the environment may lead to possible re-negotiations and thus expose 
transactions to hold up. 
 
It is therefore reasonable to argue that while incentive alignment is an appealing concept as it 
ensures that both the principal and the agent have the same interests, the issues of bounded 
rationality and hence incomplete contracts, monitoring and outcome measurement costs as 
well as the costs of bonuses in the face of high environmental uncertainty weaken the ability 
of agency theory to adequately protect exchange relationships from opportunism. Given the 
incomplete nature of contracts, an ex ante incentive agreement looks very fragile as new states 
may alter the risk profile of the agent, requiring the agent to seek a renegotiation of terms 
which may expose transactions to hold up. Thus, agency theory addresses opportunism only 
when environmental uncertainty is low, but fails to acknowledge the hazards of incomplete 
contracting. Thus, like TCE, agency theory cannot adequately address the problem of 
opportunism, particularly due to its neglect of the fact that contracts are incomplete.  
 
However, as with TCE, the theoretical limitations sighted above do not in any way suggest 
that agency theory does not provide exchange protection. The monitoring and incentive 
framework does offer exchange protection, especially when environmental uncertainty is low. 
The limitations simply point to the fact some aspects of the theory may compromise exchange 
protection and that not recognising bounded rationality, and hence assuming complete 
contracting, it cannot successfully counter exchange hazards since incomplete contracts are 
still widely used. For example, Juras and Hinson (2008) developed and tested propositions 
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about the relationship between board of directors‟ characteristics and firm performance within 
the banking sector and conclude that board size, independence, and strong ties to the 
organization through stock ownership lead to increased performance of the organization. 
Essentially, this study showed support for the agency theory in that strong ties to the 
organisation were found to lead to increased performance. Managers‟ stock ownership in 
firms helped achieve good firm performance, which was also the boards‟ objective.  
 
Muller and Gaudig (2010) investigated the antecedent of information exchange in supply 
chains and found that monitoring measures and frequent meetings positively influence the 
exchange information flow. They also found that measures such as reputation mechanism 
would probably be effective only in the long run. This study showed that the agency 
mechanism does protect exchange relationships. The study also considered both agency and 
relational effects on exchange protection, which contributed to the current study‟s decision to 
employ a multi-paradigm approach to exchange protection. It also helped confirm the 
governance continuums‟ assertion (Peterson et al., 2001; Webster, 1992) that companies 
employ a variety of governance measures to manage their transactions, that as per Wilson‟s 
(1995) argument, governance structures may be active or latent at different stages of the 
relationship. In this case, relational norms were found to become effective or active after 
relationships have been managed through formal contractual means.  
 
These studies helped address the weaknesses of the TCE incomplete contract in that they 
show that agency theory provides an added safeguard to exchange relationships. This suggests 
that the monitoring and incentive mechanism compliments the TCE incomplete contract in 
protecting exchange relationships.  
 
It has to be noted however, that all contracts are incomplete (Hart, 1988) and therefore the 
fact that managers‟ stock ownership did not completely remedy the managers‟ opportunistic 
behaviour. Hence, despite the added safeguards provided by agency theory‟s incentive and 
monitoring mechanisms, the threat of hold up still remains. Further, while agency theory 
helps address the weaknesses associated with incomplete contracting, it fails to explain the 
key theoretical question that this research seeks to address, that of explaining the continued 
use of contracts despite their vulnerability to holdup. 
 
Agency theory has also been criticised for being under-socialised as it does not account for 
prior meeting of trading partners, which may reduce and even eliminate goal incongruence 
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between the principal and the agent (Granovetter, 1985). Perrow (1986) argues that since the 
theory emphasises monitoring and offering of incentives to control opportunistic behaviour, it 
would actually increase attitudinal differences in the long run. Critics of agency theory 
recommend concentrating on building trust between the principal and the agent which could 
reduce opportunistic behaviour of agents (Beccerra & Gupta, 1999). These critics highlighted 
the importance of the exchange protection qualities of a more socialised transaction 
coordination approach, and will be incorporated under the next theoretical construct. 
 
In summary, the focus of agency theory is to design a contract between the principal and 
agent that will minimise agency costs (Nilakant & Rao, 1994). The contract entails both 
monitoring and incentive aspects. This helps address the limitations of TCE. Incentives and 
monitoring help prevent the opportunistic agent from taking advantage of the principal. 
Monitoring helps improve the principal‟s information about the agent‟s behaviour and 
actions, and thus provides a means of controlling the agent‟s opportunistic behaviour. Further, 
incentives promise positive rewards in cases where the agent behaves in the best interests of 
the principal. This again dissuades the TCE opportunistic agent from taking advantage of the 
vulnerable principal. Hence, it is fair to argue that the agency theory goal alignment strategy 
compliments TCE exchange framework as the strategy helps address the transaction 
vulnerability associated with TCE incomplete contract and opportunistic agents. Moreover, by 
designing a contract that ensures that agents are incentivised to meet the principal‟s 
expectations ex ante, the agency contract represents a positive step towards a complete 
contract as it substantially reduces the need for ex post contractual renegotiations.  
  
However, like TCE, agency theory has limitations when it comes to protecting exchange 
relationships. Hart (1988), is of the view that agency theory should embrace TCE assumption 
of bounded rationality and appreciates that while incentives and monitoring would reduce 
opportunistic behaviour, there are other contractual hazards beyond those two that cannot be 
included in a contract. Contracts are naturally incomplete. The theory is also said to be under-
socialised as it does not account for prior meeting of trading partners. It is against this 
background that the next section of this review is on the norm based relational exchange 
theory.  
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2.3.3 Relational Exchange Theory and the Protection of Exchange 
Relationships   
2.3.3.1 Introduction and Background 
Unlike the neo-classical economic theory that has a price mechanistic view of the firm, the 
relational exchange theory integrates and helps understand the social behaviour in economic 
undertakings (Homans, 1958). It is concerned with protecting exchange relationships through 
norms such as commitment and trust (Yaqub, 2010). It is against this background that in 
contrast to TCE and agency theories that emphasise formal contracting (and vertical 
integration in the case of TCE) to address market uncertainties, the relational exchange theory  
perspective is that market uncertainties can be dealt with through adopting a more social 
orientation to doing business (Podolny, 1994).  
The origins of the relational exchange theory can be traced to Homans (1958) who suggested  
that any interaction between humans represents an exchange of resources and that the 
resources exchanged may be both tangible (goods) and intangible (friendship). His thesis was 
that parties enter and maintain a relationship with expectations that the relationship will be 
rewarding. Parties expect some benefit from entering into and maintaining relationships. This 
line of thought was later advanced by among others, Macaulay (1963) and Macneil (1978) 
who also highlighted the importance of social norms and self enforcing contracts in business 
relationships.  
2.3.3.2 Relational Exchange Theory Solutions to Exchange Hazards 
As stated above, relational exchange theory is concerned with protecting exchange 
relationships through establishing relational norms between exchange partners. Relational   
norms are many and varied. They may include shared planning and joint responsibility 
(Johnston, McCutcheon, Stuart, & Kerswood, 2004), reputation and cooperation (Arend, 
2009), risk sharing and exchange of information (Arrighetti, Bachmann, & Deakin, 1997) and 
trust (Claro & Claro, 2008; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Further, trust is generally considered to 
be the most important variable within relational exchange literature and is commonly used to 
represent relational norms (Lambe, Wittman, & Spekman, 2001). Trust is an abstract concept 
and means different things to different people. For example, Ring & Van de Ven (1992) 
define trust as confidence in the other party‟s goodwill. It is the firms‟ belief that each party to 
the transaction will act for the benefit of the other (Anderson & Narus, 1990). Sako (1992) 
identifies three types of trust relevant to buyer supplier relations and these are contractual 
trust, competence trust and goodwill trust. Contractual trust refers to a belief that all parties 
will act ethically and keep the promise, be it a written or an oral promise, while competence 
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trust refers to a belief that a partner possesses the capabilities of doing what it promises to do, 
or is competent to execute the task at hand. Goodwill trust refers to the assumption that 
parties will make an open ended endeavour to take initiatives for the benefit of both parties 
and will not act opportunistically. According to Burchell and Wilkinson (1997, p. 218) trust 
means “at a minimum that the supplier can be relied upon to deliver on time the product or 
service of the agreed design, quantity, quality and price, and that the customer can be relied 
upon to accept the delivery of the order and to pay up fully and on time”. What emerges is 
that despite the many meanings of trust, a common thread between these meanings is that 
trustworthy partners are expected to act in the best interest of their trading partners and thus 
are least expected to behave opportunistically. 
 
Norm based relational exchange theory argues that inter-firm transactions are governed by 
these norms. Transactions are characterised by repeated exchanges and embeddedness in 
social relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Firms create close ties with 
their trading partner(s) and transactions are projected into the future (Macneil, 1978). They 
are seen as a series of uncertain, open ended, incomplete exchanges over medium to long term 
(Masters, Miles, D'Souza, & Orr, 2004). Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) argue that in a 
relational   set up, the relationship between the two parties is sustained by the value of future 
transactions and interactions. Relational governance allows inter-firm relationships to go 
beyond transactions to include sharing of knowledge, technology and even marketing 
strategies. There is expectation that cooperation between the firms will provide future mutual 
benefits (Paulin, Perrien, & Ferguson, 1997). The need and will to adhere to relational norms 
and expectations, especially norms of reciprocity, obligation to cooperate and fairness are 
important foundations for relational governance (Chiles & McMackin, 1996).  
 
The main objective of the exchange partners is to maintain their relationship for the 
foreseeable future. They are therefore unlikely to conduct themselves in ways that would 
compromise this goal. This leads to repeated exchanges, which further fosters trust as the 
more the parties trade with each other over a long period of time without breach, the more 
they trust each other and reduces transaction costs.  Repeated exchange between parties also 
leads to social embeddedness where economic relationships are shaped by social networks 
characterised by informal arrangements rather than bureaucratic structures such as formal 
contractual relationships between actors (Granovetter, 1985; Ring & Ven, 1992). In fact, 
some commentators view the use of formal contracts as encouraging opportunism rather than 
protecting exchange relationships as intended.  For example, Macaulay (1963, p. 64) argues 
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that the use of formal contracts in an exchange relationship “indicates a lack of trust and 
blunts the demands of friendship, turning a cooperative adventure into an antagonistic horse 
trade”. He further argues that businesspeople often prefer to rely on a word of mouth or a 
handshake even when exposed to serious transaction risks. These relational norms therefore 
reduce transaction costs (Chiles & McMackin, 1996), and hence, like the TCE and agency 
exchange frameworks, it helps protect exchange relationships against opportunism. For 
example, when there is trust between two actors, there is less need to employ expensive 
safeguard measures such as contract negotiations and renegotiations, installation of 
monitoring devices to detect agents‟ shirking or even provision of incentives to encourage 
agents‟ performance, all of which results in increased transaction costs. In a relational set up, 
monitoring costs are substantially lowered because trust reduces the need to check every time 
whether the other party is really doing what he promised to do. Thus, norms help address 
problems associated with moral hazard. When actors belong to the same group they face less 
coordination problems, which reduce their transaction costs. With reference to trust, Lyon 
(2000, p. 664) notes that; “trust plays a major role in reducing transaction costs, especially in 
situations of long distance trade, through reducing the need for monitoring and information”.  
 
Since norms discourage opportunistic behaviour (Uzzi, 1997; Wakabayashi, 2003), they 
encourage better investment decisions, and ensure rapid and flexible responses to unforeseen 
circumstances (Lyons & Mehta, 1997). The theory argues that specific investments through 
the use of social mechanisms such as restricting access to exchanges, imposition of collective 
sanctions, and trading with reputable partners only (Borgatti, Hesterly, & Jones, 1997). 
Restricted access seeks to limit the number of trading partners within the network. This is 
normally meant to ensure that members of the network are of an acceptable status. It has been 
mentioned that repeated exchanges facilitate the development of trust and therefore 
embeddedness. Access is therefore in most cases restricted to members who have 
continuously shown commitment to quality through previous transactions (Podolny, 1994) 
and who have developed as a social unit over time.  
 
Fewer suppliers or restricted access reduces transaction costs (coordination costs) and allows 
for better and close monitoring through frequent interaction (Borgatti et al., 1997). This not 
only helps ensure high quality inputs but also reduces the possibility and dangers of 
opportunism. This is so because having fewer partners who closely interact encourages the 
development of close ties and as this happens, the parties interests become aligned and hence 
mitigate opportunistic behaviour (Granovetter, 1973). Smaller groups generally find it easy to 
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become loyal towards each other, which is a positive development towards averting 
opportunism because in the absence of loyalty and adherence to promises, opportunism is 
largely seen as a stronger form of self interest (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Group sanctions 
involve imposition of sanctions or punishment on group members who violate group norms 
and values. Punishment may include withdrawal of cooperation, disapproval and stigmatising 
culprits (Lyon, 2000). Sanctions safeguard exchanges and relationship specific assets as actors 
are normally aware of the consequences of engaging in unacceptable behaviour. Reputation 
involves a high degree of integrity. It is a signal of the company‟s capabilities and reliability, 
and hence conforms to Sako‟s (1992) competence trust. It is about the company‟s attributes 
based on its past dealings with transacting parties. Such attributes include level of 
performance, quality of products and even the type of partners (Vendelo, 1998). Dolphin 
(2004) views identity, image, prestige, goodwill, esteem; and standing as synonyms of 
reputation. Good reputation is good for business as it is a signal of value, good performance 
and helps build sustainable competitive advantage (Mahon & Wartick, 2003). Reputation is 
therefore sort after as it is an advantage to firms.  
 
The fact that relational norms help reduce transaction costs and the need for constant 
monitoring, suggests that relational exchange theory may help address the limitations of 
agency theory that arise due to monitoring and incentive costs. This further helps the 
performance of TCE incomplete contracts. Hence, it is fair to argue that like monitoring and 
incentives, relational norms help drive TCE incomplete contract to some degree of 
completeness, and thus help improve the protection of exchange relationship. That is, 
incomplete contracts may perform better when they are coupled with monitoring, incentives 
and relational norms.  
2.3.3.3 Limitations and Empirical Evidence of Relational Exchange Theory  
The first limitation of the relational exchange theory is what Grayson and Ambler (1999) and 
Zahra, Yavuz and Ucbasaran (2006) refer to as the “dark side”, which in simple terms means 
that excessive reliance on norms can have negative effects (Lambe et al., 2001; Nooteboom, 
2002). Nooteboom (2002) argues that over emphasis of relational norms may induce rigidities 
and create barriers to innovation. This view is supported by Zahra et al., (2006) who explored 
the role of trust in the new business creation process in established firms. They found that 
while relational trust may help overcome some problems that may arise in the various stages 
of new business creation, they also identified many downside effects of trust on business 
development for established firms. For example, trusting partners may overlook due 
diligence, fail to consider alternative partners, lack effective controls and in extreme cases fail 
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to guard against partner(s)‟ opportunistic behaviour. Moorman, Zaltman and Deshpande 
(1992) investigated the role of trust between knowledge users and knowledge providers. 
Based on their results, they argued that clients in long term relationships are more likely to 
begin to have higher expectations, which would in turn increase the likelihood of 
dissatisfaction. They also noted that clients may start believing that long term service 
providers are taking advantage of the trusting relationship and being opportunistic. The point 
supports Lambe et al., (2001) who argue that the theory should be criticised for its assumption 
that social norms are devoid of opportunism. Their thesis is that even after achieving the 
highest levels of relational norms, occasional differences between partners are still possible, 
and they may expose transactions to opportunism. Further, the dark side of relational norms is 
in line with Wilson (1995) who observed that constructs aimed at protecting exchange 
relationships such as trust, commitment, cooperation and mutual goals may be active and 
latent in certain stages of the business relationship. Hence, as the above studies show, there 
are times when the relationships are characterised by the dark side of trust, and this may be 
during stages when the variable is latent. This suggests that exchange relationships cannot be 
protected by norms alone, as there are problems associated with over reliance on norms. Thus, 
firms may benefit from combining relational norms with other exchange protection 
frameworks. In this way, other exchange safeguards would protect relationships when the 
norm based mechanisms are latent or affected by their dark side. This has therefore 
contributed to the multi-paradigm exchange protection approach adopted for this research 
where norms are integrated with other exchange protection frameworks.      
The second limitation is related to the conceptual argument that relational governance may be 
substitutes for formal governance mechanisms such as formal contracts (Macaulay, 1963). 
Recent studies (Argyres, Bercovitz, & Mayer, 2007; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Ryall & 
Sampson, 2009) point to the complimentarity between formal and relational governance 
structures. Thus the relational theory‟s perception that relational governance may be 
substitutes for formal governance may have robbed managers of the benefits of a balanced 
and improved relational /formal governance framework. A related limitation is that it puts a 
lot of emphasis on long term relationships at the expense of short term one. The theory argues 
that transactions are projected into the future (Macneil, 1978) and are characterised by 
repeated exchanges (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). However, relational norms develop over time 
(Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006). For example, Gulati (1995) posits that trust is built 
as firms repeatedly interact. This view is shared by Luo (2002) who states that formal 
contracts serve as a framework for guiding cooperation and Beave and Saussier (2010) who 
argue that informal agreements emerge to improve on the results of formal agreements. This 
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suggests that before relational norms develop, actors rely on formal coordination measures. 
Formal governance mechanisms protect exchange relationships before familiarity between 
trading partners develop. The relational exchange theory should therefore implicitly 
acknowledge the importance of formal contracts especially in short term relationships that 
cannot rely on familiarity to provide exchange protection. This is more so as Beave and 
Saussier (2010) point out, while relational norms are often presented as a mechanism of 
addressing limitations associated with contracting, firms always sign a contract of some type.  
Further, the theory plays down the role of the legal system in protecting exchange 
relationships. Its argument is that the problems of bounded rationality and hence opportunism 
may be addressed through self enforcing relational contracts. This argument is based on 
Macaulay‟s (1963) findings that courts are seldom used to resolve disputes between trading 
partners, even in developed countries like the United States. However, as shall become 
apparent when the role of the legal system in protecting exchange relationships is reviewed, 
courts do protect exchange relationships and may therefore complement norms in protecting 
exchange relationships. Lastly, despite its apparent disdain for the use of formal contracts 
(Macaulay, 1963) and arguing that transactions are better protected through norm based 
relationships than formal contracting, the relational exchange theory fails to explain the 
continued use of incomplete contracts despite their vulnerability to holdup.  
These limitations point to the fact that while the theory provides protection to transactions, it 
has shortcomings. This suggests that, just like TCE and agency theory, it fails to 
comprehensively control for opportunism. Once again it is important to note, that this does 
not mean that relational exchange theory completely fails to protect exchange relationships. 
Empirical studies show that relational norms do indeed protect exchange relationships. 
However, there are glaring limitations in these studies. For example, Claro and Claro (2008) 
tested the relationship between performance and trust in the Brazilian distribution market and 
concluded that overall, trust efficiently coordinates the activities of the relationships. They 
further stated that managers of the companies seek to build trusting relationships as a way of 
mitigating opportunism. The study‟s overall findings therefore support the propositions of 
relational exchange theory. They show that relational norms, in this case trust, do help protect 
exchange relationships. However, while it is impossible to explore all the determinants of 
exchange performance within any given industry or relationship, by focussing exclusively on 
trust (relational norms), and excluding other governance mechanisms such as formal contracts 
and monitoring/incentives, the authors may have missed the opportunity to gain a broad 
understanding of determinants of exchange performance within the Brazilian distribution 
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sector. Another study by Masuku and Kirsten (2004) examined contractual relationships 
between smallholder growers and millers in the sugar industry supply chain in Swaziland. 
Their results showed that higher levels of trust led to higher levels of cooperation between 
growers and millers, which in turn led to higher levels of commitment of growers to the 
business relationships. The authors suggested that since contracts work on compliance and 
relational exchange requires only trust and commitment, transactions supported by relational 
norms are most likely to succeed than those supported by legal contingencies. Indeed these 
results show support for the relational exchange theory in protecting exchange relationships. 
However, the authors played down the role of other governance frameworks such as forms 
contracts in insuring transaction performance. They adopted the formal/relational contracts 
substitution approach and as such their advice may have denied managers the opportunity to 
put in place the governance structures that take advantage of the benefits of both formal and 
relational contracting. Furthermore, even though the authors showed their disapproval of 
formal contracts, they did little to shed light on why formal contracts continue to be used even 
when, as they note, are more likely to fail than the relational contracts. This research will 
argue that the choice of governance measures should not be informed by whether or not the 
formal or relational approach is most likely to fail but should be informed by the right mix, 
based on different circumstances, of both formal and relational governance mechanisms. The 
two are complimentary.   
This view is influenced by among others, Poppo and Zinger (2002) and Zhang and Aramyan 
(2009) who perceive formal and relational contracts as complements rather than substitutes. 
Poppo and Zinger (2002) used data from a sample of information services exchanges and 
found empirical support for the complementarity between relational and formal governance. 
Managers appeared to couple their increasingly customised contracts with high levels of 
relational governance (and vise-versa). They argued that that in settings where hazards are 
severe, a combination of both formal contracts and relational arrangements may result in 
superior exchange performance than either governance framework in isolation. Formal 
contractual specifications such as clauses on punishment in case of default may encourage 
long term agreements and thus discourage opportunistic behaviour aimed at short term gains. 
In this case, specification contracts and relational based alliances in Peterson et al.,’s (2001) 
continuum were used at the same time, suggesting that different mechanisms may 
simultaneously be employed to protect exchange relationships. However, this study was cross 
sectional in nature and therefore did not capture the dynamics of the relationships. Wilson 
(1995) and Peterson et al., (2001) continuums of relationships suggest that relational norms 
develop at later stages of the relationships.  
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A related study by Ryall and Sampson (2009) examined 52 contracts for joint technology 
development in the telecommunications equipment industry to determine whether and how 
their content is affected by relational considerations. They found that contracts became more 
detailed and included stronger enforcement terms when at least one of the firms has prior 
relationships with each other. The reason given for this was learning by doing: as a firm 
interacts with its trading partner(s), its ability to write more complex contracts improves. That 
is, repeatability and socialisation did not lead to less contract complexity but instead led to 
greater contract complexity. A related study by Argyres et al., (2007) investigated the 
evolution of the contracting process in the information technology sector and found that 
dyadic repeat exchanges lead to complexity in subsequent contracts. This was said to be 
mainly due to the fact that contract implementation revealed shortcomings in the relationship 
and the shortcomings were dealt with by including new and appropriate contingency 
provisions in the subsequent contracts. This suggested that as firms come to know each other 
over a longer period of time, they tend to include more provisions in their contractual 
relationships, suggesting a positive correlation between relational governance and formal 
contracting. Again this suggests complementarity between relational governance and formal 
contracting. It suggests that different governance mechanisms may work together in real life.  
 
These studies played an important role in influencing the current research to develop a multi-
paradigm exchange performance framework and using it to explain why incomplete contracts 
are used to govern transactions despite their vulnerability to hold up. The studies gave initial 
indications that formality and informality may co-exist in a relationship and indeed 
complement each other in ensuring exchange performance. Managers may rely on relational   
governance for increased protection as contracts become more complex and may also use 
formal contracts as added safeguards in case relational norms fail to perform. This is more so 
as relational exchange theory has a dark side, the effects of which may be dealt with by 
complementing norms with other exchange protection mechanisms.  
   
In summary, unlike TCE and agency theories that protect exchange relationships through 
formal contracts, the relational exchange theorists (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997; Granovetter, 
1985) argue that opportunism may be reduced by the development of norm based 
relationships. Relational exchange theory views norms such as trust and commitment as 
substitutes to vertical integration and/or explicit contracts. Market uncertainties can be 
addressed through socially orientated relationships (Podolny, 1994). Norms are seen as 
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enforcers of anti opportunistic behaviour. This has implications for both TCE theory and 
agency theory. Relational norms help address the problem of bounded rationality and hence 
opportunism. Thus, like TCE and agency theory formal contract, the relational exchange 
theory seeks to protect transactions from opportunism. This suggests a complementarity of 
purpose between the three governance structures, an indication that there is room for a 
simultaneous application of the three governance frameworks with a view to offer improved 
protection to exchange relationships. 
 
This notwithstanding, some studies (Claro & Claro, 2008; Masuku & Kirsten, 2004) adopt the 
traditional relational approach of focusing on relational exchange protection attributes and 
disregarding the exchange protection qualities of formal contracting. While these studies 
show that relational norms encourage exchange performance, they fail to account for the use 
of formal contracts as a governance measure. Hence, like TCE and agency theory, the 
relational exchange theory falls short of providing a tangible reason for the continued use of 
incomplete or formal contracts. 
 
However, some studies (Argyres et al., 2007; Ryall & Sampson, 2009) help shed light on the 
reasons for incomplete contracting despite its limitations. Unlike studies that implement the 
Relational exchange theory as given and thus treat formal contracts and relational contracts as 
substitutes or ignore the role of formal contracting in ensuring exchange performance, these 
studies treat formal and informal governance approaches as complements. The central thesis 
of these studies is that as contracts become more complex, managers rely on relational   
governance as an added exchange safeguard.  This view has influenced the current study and 
hence it treats formal contracts and relational contracts as complements.  
2.3.4 The Legal System and the Protection of Exchange Relationships 
2.3.4.1 Introduction and Background 
The legal system is one of the institutions devised by society to create order and reduce 
uncertainty in exchange (North, 1991). Williamson (2000) argues that these institutions fall 
into two main categories of formal and informal institutions. The formal institutions are 
basically the state‟s legal system and are comprised of the law of the contract and other bodies 
of the law that shape or impinge upon contractual ordering, and the courts and procedures 
involved in enforcing contracts (Kahkonen & Meagher, 1997). The informal institutions 
include customs, mores, social sanctions, traditions and codes of conduct among others 
(North, 1991; Williamson, 2000). These formal and informal institutions are essentially rules 
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of the game (Aoki, 2000). They play an important part in guiding and influencing the 
outcomes of the transacting process because as rules of the game, they reduce the uncertainty 
involved in human interaction by prescribing the transacting parties‟ patterns of behaviour 
(Yeager, 1999). These rules establish and clarify property rights and reduce dispute resolution 
costs and provide exchange partners with protections against abuse (World Bank, 2010).  
 
The norms, customs, mores and social sanctions, fall under the relational governance mode 
that was reviewed in the last sub-section and will not be reviewed in this section. Instead, this 
section focuses on the role of the formal institutions, hereinafter referred to as the legal 
system, in protecting exchange relationships.  
 
2.3.4.2 The Legal System’s Exchange Protection Mechanism 
When parties exchange goods or services simultaneously, the need for contract law is small 
(Chirelstein, 1998).  When goods and services are exchanged on a non-simultaneous basis, the 
need for a system to mediate exchanges arises because in this case, parties promise future 
performance. But there are uncertainties associated with promises for future performance due 
to opportunistic nature of transacting parties and incomplete contracting (Williamson, 1985). 
As discussed under the review of the relational exchange theory, parties may resolve 
transaction uncertainties through non legal sanctions such as ostracism and dealing with 
fellow reputable participants only (Juurikkala, 2009). In such cases, the need for legal 
intervention may be reduced. Legal intervention may be used when controlling opportunism 
through non legal means is more costly than the judicial alternative (Kostritsky, 2004) or 
when the legal system is perceived as credible (Zhou & Poppo, 2010) and capable of 
providing added safeguards to exchange relationships.  
 
The legal system uses a legally binding contract as an instrument for protecting exchange 
relationships. The contract represents legal commitments that parties to a transaction agree to 
honour (Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007). It represents promises or obligations that 
parties to a transaction agree to perform in future (Mayer & Argyres, 2004). It can also be 
seen as a form of private ordering whereby the transacting parties document the terms 
governing their relationship (Kahkonen & Meagher, 1997).  By enforcing the contract, the 
legal system helps ensure that trading parties honour their promises (Kostritsky, 2004). It 
allows parties to coordinate their actions with their trading partners by guaranteeing bilateral 
commitment to the trading agreement and that in the event of transaction default, the parties 
can enforce the agreement through the court system (Bridgeman, 2009).  It also allows parties 
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without prior trading history to contract major transactions with reduced fear of opportunistic 
tendencies such as fraud (Leeson, 2008). The legal system therefore facilitates exchange 
among anonymous individuals and firms by providing impartial and predictable enforcement 
of contracts (Kahkonen & Meagher, 1997).  This reduces uncertainty.  
 
It can therefore be argued that the legal system minimises the problems associated with 
bounded rationality, and hence hold-up. This complements the relational theory in that it can 
be used as an added transaction safeguard measure. It also plays a complementary role to both 
TCE and agency theories, since these two struggle with possibilities of contract re-
negotiations and opportunism. By guaranteeing that the government will enforce the 
agreement (Bridgeman, 2009), the legal system helps curb problems associated with 
incomplete contracting. It drives incomplete contracts to some degree of completion. This 
suggests that the legal system complements all the exchange protection mechanisms reviewed 
so far (TCE, agency theory and the relational exchange theory). It is therefore logical to 
incorporate the legal system into this research.  
 
The role of the legal system in protecting exchange relationships is also supported by 
empirical studies. For an example, in a comparative study on the regulation of inter-firm 
contracting between companies in Germany, Britain and Italy, Arrighetti et al., (1997) 
concluded that relational contracting involving higher frequency of contracting as well as 
asset specificity may also be associated with the use of legal enforceability as a form of 
security. They further pointed out that the role of the legal system in underpinning relational 
contracting is arguably greater than has been previously thought, and that there are indications 
that legal regulation plays an important role in fostering inter-firm cooperation. They argue 
that the law creates an attractive environment within which parties can transact in that it 
makes provision for future contingencies as well as for legally enforceable sanctions that 
encourage performance from both parties and discourages opportunistic behaviour. The 
conclusions of this study have implications for whether the legal system replaces norms or 
compliments them. The conclusions suggest that the legal system may act as an added 
safeguard measure in case relational norms fail to provide exchange protection. Perhaps this 
also helps explain why transacting parties often sign a contract (Beave & Saussier, 2010) even 
if their relationship is norm based. A related study by Juurikkala (2009) investigated the role 
of legal and social norms in the governance of contractual relationships in the United States 
and Taiwan and concluded that legal norms are most relevant and efficient when they are well 
aligned with social norms.  
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de Jong, Rosaline and Klein-Woolthuis (2008) studied the governance of high-tech alliances 
and found that legally enforceable contracts play two important functions in an exchange 
relationship. First, they safeguard contingencies. That is, they act as a framework for how to 
react if unforseen contingencies arise. Second, participants use legally enforceable contracts 
to show commitment, a view that is also supported by Mellwigt et al., (2007). This suggests 
that while the legal system may be used to enforce contracts in case of transactional default, it 
may also be used to simply show partners‟ commitment, which once again shows the 
complementarity between the legal norms and relational norms. This suggests that norms do 
not necessarily replace the legal system. Further, drawing on the perspective of the 
neoclassical contract lens, Aulakh and Genctuck (2008) examined the export-import 
relationships and found that under conditions of high dependency of either the exporter or the 
importer on its trading partner. Their main conclusion was that both firms will prefer detailed 
legally enforceable contracts which provide for the necessary safeguards and guarantees.  
 
These studies therefore show that the legal system provides enforceability of contracts and 
this helps ensure exchange performance. This has influenced this research to incorporate the 
legal system into a broader multi-paradigm exchange protection framework.      
 
2.3.4.3 Strength of the Legal System and Exchange Protection 
While it is evident that the legal system does protect exchange relationships, empirical 
research support the argument that strong legal systems provide better exchange protection 
than weak legal systems. For example, Lerner and Schoar (2005) analysed 210 developing 
country private equity investments with the key objective of understanding how differences in 
the enforcement of commercial laws affect financial contracting. They found that transactions 
vary with the nations‟ level of legal enforcement capability. In particular, they found that 
investments in countries with effective court systems have more protections for private equity, 
while investors in countries with less effective legal systems protect their investments through 
control measures such as majority ownership and board dominance. This is in line with the 
current research‟s proposition that the stronger New Zealand legal system is more likely to 
better protect exchange relationships than the weaker South African legal system. Another 
study by Mina (2006) examined the influence of contract enforcement in international lending 
and debt maturity. The study concluded that countries with good contract enforcement are 
more likely to get higher levels of lending with longer repayment terms. This indicates that 
lenders are more comfortable extending credit to countries with good legal systems than to 
countries with a weak legal system. This again influenced the current research to make a 
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distinction between weak and strong legal systems.  Further, a study by Lu and Tao (2009) 
used a sample of private businesses in China to investigate the impacts of contract 
enforcement on the degree of family control of businesses. They found that weak contract 
enforcement is associated with higher degree of family control of businesses. This is primarily 
because when contract enforcement standards are low, firms may opt to complement legal 
enforceability with other governance structures that afford them greater control over the 
activities of the firm such as family ownership and vertical control.    
 
Laeven and Woodruff (2008) used data from different Mexican states to test the proposition 
that the quality of the legal system affects the efficiency of the economy and found that the 
legal system affects firm size by reducing the idiosyncratic risk faced by firm owners. They 
therefore concluded that better legal systems reduce investment risk which in turn allows for 
increased efficiency in the allocation of capital. A related study by Du, Lu and Tao (2010) 
investigated the relationship between the quality of contracting institutions and vertical 
integration across various cities in China. They found that poorer contracting institutions 
cause firms to be more vertically integrated. They concluded that given that the quality of 
contracting institutions is imperfect even in some developed countries, and a major concern in 
many developing countries, the investigation of the quality of contracting institutions on 
exchange performance is highly needed.  In addition, Ma, Qu and Zhang (2010) used data 
from 28 developing countries to investigate how judicial quality affects firm exports through 
relationship specific investments. They found that sound contract enforcement and a good 
quality legal system significantly encourage export performance of firms that have to invest in 
relationship specific investments. These studies‟ findings are in line with the World Bank 
(2010) assertion that strong legal systems protect exchange relationships better than weak 
legal systems.   
 
In summary, the above review shows that the legal system plays an important role in 
protecting exchange relationships. The World Bank (2004) is supportive of this view and 
empirical studies (Arrighetti et al., 1997; Lerner & Schoar, 2005) show that indeed the legal 
system does provide protection to exchange relationships. This reduces transaction threats 
posed by bounded rationality and opportunism. Thus, the legal system compliments the two 
contract based theories (TCE and agency theory) reviewed in this research through facilitating 
the enforcement of contracts. It also compliments the relational forms of protecting exchange 
relationships in that relational contracting involving higher frequency of contracting as well as 
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asset specificity may also be associated with the use of legal enforceability as a form of added 
transaction safeguards (Arrighetti et al., 1997). 
 
This notwithstanding, the TCE implicitly casts doubts on the ability of the legal environment 
to safeguard the exchange relationships. The theory assumes that an outside authority like the 
courts would not be in a position to adequately figure out the real meaning of what is 
contained in a contract, thus leading to difficulties in enforcing it (Williamson, 1985). While 
there may be some truth in this, TCE fails to take into account differences in inter-country 
legal jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions have greater capacity to enforce complex contracts than 
others. The risk of opportunism is likely to be higher in a country with a weak legal system 
than a country with a strong legal system. Agency theory on the other hand fully embraces the 
legal environment as it relies on a well customised contract to protect the principal from the 
agent‟s opportunistic behaviour.  However, like TCE, it does not account for the strength or 
otherwise of the legal environment. This research will therefore incorporate the legal system 
into the multi-paradigm exchange framework to be developed. The framework will further 
acknowledge the fact that a strong legal system protects exchange relationships better than a 
weak legal system. The difference between the effectiveness in contract enforcement in the 
wine producing countries studied in this research has therefore influenced the adoption of a 
comparative approach where a country with a weak legal system (South Africa) and one with 
a strong legal system (New Zealand) have been studied.  
2.4 The Wine Industry Value Chain 
Although TCE framework has been widely applied in empirical work, surprisingly, only a 
few studies (Fernández-Olmos, Rosell-Martínez, & Espitia-Escuer, 2009; Fernandez - Olmos, 
2008 ; Zylbersztajn & Miele, 2001) have applied the framework within the wine industry. The 
wine industry is therefore one of the few industries which provide opportunities for further 
empirical assessment of TCE framework. It is against this background that the current 
research uses the TCE framework as the basis for studying the exchange relationships 
between the growers and wineries in South Africa and New Zealand wine industries. As 
indicated earlier in the study, the choice of the two countries was primarily based on the fact 
that they are both wine producers and New Zealand has a more efficient legal system than 
South Africa. This section will therefore review the South African and New Zealand wine 
industries in terms of industry characteristics and structure. The review will follow the 
individual countries‟ industry data reporting styles. For example, in South Africa, grape 
growers are categorised by tons of grapes produced and wineries are categorised by tons 
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grapes crushed and are also categorised into private wine cellars, producer cellars and 
producing wholesalers. The distinctions between these will be elaborated further in this 
review. In New Zealand, there are no distinct categories of grape growers. However, wineries 
are categorised by annual sales of wine in litres. The section will then provide a generic value 
chain of the wine industry but with emphasis on the grower-winery relationship, before 
discussing the sources of transaction costs within the wine industry. This will be followed by 
a brief discussion of how agency problems arise and are addressed within the wine industry as 
well as how relational norms and the efficacy of the courts help address opportunism.  
2.4.1 The Structure of the South African Wine Industry 
According to South African Wine Industry Information and Systems (SAWIS) annual report 
of 2009, all grape growers and wineries in South Africa are SAWIS members. SAWIS is an 
organisation under the control of the South African wine industry and its main functions are 
to collect, process, disseminate industry information and represent the general welfare of its 
members. This suggests a close relationship between grape growers and wineries because they 
belong to one umbrella organisation. There are 3,839 primary wine producers (grape growers) 
in South Africa. The majority of these (2,967) or 4.02 percent produce 500 tons of grapes or 
less per annum, while only 7 (0.18 percent) produce over 5,000 – 10,000 tons. Table 2.2 
below summarises the distribution of the South African grape growers by production 
category. 
Table 2-2: South African grape producers per production Category (2009) 
Tons Number of producers % 
1 - 100 1,544 40.2 
>100 – 500 1,423 37.4 
>500 - 1000 498 13.0 
>1000 - 5000 367 9.6 
>5000 - 10000 7 0.18 
Total 3,839 100.0 
Source: SAWIS, 2009 
 
These grape producers are made up of: (a) growers that part of a cooperative or a 
shareholding company, (b) independent grape growers that do not have wine making facilities 
and do not hold any shares in wineries, and (c) vineyards that are wholly owned by wineries 
in vertically integrated firms. In addition, there are 585 cellars (wine producers). Of these, 58 
are producer cellars or wineries that are owned by grower shareholders. They get their grapes 
mainly from their own shareholder growers. The other category is the private wine cellars and 
they total 504. These are mainly fully independent firms, vertically integrated from vineyard 
to export (Ponte, 2009). However, they may also source grapes from cooperative grower 
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shareholders and also the spot market. The last category of wine producers in South Africa is 
the producing wholesalers. These produce limited varieties of high quality wines through their 
own grapes but mainly deal in wines made by both producer cellars and private cellars. They 
essentially perform two functions in the chain, that of wine production and marketing. 
Published statistics do not show any data on import or export of grapes, suggesting that most 
if not all grape requirements are met through locally produced grapes.  
 
Table 2-3: The number of South African Wineries (2009) 
Winery Size in 
Tons of Grapes 
Crushed (2008) 
Total % Private 
Wine 
Cellars 
% Producer 
Cellars 
% Producing 
Wholesalers 
% 
1 - 100 267 45.6 260 51.6 - - 7 30.4 
>100 - 500 150 25.6 144 28.6 - - 6 26.1 
>500 - 1000 50 8.5 47 9.3 1 1.7 2 8.6 
>1000 - 5000 63 10.7 50 9.9 10 17.2 3 13.0 
>5000 - 10000 15 2.6 3 0.6 10 17.2 2 8.6 
>10000 40 6.8 - - 37 63.8 3 13.0 
Total 585 100.0 504 100.0 58 100.0 23 100.0 
  SAWIS, 2009 
2.4.2 The structure of the New Zealand Wine Industry 
Growers and wineries in New Zealand are members of the New Zealand Winegrowers 
Association, an organisation whose main objective is to advocate for the welfare and interests 
of wine industry members. This means that industry members are close and guided by 
common goals, such as maintenance of quality standards set by the umbrella body. There are 
1128 grape growers in New Zealand who supply the industry with grapes. As with South 
Africa, published statistics do not show any data on import or export of grapes, and this is 
taken to mean that most if not all the grape requirements are met through locally produced 
grapes. Further, although MAF Biodiversity New Zealand (2009) does not provide any 
statistics on imported grapes in New Zealand, it states that grapes can currently only be 
imported into New Zealand from countries covered by the import health standard, which are, 
USA, Italy, Australia, Mexico and Chile. This suggests that while wineries may not be 
sourcing grapes from the international market, they have an option of doing so if the need 
arise. There are 643 wineries in New Zealand, and they are classified into three categories of 
annual sales of wine. Category one captures wineries that sold less than 200,000 litres of wine 
in the last harvest year, while categories two and three capture wineries that sold between 
200,000 and 400,000 litres and those who sold in excess of 400,000 litres respectively. Table 
2.4 below presents the structure of the New Zealand wine industry. 
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Table 2-4: New Zealand growers and wineries (2009) 
Growers and Wineries Number of 
producers 
 
% 
Grape growers 1128 100.0 
Wineries - Category one (annual sales not 
exceeding 200,000 litres) 
577 51.1 
Wineries - Category two (annual sales 
between 200,000 and 400,000 litres) 
60 5.3 
Wineries - Category three (annual sales 
exceeding 4,000,000 litres) 
6 0.5 
Source: NZWINE, 2009  
 
There are no indications of special relationships between certain groups of grape growers and 
wineries in New Zealand as is the case in South Africa where, for example, some wineries 
source grapes mainly from the shareholder growers. However, the literature provides some 
preliminary insights into the New Zealand wineries‟ grape sourcing strategies. For example, 
Wilson and Goddard (2004) observe that major players within the New Zealand wine industry 
create value by making significant investments into the strategy of vertical integration. For 
example, Montana and Nobilo are said to have made direct asset purchases and Villa Maria 
Estate to have used publicly owned investment vehicles to gain control of vineyards. This 
observation is supported by Gwynne (2006) who argues that Montana sources grapes from its 
vineyards located in growing areas such as Hawkes Bay, Gisborne, North Canterbury and 
Marlborough. Further, NZWINE (2010) describes the structure of the New Zealand Wine 
Industry as vertically integrated with functional specifications such as specialist processors 
and vineyard contractors. This suggests some degree of integration of grape supply and 
contracting within the New Zealand wine industry. 
2.4.3 The Wine Value Chain 
The value chain encompasses all the activities associated with the flow and transformation of 
goods from the raw materials stage through to the end user, as well as the associated 
information flow (Atkin & Affonso, 2004). It represents a coherent link between input supply, 
production, trade and consumption (Ponte, 2007). The value chain can therefore be said to be 
a series of linked activities that link suppliers and customers. The wine industry literature on 
South Africa (Ponte, 2007) and New Zealand (Wilson & Goddard, 2004) as well as Atkin and 
Affonso‟s (2004) generalised supply chain, present differing but close versions of the wine 
value chains. The slight differences may be due to the focus of the individual authors. Yet the 
different versions have one common thread, the “grape-grower relationship”, and this 
relationship is central to this research. Based on this literature, below is the current author‟s 
attempt to present a simple generic wine industry value chain, with of course, particular 
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emphasis on the “grape-winery” link of the value chain. Detailed value chains for the South 
African and New Zealand wine industries are presented in Ponte (2007) and Wilson and 
Goddard (2004) respectively.  
 
Figure 2-1: A simplified wine industry value chain 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
Adapted from: Ponte (2009), Wilson and Goddard (2004). 
 
The chain indicates that some input supplies (e.g. water and fertilisers) are used in the grape 
production process. The resultant grapes are then supplied to the wineries and together with 
other input supplies (e.g. fermenting tanks) are then used by wineries to produce wine, which 
is then taken to both domestic and international markets through the distribution channels.  
However, as highlighted above, this research is primarily concerned with the critical grower-
winery relationship which captures the part of the chain that produces significant value that 
ensures the supply of grapes to the wineries.  This part is identified as the “grower-winery 
relationship in figure 2-1 above and its component parts are shaded. 
2.4.4 The Grape Grower-Winery Value Chain 
Grape supply within the wine industry mainly takes any or all of the following three forms 
Wineries source their grapes through (a) own vineyards; (b) contractual arrangements with 
grape growers or (c) compete in the open market for the grapes produced by independent 
growers (Scales et al., 1995; Somogyi et al., 2010). The grape sourcing process involves 
transaction costs that wineries must minimise (Hobbs & Young, 2000). The process of how 
these transactions costs arise may be best captured through the review of TCE within the 
context of the wine industry. 
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2.4.5 The Wine Industry and the TCE theory 
As indicated in the review of TCE, transaction costs emanate from the transaction properties 
of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency.  However, as with the main review of TCE, it 
is important to first discuss TCE behavioural assumptions of opportunism or self interested 
behaviour and bounded rationality in the context of the wine industry before discussing how 
the transaction properties lead to increases in transaction costs within the wine industry 
because these assumptions contribute to how all the three transaction properties increase 
transaction costs of sourcing grapes.   
 
Opportunism arises due to agents‟ self interest (Williamson, 1985) and it is also a potential 
problem for the wine industry. Hayward and Lewis (2008) acknowledge the importance of 
production practices in influencing the quality of the grapes. They point out that vineyard 
management decisions (site selection, vine spacing, monitoring fruit development, selecting 
varieties, removing bunches, thinning and other practices) are important for the production of 
good quality grapes, and by extension, good quality wines.  For an example, Smith and 
Whigham (1999) argues that it is widely recognised within the wine industry that the less 
grapes harvested per hectare, the better the quality of the grapes. An opportunistic grower 
may decide to produce larger volumes of grapes per hectare at the expense of quality, and sell 
the grapes at the price of good quality grapes. Since good wine requires good grapes, this will 
compromise not only the quality of the wine, but also the integrity and ultimate market 
position of the wine maker. The wine producer will have fallen victim to the grape producer‟s 
opportunistic behaviour.  
 
Bounded rationality may come in different forms within the wine industry. As the above 
discussion shows, the grower‟s behaviour may significantly influence the ultimate quality of 
the wine. This brings in some risk that needs to be taken into account in the design of the 
contractual relationships between grape producers and wine makers. However, due to 
bounded rationality, Williamson (2008) states that it is impossible to anticipate all possible 
grower behaviours that may compromise the quality of wine and lock them into the contract 
ex ante.  Asset specificity is common within the wine industry. Wine production requires 
huge capital expenditures including an insulated hot room for control of secondary ferments 
(e.g. New Zealand Wine Company), bottling hall with bottling line, warehouse, crushers, 
fermenting and storage tanks and cooling plant (New Zealand Wine Company, 2007). This 
represents Williamson‟s (1985) physical asset specificity. Wine making also requires 
specialist skills such as grape processing, control of the fermentation process and bottling 
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(Bigsby, Trought, Lambe, & Bicknell, 1998). This represents Williamson‟s (1985) human 
asset specificity. Further, when studying the determinants of make or buy decisions by 
wineries in the Rioja region, Fernandez-Olmos, Rossel-Martinez and Espitia-Escuer, (2009) 
used distance between the vineyard and the winery to represent Williamson‟s (1985) site asset 
specificity. Uncertainty within the grower-winery relationship may arise due to many factors 
including climatic conditions such as rain and other risk factors such as virus contamination, 
the possibility of growers‟ default to deliver quality grapes at agreed prices and time and 
inappropriate vineyard practices (Hayward & Lewis, 2008). These may have adverse impact 
on the quantity and quality of vintages (Zylbersztajn & Miele, 2001). Frequency of the 
transaction is also considered important within the TCE framework. Frequency refers to the 
regularity of the transaction (Williamson, 1985). The nature of the wine industry makes it 
irrelevant to measure the effects of the frequency, as the regularity of transactions is not 
influenced by the deliberate firm decisions irrespective of the governance choice, but by the 
yearly cycle of grape production. That is, because “the vineyard is governed by nature, its 
schedule is also adjusted to the seasons” (Thomas, Greenspan, Thach, & Matz, 2004, p. 34). 
Thus, the transactions follow the season, and thus occur with similar frequency for all the 
wineries regardless of the choice of the governance structure.  
 
The above discussion shows that in line with TCE, transaction costs within the grower-winery 
relationship may increase due to the transaction properties of asset specificity and uncertainty. 
This research is of the view that these transaction costs can be reduced by incorporating the 
exchange protection properties of agency and relational theories as well as the efficacy of the 
legal system. The next three sub-sections discuss how these exchange protection properties 
help reduce transaction costs within the grower-winery relationship.   
2.4.6 The Wine Industry and Agency Theory 
In a world of perfect information, wineries would know the capabilities and practices of 
growers, and this would help design contracts that reward growers according to their 
capabilities and effort. However, wineries operate with limited information because some of 
the growers‟ actions are difficult to observe, and part the growers‟ performance is influenced 
by random factors that are beyond the control of growers (Bergen et al., 1992). This may 
make wineries vulnerable to the growers‟ opportunism as growers may shirk and shift the 
blame for poor performance to random events. Because the wineries have no way of verifying 
whether or not the any random event occurred, the wineries may still have to pay the grower 
despite the poor performance.  Hueth et al., (1999) have suggested four ways that may help 
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the winery prevent the grower from acting opportunistically. First, the winery may wish to 
monitor the growers‟ activities by having periodic visits to the grower. The field visit is not 
normally only for policing purposes, but also for sharing vital information on the market, 
other growers, to discuss expected yields and harvest times as well as to maintain a presence 
on the vineyard in order to ensure that the contract is extended into the next year. Second, the 
winery may place some controls on which inputs should be used such as the grape variety and 
choice of irrigation system and any other technologies used. Third, the winery may put in 
place quality measurements criteria. These include investing in highly sophisticated quality 
monitoring systems, such as procedures for sampling and testing grower(s)‟ produce, and 
putting in place bonuses and penalties that influence the grower‟s behaviour. Fourth, the 
winery may pay the grower on the basis of the down-stream price (e.g. by a supermarket) to 
the winery, thus making growers residual claimants for their actions.  
2.4.7 The Wine Industry and Relational Exchange Theory 
Relational exchange theory is concerned with strategic alliances of firms in which knowledge 
transfer between members of the network is encouraged for the benefit of all members 
(Gwynne, 2008; Visser & Langen, 2006). It emphasises achieving good working relationship 
through trust and commitment. Within the wine industry, the move towards this cooperative 
governance/strategic alliances has largely been due to international competitive pressures 
(Sutton-Brady, 2008; Tipples, 2010), where firms have to start and maintain overseas 
relationships as a way of securing international markets. It is against this background that Batt 
and Wilson (2000) observed that due to international and domestic market pressures, 
Australian wineries are developing and maintaining close and cooperative relationships with 
their grape growers. This is expected to help them become more efficient and cost effective. 
This view is supported by Somogyi et al., (2010) who studied the long-term grower/winery 
relationships in the Australian wine industry and concluded that relationally engaging grape 
growers not only creates benefits for growers and wineries, but also the industry as whole. 
This suggests that exchange performance between growers and wineries can be improved 
through relational exchange governance of transactions. 
2.4.8 The Wine Industry and the Efficacy of the Legal System 
The legal system facilitates transaction performance between trading partners through the 
enforcement of contracts (Kahkonen & Meagher, 1997). It has been observed that one of the 
governance mechanisms used by wineries to source grapes is through contracts (Scales et al., 
1995; Somogyi et al., 2010). Since contracts represent legal commitments that grape growers 
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and wineries agree to honour (Mellewigt et al., 2007), it is expected that the legal system 
would help ensure contract enforcement between grape growers and wineries. This would 
help ensure that growers do not act opportunistically. However, in line with the argument 
raised during the review of the legal system, the stronger New Zealand legal system would be 
expected to offer better protection to grape-grower relationships than the weaker South 
African legal system. 
2.4.9 Empirical Studies on Grape Coordination Strategies 
Empirical literature focusing on the “grower-winery” part of the wine industry value chain is 
very thin. This is particularly so for South Africa and New Zealand, hence this empirical 
review is not necessarily specific to these two countries. What is apparent from the review, 
however, is that there are transaction costs within the wine industry and different exchange 
protection frameworks are occasionally used to reduce these costs or to protect exchange 
relationships against opportunism. For example, Meissenheimer, Karaan and Vink (2001) 
studied the sources of transaction costs within the South African wine industry. They noted 
that some grape growers belonging to cooperatives deliberately produced low quality grapes 
by engaging in mass grape production because all members of the cooperative were paid the 
same price regardless of the quality of the grapes. This confirmed the existence of 
opportunistic behaviour within the wine industry. 
 
Fernandez-Olmos, et al., (2009) studied the determinants of governance choice within the 
wine industry in the Rioja region of Spain. The determinants of governance choice that they 
focused on were the TCE variables of physical and dedicated asset specificity as well as 
behavioural and environmental uncertainty. They found that both physical and dedicated asset 
specificity led to vertical integration as a way of protecting assets from opportunism. They 
also found that the efficacy of market governance decreases as behavioural uncertainty 
increases. Lastly, they found that environmental uncertainty has a positive effect on vertical 
integration when specificity is involved. They concluded that their results provide strong 
support for the argument that transaction cost considerations influence integration decisions. 
However, this study only captured the TCE exchange protection mechanism and did not 
consider other exchange frameworks such norms and incentives‟ as well as the efficacy of the 
legal system in reducing transaction costs or controlling opportunism.  
 
Other studies (Sutton-Brady, 2008; Zylbersztajn & Miele, 2001) have either avoided or 
helped address the limitations of the previous study by considering the value of relational 
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exchange theory in controlling opportunism. Zylbersztajn & Miele (2001) studied the stability 
of contracts in Brazil. They used the average number of transactions between the grower and 
the winery as the dependent variable. Independent variables were measures of asset specificity 
including age of the vineyard which was meant to capture product quality and the distance 
between the grower and the winery, which was used to capture site specificity. The other 
independent variable was whether or not the winery and grape grower were members of a 
cooperative (captured as a dummy variable), which represents a relational norm based 
relationship. The results showed that short distances were more likely to result in stable 
contracts than long distances, which confirms the TCE propositions. The relational aspects, 
captured through the dummy variable were also positive and significant, suggesting that 
transacting parties that belonged to a cooperative were more likely to have stable contractual 
relationships. Further, Sutton-Brandy (2008) interviewed 15 Australian wineries with the key 
objective of studying the stability and change in business networks in Australia (40% of 
which had been trading with each other for 5 years or more). None of the wineries had a 
written contract with their suppliers, yet they have managed the relationship for a long period. 
The wineries emphasised that the reason for the longevity of their relationship was the 
importance of maintaining good relationship with their suppliers.  That is, they were all 
deriving benefits, which is in line with the relational exchange theory. 
 
While these studies considered both the relational and TCE antecedents in the exchange 
protection framework, other studies (Fernandez - Olmos, Martinez - Rossell, & Espitia - 
Escuer, 2008; Fraser, 2005; Goodhue et al., 2003) considered the importance of agency theory 
monitoring and incentive mechanisms in the design and maintenance of governance 
relationships. Goodhue et al., (2003) analysed the relationship between product quality and 
contracting choices using data from the California wine growers. They found that written 
contracts for high quality grapes were more likely to include provisions aimed at monitoring 
the production process, while written contracts for low quality grapes were more likely to 
include explicit financial incentives for sugar content and other attributes. A related study by 
Fraser (2005) examined the grape supply contracts in Australia. It found that among others, 
wineries in regions that produce low quality grapes place greater reliance on grape quality 
assessment to determine bonus and penalty payments compared to wineries in higher quality 
regions. They also found that contracts used by wineries in higher quality regions put greater 
emphasis on winery involvement in vineyard management. These studies‟ findings therefore 
suggested that financial incentives were more likely to be used as a mechanism for controlling 
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opportunism by low quality wineries while the use of monitoring is associated with high 
quality wineries. 
 
What emerges from the empirical review of the grower-winery relationship is that wineries 
generally use more than one exchange protection framework to manage exchange 
relationships. In particular, agency and relational considerations were found to be used to 
manage transactions. However, none of the studies employed more than two paradigms at any 
one time in the analysis of the relationships. Second, none of the studies considered the 
efficacy of the legal system in protecting exchange relationships. This reinforces the current 
research‟s resolve for developing a multi-paradigm exchange protection framework that better 
protects transactions than any paradigm in isolation. The lack of studies that have considered 
the contract enforcement mechanism of the legal system further encouraged this research to 
incorporate the legal system as well. 
 
In summary, wineries may source their grapes through own production, contractual 
arrangements with other wineries and through the spot market (Somogyi et al., 2010). 
However, in line with TCE, due to asset specificity and uncertainty, this involves transaction 
costs. Preliminary indications are that wineries reduce transaction costs by using different and 
overlapping exchange protection frameworks such as monitoring and providing incentives to 
growers and building long term relationships between growers and wineries. This suggests 
that a multi-paradigm approach to protecting grower-winery exchange relationships is needed.   
2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on three theoretical frameworks concerned with the 
protection of exchange relationships. It has further reviewed the literature on the role of the 
legal system in protecting transactions. The review was undertaken on the backdrop of a 
realisation that the theories and the legal system have a common goal protecting exchange 
relationships, albeit through different means. Key to the review was to indentify how the 
different theories and the legal system protect exchange relationships, identify the limitations 
of the theories in protecting exchange relationships and decipher any complementarities  
between the theories and develop a theoretical framework that takes into account these 
complementarities in the next chapter.  
 
The review revealed that TCE protects transactions through incomplete contracting. However, 
the theory was found to have limitations that may expose transactions to opportunism. First, 
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given that agents are assumed to be opportunistic and contracts are incomplete, the theory 
fails to offer meaningful contractual protection to transactions. Transactions are forever 
exposed to hold-up. Second, since the theory fails to provide adequate contractual protection 
and also argues that vertical control is the preferred governance mode when contracts expose 
transactions to hazards, it fails to explain the observed continued use of contracts despite their 
potential hazards. This research suggests that other complementary exchange frameworks 
help ensure that opportunistic agents do not always take advantage of their vulnerable trading 
partners. The review has also revealed that agency theory protects exchange relationships 
through designing a contract in such a way that the agents‟ interests or goals are aligned with 
those of the principals. The contract has in-built monitoring and incentive mechanisms that 
help align the agents‟ goals with the principals. This reduces the incentive for the agents to act 
opportunistically and thus helps draw the TCE contract towards completion. That is, the TCE 
incomplete contract is complemented by agency theory monitoring and incentive contract. 
 
On the relational exchange theory, the review has shown that it shuns formal contracting as a 
means of protecting exchange relationships. Instead, the theory advocates for norm based 
protection measures. Norms provide added safeguard measure to transactions, and this 
complements the exchange mechanisms proposed by both TCE and agency theory. Therefore, 
as with agency theory, this draws the TCE contract further towards completion. The review 
has also shown that the legal system offers protection to transactions by threatening to punish 
for opportunistic behaviour, and hence reduces threats posed by contract incompleteness and 
opportunism. It therefore also compliments the TCE framework in protecting exchange 
relationships and, like agency theory and relational exchange theory, further helps drive the 
TCE contract towards completion. 
 
Hence, the exchange protection mechanisms provided by agency theory (monitoring and 
incentives), relational exchange theory (norms), and the legal system seem to all push the 
TCE incomplete contract towards completion. This research therefore argues that the 
continued use of contracts despite their vulnerability to hold-up is because contracts are 
complimented by support mechanisms from the agency and relational frameworks as well as 
the legal system. This line of thought informs the development of the theoretical framework 
for this research in the next chapter. Further, the review of the wine industry has shown that 
wineries generally use more than one exchange protection framework to manage exchange 
relationships, an indication that the exchange mechanisms may be complementing each other 
in protecting exchange relationships within the wine industry. However, to date, no study has 
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incorporated the legal system in its exchange protection framework, and this encouraged the 
current research to incorporate the legal system in its analysis. 
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     Chapter 3 
Theoretical Research Framework and Hypothesis 
Development 
3.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter has reviewed the literature on TCE, agency and relational exchange 
contracting frameworks, as well as the contract enforcement mechanism of the legal system. 
These frameworks have a common goal of protecting exchange relationships against 
opportunism. This chapter draws from the findings of the literature review and develops a 
theoretical framework for this research.  
3.2  Development of the Theoretical Framework 
The literature review showed that even though TCE incomplete contracting framework 
exposes transactions to opportunism, contracts are still widely used (D'Silva et al., 2009; 
Dawes et al., 2009). Vertical integration is not always a natural response to the exchange 
hazards posed by bounded rationality and opportunism (Carter & Hodgson, 2006). This 
chapter develops a multi-paradigm exchange protection framework that is expected to reduce 
exchange hazards that arise due to TCE incomplete contracting framework. The framework is 
also expected to help explain the continued use of contracts despite their vulnerability to hold 
up. This framework will attempt to capture the interplay and complementarities of the 
exchange protection properties of TCE, agency theory, relational exchange theory and the 
legal system.  
 
The integrated exchange framework concurs with TCE that transactions are carried out within 
the market when specific assets are not involved and that contracts are used once specificity 
increases. However, unlike TCE that argues that increased asset specificity would drive 
transactions into the firm, this framework argues that this is not necessarily the case. Contract 
use is still prevalent (Fraser, 2005) despite the limitations associated with contract 
incompleteness. The theoretical framework developed for this research therefore argues that 
contracts are more complete than TCE envisages. As such, firms are confident that contracts 
provide better exchange protection than TCE would have us believe because the TCE 
incomplete contract is driven towards completion by the exchange protection 
complementarities provided by monitoring and incentives, relational norms and the threat of 
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legal intervention in the case of contractual violations. The framework further makes a 
distinction between a strong and a weak legal system. In line with the World Bank (2010), it 
argues that a strong legal system should better protect exchange relationships than a weak one 
(World Bank, 2010). The interplay of all these theoretical underpinnings, together with the 
legal system not only provides an improved contractual framework but also a better 
understanding of why firms use incomplete contracts despite their apparent vulnerability. 
Below is the development of the multi-paradigm exchange framework. The development 
process starts with the TCE as the base case scenario and then integrates the other two 
theories as well as the legal system. The process will culminate in an improved contract than 
the TCE incomplete contract. 
3.2.1 The Base Case Scenario  
TCEs prediction of governing transaction through the spot market in the absence of specific 
assets and resorting to the contractual governance mode once specific assets are involved is 
the starting point. Since TCE assumes bounded rationality and opportunism, contractual 
hazards are inevitable. Contracts are incomplete. Hence the base case scenario exposes 
exchange relationships to opportunism. This research argues that the security of transactions 
can be improved by adding other exchange safeguards to the base case scenario, hence the 
integration of agency theory, relational exchange theory and the legal system‟s contract 
enforcement mechanism to the base case or TCE incomplete contracting framework. The base 
case contract therefore takes the form: 
“Contract = Specified duties and obligations (TCE incomplete contract)”. 
3.2.2  Integration of Agency Theory  
Integrating monitoring and incentive mechanisms into the base case scenario is expected to 
result in an improved contracting framework since incentives and monitoring help reduce 
principal-agent goal misalignment (Tan & Mahoney, 2006) and therefore reduce exposure of 
transactions to opportunism. This is so because goal alignment helps reduce the need for ex 
post re-negotiations, and thus reduces exchange hazards associated with incomplete contracts. 
The resultant contract has both the coordination properties of the TCE incomplete contract 
and the Agency theory exchange protection mechanisms of monitoring and incentives. It 
therefore offers better protection to transactions than the original base case or TCE incomplete 
contract. The resulting contract takes the form:  
 
“Contract = Specified duties and obligations (TCE incomplete contract) complemented by 
monitoring and incentives (agency theory contract)”.  
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However, the integration of the agency contract comes with the monitoring and incentive 
costs, which are exacerbated by environmental uncertainty as under high levels of 
environmental uncertainty, the client has to pay substantial amounts to entice the contractor to 
accept the environmental risk. If left unresolved, these costs would reverse the gains of 
monitoring and incentives, and restore the TCE incomplete contract, which would require 
organisation within the firm, i.e. vertical control. However, this research does not expect these 
costs to lead to vertical integration because, as argued below, the integration of the relational 
exchange theory helps mitigate them, and therefore further increase the stability of contracts.  
3.2.3 Integration of Relational Exchange Theory  
The relational exchange theory aligns the interests of the agent with those of the principal by 
governing exchange relationships through adherence to relational norms. With this 
governance mode, normative behaviours such as good will, sharing of information and the 
expectations for future mutual benefits are all expected to help ensure that the risk of 
opportunism is minimised. This helps reduce the need for monitoring, and thus reduce 
monitoring costs that arise due to environmental risk. Further, the expectation for future 
mutual benefits and cooperation may help keep the bonus payments down as high bonus 
payments may compromise the continuation of the relationship between the actors. Thus, 
relational exchange theory not only complements the TCE duties and obligations based 
contract, but also helps address agency theory weaknesses by minimising monitoring and 
bonus payment costs. The result is a further improved exchange protection framework that is 
supported by TCE duties and obligations, agency theory monitoring and incentives and 
relational exchange theory norms. The contract takes the form:  
 
“Contract = Specified duties and obligations (TCE incomplete contract) complemented by 
monitoring and incentives (agency theory contract) as well as relational norms (relational   
exchange contract)”. 
 
This contracting framework is further improved by integrating the role of the courts or legal 
system in protecting exchange relationships. 
3.2.4 Integration of the Legal System 
The legal system protects exchange relationships by ensuring that contracts are enforced 
(Kahkonen & Meagher, 1997). This may discourage opportunism because dishonest actors 
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may fear facing the consequences of their actions. This complements incomplete contracting 
because court enforcement provides guarantees that the state may enforce the agreement in 
the event of one party reneging on the agreement (Bridgeman, 2009). However, the strength 
of the legal system varies between countries, with many developing and transitional 
economies having weaker legal systems than developed countries (World Bank, 2008). Even 
when the legal system is weak, firms still sign contracts (Beave & Saussier, 2010) but then 
supplement contractual exchange protection with alternative or non-state forms of enforcing 
business agreements (Vinogradova, 2006). For example, Li, Xie and Peng (2010) studied the 
formal and social control mechanisms in domestic and international buyer-supplier relations 
in China and found that social and formal control mechanisms are complements in 
international relationships. Norms that firms may use include restricting access to the trading 
network to only those members who have continuously shown commitment to quality through 
previous transactions (Podolny, 1994). Also collective (peer) sanctions can occur where a 
group of traders may impose group sanctions on a member or members who violate group 
norms and values (Borgatti et al., 1997). This shows that norms may play an important role in 
providing added exchange protection in situations where the legal system is weak. Thus 
integrating the legal system not only helps improve contractual safeguards, but it is also 
complemented by norms in cases where the legal system is weak or inefficient. The result is a 
further improved contracting framework that takes the form:  
 
“Contract = Specified duties and obligations (TCE incomplete contract) complemented by 
monitoring and incentives (agency theory contract), relational norms (relational   exchange 
theory contract) as well as court enforcement mechanisms.  
 
The above contract framework is therefore the one that is developed and adopted for this 
research. It appreciates the exchange protection qualities of TCE incomplete contract, agency 
theory monitoring and incentives, relational exchange theory‟s norms and commitments as 
well as the threat of enforcement provided by the legal system. The support offered to the 
TCE contract by all these exchange frameworks help ensure the stability of contracts and thus 
reduces the need to internalise transactions even when transactions are exposed to hazards 
associated with incomplete contracting.  
 
It is important to point out that removing any of the additional mechanisms proposed in this 
multi-paradigm exchange protection framework would result in the weakening of the 
framework and removing all would collapse it back to the base case scenario or the TCE 
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incomplete contract. The integrated exchange framework discussed above is presented in the 
table below. 
  
Table 3-1: The multi-paradigm theoretical framework 
 Transaction Cost 
Theory 
Agency Theory Relational   
exchange theory 
Legal System Multi-paradigm 
Theoretical Framework 
Objective: Reduce actors‟ 
opportunism.  
Reduce agent‟s 
opportunism.  
Reduce actor‟s 
opportunism  
Enforce 
agreements 
Offers a multi-variable 
protection of exchange 
relationships  
Modalities of 
achieving the 
objective 
Complex 
contracting to try 
to capture as 
many 
contingencies as 
possible. 
Goal alignment 
(incentives and 
monitoring) to 
ensure similar 
goals 
Building of norm 
based 
relationships to 
reduce the 
incentive for 
cheating. 
Enforcing 
contract 
violation 
remedies, even 
if it means force 
(fiat). 
Integrated approach 
encompassing, complex 
contracting, goal 
alignment, trust and court 
contract enforcement to 
provide a holistic 
approach to exchange 
protection.  
Behavioural 
assumptions 
Actors are self 
centred and are 
always ready to 
cheat and deceive 
in their quest to 
meet their self 
interest. 
Principals and 
agents are self 
interested and 
thus have 
conflicting goals. 
Agents are risk 
averse and 
principals are risk 
neutral. 
Trading partners 
are cooperative 
and have common 
goals. E.g. both 
want to engage in 
future 
transactions. 
Actors are self 
interested, 
hence the need 
for a third party 
mediation to 
control their 
opportunistic 
tendencies. 
Trading partners may be 
both self-centred and 
common goal oriented. 
Thus, no single approach 
is enough to address 
opportunism, hence the 
need for an integrated 
approach. 
Theoretical 
focus 
The transaction The contract The relationship Contract 
enforcement 
Exchange environment. 
That is, the transaction, 
contract and relationship.  
Nature of 
relationships 
Arms length for 
non asset specific 
transactions. 
Otherwise 
adversarial 
relationships 
requiring strategic 
interventions such 
as complex 
contracting and 
vertical control. 
Adversarial 
relationships 
requiring an 
optimal contract 
that aligns 
principal and 
agent‟s goals.  
Cordial 
relationships 
based both on past 
interactions and 
expected future 
interaction and 
mutual benefit. 
Adversarial 
relationships, 
hence the need 
for third party 
enforcement. 
Relationships can either 
be cordial, adversarial or 
have elements of both, 
requiring an integrated 
approach (strategic, goal 
alignment, mutual norms 
based and third party 
enforcement) to address 
opportunism. 
Time 
Dimension 
Short term for non 
asset specific 
transactions and 
long term for 
asset specific 
transactions. 
Ex ante – with all 
incentives and 
monitoring tools 
agreed before 
signing the 
contract. No ex 
post re-
negotiations. 
Long term – with 
relationships built 
over time and 
expectations for 
continuation of 
the relationship.  
Instantaneous. 
I.e. when the 
principal calls 
for contract 
enforcement. 
This assumes an 
efficient legal 
system 
Short and long term. The 
integrated approach 
ensures that appropriate 
tools are used as and 
when the need arises. 
That is, it moderates both 
ex ant and ex post time 
dimensions.  
 
The model for the above theoretical framework is represented below.  
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Figure 3-1: A conceptual model of the multi-paradigm framework 
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Contract
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Legal contract 
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Contract
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+
+
+
+
-
+ -
-
-
Exchange Continnums
 
The above model suggests that in real life, transactions that are free from specificity are 
carried out through the arms-length governance structure (Lambert et al., 1996; Williamson, 
1991). Once transactions involve specific assets, companies use the multi-paradigm contract 
to protect exchange relationships. This contract is more resilient than the TCE incomplete 
contract. That is, companies safeguard exchange relationships through a combination of the 
TCE contract which specifies duties and obligations, agency theory monitoring and incentives 
mechanism, relational theory norms and commitments as well as the efficacy of the legal 
system. Thus, the day to day contract used by firms is a multi-paradigm contract but not a 
typical TCE incomplete contract. As stated above, this contract is more resilient than the TCE 
contract and this may explain why firms use contracts even though in purely TCE context 
they expose exchange relationships to opportunism. Firms also have an option to internalise 
transactions (vertical integration). This governance mode is used when companies believe that 
potential contractors cannot meet the required standards. They do not necessarily integrate to 
control opportunism; they integrate to ensure certain standards are achieved. Thus, vertical 
integration is more a response to concerns about contractors‟ capabilities rather than 
deliberate intentions to mislead or take advantage of the contracting partner(s).  Hence firms 
have the options of using the spot market/arms-length governance mode, multi-paradigm 
contract (which includes the exchange protection qualities of the TCE incomplete contract, 
agency theory, relational exchange theory and the legal system) and vertical integration.  
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This notwithstanding, the framework developed for the current research cannot be said to be 
faultless or complete. While it is expected to provide better exchange protection than the TCE 
contracting framework, it is not free from problems associated with bounded rationality and 
hence this assumption is still valid even with the new framework. That is, it does not cover all 
possible future contingencies. However, the new framework helps reduce the problems that 
arise due to bounded rationality or contract incompleteness by complementing the TCE 
contract with other exchange protection mechanisms. 
3.3 Hypothesis Development  
Based on the above theoretical framework, the following hypotheses were developed. This 
was done by way of summarising the above discussion, gradually showing how the 
complementarities between the four exchange protection frameworks work out into testable 
hypotheses.  
 
The TCE contracting schema argues that opportunism is more likely to arise when specific 
investments are involved. In the absence of specific assets, the spot market is the ideal 
governance choice as governance is accomplished through competitive market prices, and any 
disputes can be handled by court awarded damages (Williamson, 2002). This means that 
courts have a role in facilitating spot market transactions. A bit of clarification is warranted 
here because in truly discrete exchanges, parties would be strangers that just happened to meet 
by chance and would hope never to meet again (Macneil, 1978), which would mean no role 
for any future court enforcement. Macneil (1978) argues that this is only possible under barter 
of goods as the exchange of money between partners represents some form of social structure. 
He further argues that bargaining about quantities and other aspects of the transaction can 
erode its discreteness, which requires that the construct be modified for it to reflect a 
reasonably accurate picture of actual economic life. Finally, he observed that when modified, 
the construct will retain substantial discreteness but no longer have characteristics of an 
entirely discrete transaction. This suggests that discreetness is effectively impractical in real 
life but is useful for theoretical analysis (Webster, 1992), a suggestion that a real life or 
practical market transaction is better represented by a move away from the discrete 
transaction. This would imply possibilities of transacting parties meeting again but without 
any relationship, better captured as arms length relationships in Lambert et al.,’s (1996) 
continuum. This means that the applicable legal recourse is general law (Macneil, 1978), 
which applies to TCE when specific investments are not involved. The point being made here 
is that the legal system has a role to play in enforcing specificity free market transactions, and 
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that these are not as discrete as portrayed by neo-classical theory‟s perfect market, but that 
there is a possibility of repeated transactions.    
 
In many cases however, actors have to invest in specific assets, which may expose 
transactions to holdup. To protect transactions against hold up, TCE prescribes contracting, 
but given the fact that contracts are incomplete and should the contractual safeguards break 
down due to this contract incompleteness, transactions may then be taken from the market 
into the firm (Williamson, 2002). Since actors are assumed to be self-interested, any 
opportunity for deceit will be taken when perceived payoffs are attractive. Such opportunities 
always exist because contracts are incomplete. In the face of incomplete contracts, the 
expectation is almost no contracting, yet contracting is still prevalent (Goodhue et al., 2003). 
This research proposes that this is because other theoretical underpinnings safeguard 
transactions over and above the TCE incomplete contract. For example, incentive alignment 
as proposed by agency theory provides added transaction safeguards. Incentives and the 
monitoring processes align trading partners‟ goals, which reduce opportunism because if the 
two trading partners have similar goals, there seems to be no need for the other party to want 
to expropriate rents from the other party‟s investments on assets. Thus, incorporating the 
agency theory‟s incentive and monitoring framework with TCE incomplete contract pushes 
transactions to the market and away from the internal structures of the firm. This partially 
explains the less than expected vertical integration despite the risk of opportunism. However, 
one of the problems with incentive and monitoring is that environmental uncertainty leads to 
increased monitoring and bonus payment costs, which encourages internal organisation and 
hence less contracting. Relational governance counters this, as for example, in a trust based 
relationship, monitoring costs are kept low because trust reduces the need to check every time 
whether the other party is really doing what they promised to do. This view is supported by 
Lyon (2000, p. 664) who observes that “trust plays a major role in reducing transaction costs, 
especially in situations of long distance trade, through reducing the need for monitoring and 
information”. Relationally induced reduction of monitoring costs therefore encourages 
contracting. Thus, the complementary relationship between formal and relational contracts 
better ensures exchange performance. This helps address Granovetter‟s (1985) criticism of 
agency theory that it is under-socialised as it does not account for prior meeting of trading 
partners, which may reduce and even eliminate goal congruence between the principal and the 
agent. 
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Lastly, this research has argued that the legal system offers protection to exchange 
relationships against opportunism, and this view is supported by the literature (Arrighetti et 
al., 1997; Lerner & Schoar, 2005; Vinogradova, 2006). The research therefore argues that 
despite the threat of opportunism emanating from incomplete contracts, such contracts are still 
in use partly because of the added protection provided by the legal system. The legal system 
has an inbuilt enforcement mechanism in case of contractual violation. However, strong legal 
systems are expected to protect exchange relationships better than weak legal systems.  From 
the above discussion the following hypotheses are drawn: 
 
H1:  Monitoring, incentives, trust, and the legal system encourage contracting. 
H2a: The legal systems encourage spot market transactions. 
H2b:  A strong legal system protects exchange relationships better than a weak legal system. 
H3: Monitoring, incentives and trust discourage spot market transactions.     
 
In the case of vertically integrated companies, the issue of trust does not arise or is not 
applicable because relational exchange theory is concerned with transactions between two 
independent actors. Under relational governance, firms create close ties with their trading 
partner(s) and transactions are projected into the future on a repetitive basis (Macneil, 1978). 
This does not apply to vertically integrated companies as they have internalised transactions. 
Thus;   
 
H4: Monitoring, incentives, and the legal system discourage vertical integration.  
 
Since incentives and monitoring, trust and the legal system complement each other in helping 
protect contractual relationships; it is interesting to assess how these variables interact to 
protect specific assets.  
 
Interactions between agency, relational exchange theory and the legal system  
Incentives and monitoring encourage contracting in that the principal‟s and the agent‟s 
interests are aligned, therefore making it less appealing for the agent to behave 
opportunistically. However, it has been noted that this is costly as it involves the monitoring 
and incentive costs which arise due to environmental uncertainty. This research has 
subsequently argued that the monitoring costs can be partially addressed by trust, in that trust 
reduces the need to check if the other party is really doing what they promised to do. The 
legal system also plays an important role as it also complements monitoring. Furthermore 
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incentives are likely to align the interests of the principal with those of the agent, and hence 
complement monitoring in ensuring goal alignment between agents and principals and thus 
reduce the associated monitoring costs. That is, trust, incentives and the legal system 
complement monitoring and thus reduce monitoring costs. It is therefore hypothesised that: 
 
H5:  Trust, the legal system and incentives complement monitoring. 
 
Under high levels of environmental uncertainty, agents would require higher bonus payments 
to make up for the risk. This becomes expensive for the principal.  However, since trust based 
relationships emphasise the creation of close ties with trading partner(s) and the relationship 
between the two parties is sustained by the value of future transactions and interactions, it is 
fair to argue that trust based relationships are more likely to lead to a reduction in bonus 
payments (incentives) than adversarial relationships. This is because high bonus payments 
may compromise the relationship, something that neither the principal nor the agents wants. 
The agents are expected to assume higher risk in a trusting relationship and thus keep the 
bonus payments lower than a one-off non-trust based relationship. That is, trust complements 
incentives, and thus reduces incentive costs. The legal system is not expected to have any 
significant role in the incentives mechanism because what influences incentives is not the 
behaviour of any of the trading partners but the environmental factors, i.e. circumstances that 
are beyond either the principal or the agent such as market conditions and competitor 
behaviour. It is therefore hypothesised that: 
 
H6: Trust complements incentives.   
 
Control Variables  
The decision to contract, use the spot market or organise transactions internally may be 
influenced by other factors that need to be controlled for. While there are many such factors, 
we limit our control variables to the size and maturity of the principal firm, as well as the 
importance of the procured item to the buying firm (a variable referred to as item criticality in 
this research). The rationale for including the firm size and input criticality is based on the 
literature (Antia & Frazier, 2001; Fernandez - Olmos et al., 2008; Scherer & Ross, 1990). 
Scherer and Ross (1990) suggest that firm size may play an important role in governance 
decisions. Larger firms are likely to do everything themselves as a way of reducing per unit 
cost of production. This view is supported by Williamson (1974) who argues that 
diseconomies of scale limit integration, suggesting that for example, that small firms are less 
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likely to integrate than larger firms. Item criticality refers to the importance attached by the 
principal or the contracting firm to certain items or inputs (Antia & Frazier, 2001). It is 
against this background that Fernandez-Olmos (2008) observe that one of the factors that may 
affect the choice of governance mechanism is whether the differentiation of the sourced item 
is important for the quality of the delivered product. For example, grapes are an input for 
wineries and poor quality grapes would affect the quality of wine produced and thus affect the 
winery‟s selling opportunities, especially those wineries that target the premium or super-
premium market. Therefore, wineries producing wine for the premium market are more likely 
to control the grape production process as a mechanism of ensuring that the grapes they use 
are of high quality. Everaert, Sarens and Rommel (2010) and Gilley, McGee and Rasheed 
(2004) included maturity of the firm as a control variable in their study on the determinants of 
outsourcing decisions because less mature firms are short of resources to internalise their 
functions. They used firm age to capture maturity of the companies. Hence: 
 
H7: Vertical integration is positively correlated with larger firms. 
H8: Vertical integration is positively correlated with item criticality. 
H9: Vertical integration is positively correlated with age of firms. 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has synthesised the literature and developed a theoretical framework for this 
research.  The theoretical framework consolidates the complementarities between a complex 
contract with the exchange protection measures offered by monitoring and incentives, trust 
and the legal system. Based on this framework, the hypotheses were developed. These 
hypotheses are designed to achieve the research objectives and research questions presented at 
the beginning of the chapter. The hypotheses together with the respective research questions 
and objectives they seek to address are summarised in the table below. It is however, 
important to note that some research questions were answered through hypotheses testing and 
other means such as the analysis of coordination measures. 
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Table 3-2: Research questions and corresponding hypotheses 
No Research Questions Corresponding Hypotheses 
1 What governance strategies do firms in South Africa 
and New Zealand wine industries use to source their 
grapes? 
 
Governance structures identified 
through analysis of coordination 
measures, which were then 
investigated through H1, H2a, H3 
and H4.  
2 Are there any differences or similarities between the 
South African and New Zealand grape sourcing 
strategies? 
 
Not tested through hypotheses 
but through independent 
samples t-tests. 
3 Can the continued use of incomplete contracts be 
explained through the theoretical underpinnings of 
TCE, agency theory, relational exchange theory and 
the efficacy of the legal system? 
 
All Hypotheses 
 
These hypotheses will be tested through empirical data that was collected in South Africa and 
New Zealand, and the results are presented in Chapter five. The details of how the hypothesis 
tests were performed are contained in the next chapter. 
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     Chapter 4 
Method 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter developed the hypotheses and theoretical framework for this research. 
This chapter presents the methods used in conducting this research. It provides details about 
the questionnaire development, data collection procedures and how the collected data was 
analysed.   
4.2 Questionnaire Development 
The constructs used to develop the questionnaire for this research were largely adopted from 
previous studies. Where necessary, modifications were made to suit the current research 
context. Industry experts, both academics and managers within the wine industry were also 
consulted to help improve the constructs. The key variables were the three prevalent winery 
governance choices (Scales et al., 1995) of contracting, spot market transacting and vertical 
integration as well as agency theory monitoring and incentives (Fraser, 2005), relational 
exchange theory trust (Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995), the legal system (World Bank, 
2003), firm size (Scherer & Ross, 1990), item criticality (Fraser, 2005) and firm age (Everaert 
et al., 2010).    
4.2.1 Construct Development 
Psychometric scales or constructs such as some of the ones used in this research tend to be 
unobservable and hence attempts to capture them can only achieve partial representation of 
the constructs (Peter & Churchill, 1986). This means that the constructs need to be developed 
through a rigorous process that will ensure close representation of the intended construct. 
Churchill‟s (1979) paradigm for developing better measures is widely accepted as appropriate 
for developing constructs (Peter & Churchill, 1986). This paradigm identifies the key steps 
that may help in the development of better constructs. These are, specifying the domain of the 
construct, generating the sample of items, purifying the measures, assessing the reliability and 
validity of the data and developing norms. 
 
This research generally followed Churchill‟s (1979) suggested model for developing better 
measures. This model is presented below. 
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Figure 4-1: Churchill's (1979) paradigm for developing better measures 
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Guided by the above paradigm, the stages used to develop constructs for this research are the 
review of the literature to identify the research gap. As indicated in the literature review 
chapter, TCE does not provide adequate exchange protection due to its assumptions of 
bounded rationality and opportunism and hence incomplete contracts. It was further revealed 
that agency and relational exchange theories as well as the contract enforcement of the legal 
system provided some measures of exchange protection and thus help address hazards 
associated with incomplete contracts. Hence the review resulted in the identification of four 
main construct domains: TCE incomplete contracting, agency theory monitoring and 
incentives, relational exchange theory norms and the legal system‟s contract enforcement 
mechanism. These exchange governance frameworks therefore provided the domain of the 
research‟s constructs. Further, survey items were generated, mainly through adaptation from 
previous studies and this culminated in the development of a draft questionnaire. The draft 
questionnaire was then pilot tested and the resultant data (comments) were used to purify the 
measures and also help ensure their face validity. This led to the development of the final 
questionnaire that was used to collect data for the study. The constructs were tested for 
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validity and reliability and this led to further modification of the sample of items. Finally, the 
data was analysed including the generation of descriptive statistics and hypothesis testing.       
4.2.2 Constructs Measurements 
4.2.2.1 The Governance Choices 
Governance choices are strategies employed by wineries to procure grapes. They include 
contracting with independent growers for the supply of grapes, buying grapes from the spot 
market and the in-house production of grapes or vertical control (Scales et al., 1995). These 
were captured by asking respondents to indicate the proportion of their grape requirements in 
the last full year sourced through each of the three governance options.  
4.2.2.2 Norms  
There seems to have emerged a general consensus in the literature that trust adequately 
captures relational or social norms (Ring & Ven, 1992; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). This 
literature uses the term “relational governance” to refer to inter-firm exchanges that are 
protected through organisational trust. Further, Lambe, Whitman & Spekman (2001) argue 
that trust is considered to be the most important of the “key” variables used within the 
relational exchange literature. This research therefore follows this literature and uses trust to 
capture relational norms. The construct used to capture trust was adopted from Kumar, et al., 
(1995). They used data from the automobile dealer sector to demonstrate that with increasing 
interdependence asymmetry, the dealers‟ trust and commitment in and commitment to the 
supplier decline while inter-firm conflict increases. Guided by their conceptualisation of trust, 
this research asked wineries to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with a list 
of statements (items) that are believed to capture confidence in their trading 
partner(s)‟credentials. A five point likert-scale was used to capture the extent to which 
wineries agreed or disagreed with some statements about the integrity of their trading 
partners.  
 
It has to be noted however, that the trust variable has been used in the exchange literature in 
various functional forms. For example, Morgan and Hunt (1994) argued that it is a mediating 
variable and Kumar, et al., (1995) used it as a dependent variable whereas this research will 
use it as an independent variable. This research‟s approach has been used by Kassim, Bahari, 
Kassim and Rashid (2009) who investigated and found a positive and significant relationship 
between relationship marketing and customers‟ satisfaction, customer‟s trust, employees‟ 
commitment and customer loyalty in Malaysia.   
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4.2.2.3 Incentives 
Incentives are the bonuses and penalties that are used to align the agent‟s interests with those 
of the principal (Bergen et al., 1992). In the case of this research, they align grape growers‟ 
interests with those of the wineries. The incentive variable for this research was adapted from 
Fraser (2005) who examined the wine grape supply contracts used in the main grape growing 
regions of Australia. He found that among others, lower quality grape growing regions place 
greater reliance on grape quality assessment to determine bonus/penalty payments compared 
to higher quality growing regions. He captured the bonus/penalty payments or incentives 
through a binary response question (where “1” = if contract has a bonus/penalty payment 
provision for a given attribute and “0” otherwise). The quality attributes included, among 
others, grape colour, Ph levels, disease damage and physical damage. This research has made 
a minor modification to his approach. Instead of a binary response, it used a 5 point scale 
where “1” = never and “5” = always. Wineries were asked to indicate the extent to which, on 
average their contracts specify bonus/penalty payments for a number of quality attributes such 
as colour, Ph and physical damage. This modification was due to the fact that this research 
finds a binary response approach limiting in that wineries may have different contracts with 
different growers and a given bonus/penalty may be specified in one contract but not in the 
other. Because of this, average penalty/bonus approach seemed more appropriate and was 
therefore used for this research.  
4.2.2.4  Monitoring 
The monitoring variable was also adapted from Fraser (2005), who found that contracts in 
higher quality regions placed greater emphasis on explicit winery involvement in vineyard 
management. Fraser (2005) captured input monitoring through a binary response question 
with options of “1” = if winery representatives are involved in vineyard activities and “0” 
otherwise. Monitoring activities included pruning, water and irrigation, weed control and 
disease control among others. However, as with incentives the variable above, this research 
captures monitoring on a five point likert scale. Wineries were asked to indicate (“1” = Never 
and “5” = Always) the extent to which their representatives are involved in the different 
activities and decisions of the grower(s).  
4.2.2.5 Legal System 
This construct measures the extent to which the legal environment (court system) is expected 
to protect exchange relationships against trading partners‟ opportunistic tendencies (World 
Bank, 2003). The World Bank (2003) conducted research on investment climate around the 
world and asked respondents to rate how problematic court characteristics (of fairness and 
impartiality, honesty, speed of enforcement, affordability, consistency and decrees of 
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enforcement) were for the growth and operation of their firms. It found that generally the 
most negative characteristic of courts was the speed at which they operate, followed by their 
consistency, honesty, fairness and impartiality, affordability and their enforcement of 
judgements. Following the World Bank (2003) wineries were asked to indicate, (on a five 
point likert-scale where “1” = Strongly Agree and “5” = Strongly Disagree) the degree to 
which they agreed or disagreed with statements that captured the performance of the court 
system. As with the World Bank (2003) this research focused on the characteristics of fairness 
and impartiality, honesty, speed of operation, affordability, consistency and decrees of 
enforcement. 
  
4.2.2.6 Firm Size (control variable) 
 The size of wineries was captured by litres of wine produced for New Zealand and tonnes of 
grapes crashed for South Africa. This followed the statistical reporting systems in both 
countries. In South Africa, size is captured through tons of grapes crushed in a given year by 
the South African Wine Information and Systems (SAWIS, 2009) and in New Zealand size is 
captured through annual sales of wine in litres by the New Zealand Winegrowers (NZWINE, 
2009). 
4.2.2.7 Item Criticality (control variable) 
Item criticality refers to the extent to which grape quality is considered important to the 
quality of the wine produced (Antia & Frazier, 2001). Item criticality was adapted from Fraser 
(2005) who identified a number of quality variables used within the wine industry in 
Australia. In order to measure item criticality for this research, wineries were asked to express 
(on a five point likert-scale where “1” = not important and “5” = very important) their 
opinions about the importance of Fraser‟s (2005) grape quality variables to the quality of their 
wines.  
4.2.2.8 Firm Maturity (control variable) 
Firm maturity refers to the length of time the firm has been in business. Following, Everaert et 
al.,  (2010), maturity was captured through age of the firm. It represents the number of years 
the winery has been in operation. 
4.2.3 Questionnaire Refinement and Pre-testing 
After the questionnaire was developed, ten PhD students and three University Faculty of 
Commerce staff with expertise in this area were asked to review and comment on the 
questionnaire. Their comments were incorporated as a way of refining the questionnaire. This 
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helped with the initial face validity of the questionnaire. The questionnaire was then emailed 
to fifteen wineries as a pre-testing exercise. This was in line with Cooper and Schindler 
(2006) who observe that a pilot test helps detect weaknesses in the design of the research 
instrument because it allows for refinements based on the responses of the pilot test. The 
wineries were asked to identify any ambiguities in the questionnaire and highlight them to the 
researcher. Nine of the wineries responded. Lastly, five managers of wineries within the 
Christchurch area were personally interviewed by the researcher. Useful feedback was 
obtained and incorporated into the questionnaire. For example, one of the managers suggested 
that tannins be included as one of the grape quality measures because they are very important 
especially to red wine as they provide colour, flavour and structure to a wine.  
4.3 Data Collection and Preparation 
4.3.1 Sampling 
The population for this research was wineries in South Africa and New Zealand. As earlier 
noted, wineries either have contracts with grape producers, produce grapes for their own use 
or buy grapes on the spot market. They are therefore key decision makers in the governance 
form, and hence were the study‟s unit of analysis.  
 
According to SAWIS (2009), there were 585 wineries in South Africa as at the end of 2008. 
SAWIS is an organisation that that collects, processes and disseminates South African Wine 
Industry information (see http://www.sawis.co.za/). SAWIS provided the contact details of 
the wineries and as per their industry policy, offered to help coordinate the research. 
Questionnaires were sent to all the wineries in South Africa. A total of 111 responses were 
usable, representing an 18.9% response rate. There were 683 wineries in New Zealand in 
2009 (NZWINE, 2009). However, NZWINE (2009) could provide contacts of only 580 
wineries (85%). Hence 580 questionnaires were sent out in New Zealand. A total of 116 
responses were usable, representing a 20.0 percent response rate. Further details of the 
responses are discussed in Chapter five.   
4.3.2 Data Collection Procedures 
A number of methods for collecting the data for this study were considered. These methods 
included self administered questionnaires, personal and telephone interviews, field studies, 
internet based surveys as well as an assortment of library based approaches (Zikmund, 2003). 
All these methods have weaknesses and strengths. The choice of each therefore depends on a 
number of considerations regarding their strengths and weaknesses. For this research, major 
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consideration was given to the costs of collecting data from South Africa and New Zealand. 
Each country has a number of regions that had to be covered and this added to the costs. Thus, 
the mail survey was seen as the most appropriate data collection method for this research 
because it allowed for the coverage of both countries at reasonable costs. It also allowed for 
respondent flexibility since respondents could fill the questionnaire as and when they had 
time (Zikmund, 2003). Further, it allowed respondents enough time to think and reflect on 
their responses.  
 
The design and implementation of the mail survey followed Dillman‟s  (2007) mail survey 
method. This method puts emphasis on improving the response rate and improving data 
quality. This is achieved through among others, the cover letter, a detailed yet short and to the 
point questionnaire, pre-paid reply envelope and a post card reminder two weeks after the 
initial mailing. All these steps were followed, except that instead of a post card, a reminder 
letter was sent with a new questionnaire and a free post envelope three weeks after the initial 
mailing. In addition, respondents were given the choice of whether or not to be sent the 
summary of the results once the research is completed. 
4.3.3 Non-Response Bias  
Despite following best practice with the intention of increasing response rates, some wineries 
did not return the questionnaire. Such potential respondents may have deliberately declined 
the questionnaires due to, among others, proprietary nature of the data or they simply did not 
have time to answer the questionnaire. This could potentially result in non-response bias, a 
statistical difference between a survey that includes only those who responded and an ideal 
survey that would also include those who failed to respond (Zikmund, 2003). This difference 
may be due to the fact that subjects that do not return the questionnaire or answer certain 
questions may have opinions that are substantially different from those who returned the 
questionnaire or answered all questions.   
 
Results drawn from data with non-response bias do not allow the researcher to say with 
confidence how the entire sample would have responded  (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). Li 
(2005) states that a standard way to test for non-response bias is to compare the responses of 
those who return the questionnaires after the first mailings with those who return it after the 
second and subsequent mailings. The assumption is that those who do not return the 
questionnaires after the first mailing have almost similar opinions with those who do not 
respond at all. For this research, non-response bias was tested through the independent 
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samples t-tests to compare means from first mailing responses with means of the after 
reminder responses (Pallant, 2007). Results are presented in Chapter five and they show no 
significant evidence of non-response bias. 
4.3.4 Data Coding, Entry and Cleaning 
 The questionnaire was pre-coded through the likert scale format. Each question had a coding 
range that guided data entry or transfer into the electronic format. All data were handled 
through Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) for windows (version 17). Data 
cleaning was then undertaken to ensure that there are no data entry errors. This included 
checking for scores that are out of range. This included checking the minimum and maximum 
scores as well as the mean to ensure that they fall within the coding framework (Pallant, 
2007). It also included the inspection of the box plots to ensure that there are no outliers. Any 
values out of line with expectation were corrected by going back to the questionnaire to re-
enter the correct values. This phase also took care of missing data. Descriptive data was 
generated and checked for the proportion of missing data. Only a few data points were 
missing. When only a few data is missing, Pallant (2007), recommends excluding the missing 
cases through SPSS‟s pairwise exclusion of missing data option. Consideration was given to 
replacing the data with the mean through SPSS “replace with mean option”. This option was 
not taken because Pallant (2007) cautions researchers against it. She argues that it should 
“never” be used as it can severely distort the results of the data analysis. This resulted in 
excluding three and five data points for South Africa and New Zealand, which yielded the 
final sizes of 111 and 116 for the two countries respectively. 
4.4 Data Analysis 
The data analysis phase used a total of four statistical techniques to analyse the data. 
Exploratory factor analysis and reliability analysis were used to refine the constructs, multiple 
regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses (except H 2b ) and the independent sample 
t-test was used to test the hypothesis that the New Zealand legal system is more effective in 
protecting exchange relationships than the South African legal system (H 2b ). The independent 
sample t-test was also used to compare the coordination strategies between New Zealand and 
South Africa, as well as compare the level of trust, monitoring and incentive practices as well 
as compare the importance of grape quality to the quality of wine produced between the two 
countries.  
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4.4.1 Instrument Validity 
Validity of the scale refers to the extent to which the scale or construct measures what it is 
intended to measure (Leech, Barrett, & Morgan, 2008). That is, do the items making the 
construct collectively measure the right thing or they measure something else? Instrument 
validity can be assessed through three main approaches: content validity/face validity, 
criterion related validity and construct validity (Cao, 2001). All the three measures were used 
to capture instrument validity for this research.   
 
4.4.1.1 Content/Face validity 
Content validity refers to the extent to which a measure represents a given construct or 
whether the items adequately capture the essence of the construct domain (Churchill, 1979). It 
requires the identification of a group of items which are thought to measure the construct 
(Cao, 2001). However, it is a subjective measure as it generally depends on the opinions 
based on the literature review and questionnaire pre-tests (Hensley, 1999). For this research, 
content validity of the scale was achieved through peer review with other researchers and 
academics within the Lincoln University Faculty of Commerce. The instrument was also 
reviewed by researchers within the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University 
of Stellenbosch, South Africa. The scale was also piloted with 21 wineries in New Zealand. 
The researchers and the wineries were confident that the constructs measure what they 
intended to measure.    
 
4.4.1.2 Criterion related validity 
This is the measure of the relationship between the scale and surrogate measures of the 
construct (Hensley, 1999). This approach is used to demonstrate the performance of a 
construct by comparing it with another measure that has been shown to be valid. It requires 
checking the performance of the construct against some criterion that is known to perform 
well. Hence, instead of developing new scales, this research opted to adopt scales that have 
been successfully used in previous studies and modify them where necessary. This approach 
has been used before. In a review of studies using scale development techniques, Hensley 
(1999) reports that many of the studies borrowed methods and scales from more developed 
fields. Further, other empirical studies such as Antia & Frazier (2001) and Tremblay, et al., 
(2003) have used measurement scales from previous research, sometimes with minor 
modifications to meet their research setting. In particular, this research converted the scales 
from binary response questions to five point likert scales.  
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4.4.1.3 Construct Validity 
Construct validity attempts to identify or establish the underlying construct being measured 
and to determine the degree to which the test represents the construct measured (Cooper & 
Schindler, 2006). This measure is mainly captured through the unidimensionality test (Cao, 
2001; Kao, 2007). Unidemensionality refers to the existence of a single construct underlying a 
set of measures (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988). Unidimensionality is commonly captured 
through factor analysis, a process of deriving a small number of variables that “hang together” 
from a fairly large set of items (Leech et al., 2008). The subsets of items that are correlated 
with one another but largely independent of other subsets of items are combined into factors 
(George & Mallery, 2009). A factor reflects underlying processes that have created the 
correlations among variables or items. It therefore represents a good measure of construct 
validity, which aims at identifying the underlying construct being measured. 
 
There are two common factor analysis methods used for assessing unidimensionality. These 
are exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). The 
former is a technique that helps researchers explore the underlying structure of a collection of 
items and the latter seeks to test the hypothesis that due to some theoretical support or prior 
research, certain variables should be grouped together on a factor. With exploratory factor 
analysis, the researcher takes what the data gives or suggests, while with the confirmatory 
technique the researcher has pre-conceived view about the actual structure of the data based 
on what theory or past research suggests. With the confirmatory technique, the analyst 
assesses the degree to which the data meets the expected structure. As indicated in the 
preceding subsection, this research adopted, albeit with modifications, constructs from 
previous studies. However, except for trust which was adopted from Kumar et al., (1995), 
these studies did not indicate that they performed validity or reliability tests on the scales, 
which meant that most scales remained largely exploratory in nature. For example, incentives, 
monitoring, and item criticality were adopted from Fraser (2005) who captured the variables 
as binary response questions where incentives was captured as (where “1” = if contract has a 
bonus/penalty payment provision for a given attribute and “0” otherwise), monitoring as (“1” 
= if winery representatives are involved and “0” otherwise) and item criticality as whether the 
contracts captured grape quality measurements or not. As mentioned above, Fraser (2005) did 
not perform validity or reliability tests on these variables.  
 
Items making up the legal framework variable were adopted from the World Bank (2003) but 
there were no reported validity and reliability results. The results were simply reported in 
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frequency terms, which suggest that it was unlikely for the study to perform validity and 
reliability tests which, unlike a simple frequency analysis approach, require determining the 
relationships between the items making the construct. 
 
Due to the fact that both the World Bank (2003) and Fraser (2005) did not report any validity 
and reliability results and due to the modifications made to the scales adopted from Fraser 
(2005), this research felt that the scales were largely exploratory in nature. There were no pre-
conceived structure of these variables and hence confirmatory factor analysis was seen as 
inappropriate for examining the latent structure of the variables used in this research. Instead, 
the research performed exploratory factor analysis as the objective was to uncover the 
underlying structure. This approach is in line with Gerbing and Anderson (1988) who suggest 
that exploratory factor analysis is appropriate in cases where the underlying dimensions of a 
data set are unknown. Although the trust variable was a prime candidate for confirmatory 
factor analysis to help assess the degree to which the data meets the expected structure of this 
variable, the variable has been widely used in empirical research (Friman, Gärling, Millett, 
Mattsson, & Johnston, 2002; Holdford & White, 1997) and this reassured the current research 
that the variable is one-dimensional. The variable performed well when subjected to the 
reliability tests and this further reassured this study that trust measured what it intended to 
measure.  
 
However, whether to perform or not to perform factor analysis on the data depends on the 
data being appropriate for the technique. Hair et al., (2010), Stewart (1981) and Coakes, Steed 
and Price (2008) identify pre-conditions for performing factor analysis on the data as, a 
sample size of 100 or more, strong and significant correlations (greater than 0.30), linearity, 
no extreme outliers and a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sample Adequacy of 0.60 
or more. The rationale for strong and significant correlation between the items is influenced 
by the fact that construct validity assumes that factors consist of subsets of items that are 
correlated with one another but largely independent of other subsets of items. It aims at 
discovering which set of variables form coherent subsets that are relatively independent of 
one another (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1990). Factor analysis is essentially concerned with the 
homogeneity of items (Stewart 1981). Since factor analysis is based on correlations, the 
importance of linearity cannot be overstated as lack of linearity may degrade the factor 
solution. Further, factor analysis is sensitive to outliers (Coakes et al., 2008), so outliers have 
to be identified and then removed from the data set or aligned with the average distribution of 
the data set.  
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Once the researcher is satisfied that the data is adequate for factor analysis, the 
unidimensionality test may be performed. According to Cao (2001) and Pallant (2007) a 
successful unidimenstionality test through exploratory factor analysis must meet the following 
criteria: 
 
1. First factor loading should explain more than 40 percent of the variance in the construct. 
2. All or most of the items should have higher loadings on the first factor than on subsequent 
factors.  
3. Three or more items must load on each factor. 
 
This research took account of these pre-conditions. An item correlation matrix was computed 
and examined to ensure that the correlations were high. The results showed high correlation 
between the items for all the constructs. The Bartlett‟s Test for Sphericity was used to test for 
the significance of the correlation matrix and all constructs had items with significant 
correlations. The research also tested for linearity and the absence of outliers and was satisfied 
that these conditions were met. These are also the pre-conditions for multiple regression 
analysis (section 4.4.5 of this chapter) and how they were met is discussed under the multiple 
regression subsection. Lastly, the KMO measure was used to test the hypothesis that the items 
do not belong together, and in all cases, the KMO was more than 0.60, which meant that the 
hypothesis that the items do not belong together was rejected. The research was therefore 
satisfied that the data for both countries was appropriate for factor analysis. The results are 
presented in Chapter five. 
4.4.2 Reliability Analysis 
After identifying the variables‟ underlying construct through validity tests, the natural process 
was to determine the degree to which the scale items go together, or the degree to which a 
given scale is free from random error (Pallant, 2007). That is, to measure the scale reliability 
of variables. There are two important aspects of reliability, repeatability and internal 
consistency (Zikmund, 2003). 
Repeatability refers to the fact that the scale should most likely produce the same result each 
time it is administered to the same person in the same setting (George & Mallery, 2009). 
Repeatability is normally measured through the test-retest method. This involves 
administering the scale on the same sample on two different occasions and then calculating 
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the correlation between the two scores obtained. A high test-retest correlation shows that the 
scale has a high level of reliability.  
Internal consistency refers to the homogeneity of items constituting the measure (Pallant, 
2007). It is concerned with the degree to which items that make up the scale or construct are 
all measuring the same underlying attribute. It can be measured in different ways, but 
Cronbach‟s alpha (α) is the most commonly used measure of internal consistency (Kao, 
2007). The (α) measures the average correlation among items making up the scale. Values 
range from 0 – 1 and higher values indicate greater reliability. While higher (α) levels are 
ideal, the literature generally considers a minimum of 0.70 as acceptable (Cao, 2001; George 
& Mallery, 2009; Kao, 2007; Paulin et al., 1997). In fact, Nunnally (1978 ) states that even 
levels of 0.60 are acceptable. However, Pallant (2007) cautions that (α) values are dependent 
on the number of items in the scale. She points out that when there are fewer than 10 items in 
a scale, the (α) values can be too small. In this situation, she recommends that it may be better 
to calculate and report the item-to-total correlations whose values ranges from 0.2-0.4. The 
item-to-total correlation measures show how closely the items within a construct relate to a 
construct as a whole. As a rule of thumb, an item-to-total correlation value of above 0.3 is 
considered adequate for good internal consistency (Cao, 2001).  
This research did not apply all the above discussed reliability tests. Notably, the test-retest 
reliability test was not used for this research. The test was not used on account of time and 
financial resources. It requires administering the scale on the same sample on two different 
occasions, which is not only expensive but also time consuming. Instead, the research tested 
construct reliability by deriving Cronbach‟s alpha for all the constructs used in this research. 
The research also took heed of Pallant‟s (2007) caution that when there are fewer than 10 
items in a scale it may be better to measure reliability through the item-to-total correlations 
because the (α) values could be too small. In all the constructs for this study, only trust had 
more than ten items. The (α) measure was therefore supplemented by item-to-total correlation 
scores. Reported in pairs of South Africa (SA): New Zealand (NZ), the following cronbach 
alphas were attained. Trust (SA=0.956: NZ=0.917), Monitoring (SA=0.951: NZ=0.913), 
Incentives (SA=0.868: NZ=0.966), legal system (SA=0.870: NZ=0.754) and Item criticality 
(SA=0.830: NZ=0.838). The item-to-total correlations are also above the acceptable 0.30 rule 
of thumb level for this test (Cao, 2001).  
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4.4.3 The Multiple Regression Analysis  
This research employed multiple regression analysis to test all the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter three except H2b. The Multiple regression analysis allows for the testing of the 
relationship between a single dependent variable and two or more independent variables (Hair 
et al., 2010)  The standard regression equation takes the form: 
 
, 1...i i iY X i n       
Equation 4-1: The standard regression equation 
  
Where Yi is the set of dependent variables, Xi is the set of independent variables, α is the 
constant and βi is the set of regression coefficients of Xis that the regression seeks to estimate. 
β represents the amount of change in the dependent variable Y corresponding to a unit change 
in the independent variable X. The ε is the error term or residual and it represents total error in 
predicting Y from X (Stewart, 2005). The ε is essentially the difference between the actual 
value of the independent variable (X) and the value of X predicted by the regression equation. 
It (ε) captures the variation in Y or variation about the mean of Y (Y ) not captured by the 
predicted value of X.  
4.4.3.1 The Estimation Technique 
The least squares estimation technique was used to estimate the relationship between the 
dependent variable (Y) and the independent variable (X). That is, to estimate α and β. This 
technique is a simple mathematical formulation that attempts to make the least amount of total 
error in predicting Y from X (Stewart, 2005). The method generates a straight line which 
minimises the sum of squared deviations of the actual values from the estimated regression 
line (Zikmund, 2003). With the symbol ε representing errors in the prediction of Y from X, 
the least squares equation criterion takes the form: 
2
1
n
i


  is minimum; where 
Equation 4-2: Least squares formula 
^
i iY Y   (residual) 
iY = actual value of the dependent variable 
^
Y = estimated value of the dependent variable 
n = number of observations 
i = number of particular observation 
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The objective of the least squares technique is therefore to minimise the variation in Y not 
explained by the predicted value of X. This helps in generating a sample β coefficient that is 
as close as possible to the population coefficient and this improves the prediction capability of 
the regression model. 
4.4.3.2 Decomposition of Variation in the Dependent Variable (Y)  
Since the objective of the least squares technique is to minimise the variations in Y not 
explained by the predicted value of X, it implies that total variation in Y has two components. 
These are the systematic component associated with the independent variable (X) and the 
unsystematic variation associated with the error term (ε). This can be represented as: 
^ ^
( ) ( )ii i iY Y Y Y Y Y      Or TV = (EV) + (UV) 
Equation 4-3: Decomposition of the variation in the dependent variable 
 Where: Y = mean value of the dependent variable. 
^
Y = value predicted with the regression equation. 
iY = actual value of the dependent variable. 
TV = Total variation 
EV = Explained variation 
UV = Unexplained variation 
The coefficient of determination ( 2r ) reflects the proportion of variation explained by the 
regression model. Thus, rearranging the equation TV = (EV) + (UV) and converting (EV) into 
a proportion of total variation gives:  
2r  =1
UV
TV
  
Equation 4-4. Formula for the coefficient of variation 
The 2r  ranges between 0 and 1, and the closer to 1 the value of the 2r is, the better the fit of 
the regression line to the data (Kao, 2007). However, it is important not to infer from a low 2r  
that the explanatory variable (s) is or are not important in determining the independent 
variable.  Stewart (2005) stresses the point that what matters most is the significance level of 
the regression coefficient (β) of the independent variable (X) because it is common to have 
situations where the independent variable explains a small variation in the dependent variable 
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yet it is a significant determinant of the latter. The issue of statistical significance is discussed 
in the hypothesis testing section discussed below.   
4.4.4 Hypothesis Testing 
Regression analysis allows the researcher to generate some point estimates of α and β about 
the population. The least squares method helps in generating estimates that are as close as 
possible to the population values. The researcher is also faced with the task of ascertaining 
themselves that indeed the estimated coefficients are as close as possible to the population 
values. They need a way of establishing with confidence the degree to which the sample 
estimates represents the population dynamics. Hypothesis testing helps in this regard. It helps 
determine the precision of the estimates and give confidence to the researcher on whether the 
estimates are a reflection of the population or not. In order to test the research hypotheses 
formulated for this research, Stewart‟s (2005) guidelines to hypotheses testing were adopted. 
These are: (a) identifying the test statistic, (b) stating the significant level (p-value), and (c) 
calculating the test statistic and the associated p-value and then making the appropriate 
decision on whether to accept or reject the stated hypothesis.  
4.4.4.1 Identification of the Test Statistic 
A test statistic helps in verifying whether a given hypothesis is supported or rejected by 
chance variation or whether it is real that it should be rejected or supported. A desirable 
property of a test statistic is that it has a tractable distribution, preferably with tabulated 
probabilities (Zikmund, 2003). Probability tables are available for the normal, 2 , t and the F 
distributions. The 2 and F distributions are not normally distributed but are rather skewed to 
the right (Stock & Watson, 2003) and therefore not suitable for hypothesis testing for this 
research. This research targeted the populations of wineries in South Africa and New Zealand. 
Thus, each member of the population had an equal chance of responding and thus be included 
in the sample, which resulted in normally distributed data sets. This is confirmed through the 
normality tests conducted in Chapter 5. Both the normal and the t-distributions are normally 
distributed or bell shaped and hence suitable for testing normally distributed data. The main 
difference between these two distributions is that the normal distribution assumes that the 
population standard deviation is known and the t-distribution assumes unknown standard 
deviation (Stock & Watson, 2003). As in nearly all empirical statistical research, the 
population standard deviation for the data for this research was unknown, which influenced 
the choice of the t-statistic as the appropriate test statistic for this research. Stewart (2005), 
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advices that as a rule of thumb, for sample sizes larger than 20, t statistics greater than 2 (in 
absolute value) suggest significant effects.      
 
4.4.4.2 Choosing the Significance Level (p-value) and Hypothesis Tests 
The main objective of performing a significance test is to determine if a relationship observed 
in a sample is the result of chance variation (Sweet & Grace - Martin, 2008). That is, the 
significance tests determine the likelihood that this same relationship also exists in the 
population. A statistically significant relationship means that an observed pattern in one 
sample would most likely be observed from different samples of the same size drawn from the 
same population. Thus, the same pattern would be observed if it was possible to study the 
entire population. Significance tests rely on significance level, the probability that chance 
explains the variation. This probability is normally represented through a p-value (Pallant, 
2007). A high significance value (p-value) suggests that the observed pattern occurred by 
chance. A low p-value suggests that the observed pattern is unlikely to have occurred by 
chance. Usually, the thresholds for the probabilities (p-values) are set at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10. 
These assert that there is only a 1 in a 100 (0.01); 5 in 100 (0.05) and 10 in 100 (0.10) 
probability that the observed pattern would have occurred by chance (Pallant, 2007; Zikmund, 
2003). This research followed convention and used these significance levels (0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10)  
4.4.5 Assumptions of Regression Analysis and Factor Analysis 
In order to use the regression technique as an estimation tool, the data set must meet certain 
assumptions and requirements. Maddala (2001) identifies the regression assumptions as;  
(a) Absence of outliers  
(b) Lack of multicollinearity 
(c) Linearity of the regression function 
(d) Normality  
(e) Uncorrelated or independent Error Terms 
(f) Equal or constant Error Variance 
Of the above assumptions, assumptions (a) and (c) also apply to factor analysis (Section 
4.4.1.3). 
4.4.5.1 Absence of Outliers  
An outlier is an observation within a data set that is so far removed from the cluster of other 
observations that it is considered an extreme value (Sweet & Grace - Martin, 2008). They can 
be due to data entry errors or may just be genuine outliers. What is apparent, however, is that 
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they can undermine conventional statistical methods and the researcher has to make a decision 
on how to deal with them (Pallant, 2007). There are different ways of dealing with outliers 
including deleting them (Coakes et al., 2008) and adjusting the extreme value in line with the 
average trend (Pallant, 2007). This research checked for outliers through two SPPS 
procedures, looking at the histogram to inspect whether there are data points sitting on their 
own on the tails of the distribution and inspecting the data‟s box plot for any scores 
considered outliers. The box plot procedure puts outliers as little circles with an identity 
number attached to them to help the researcher spot them. After identifying the outliers, this 
study ascertained whether they were data entry errors or genuine outliers by cross checking 
the values with those provided in the questionnaires. Very few outliers were identified and 
appropriate corrections were made to the data in cases where the outliers occurred due to data 
entry errors. Where outliers were genuine but uncomfortably out of line with the general trend 
of the data, the extreme values were adjusted to align them with the average scores.   
  
4.4.5.2 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity occurs when the independent variables are closely collinearly related or 
move together in a systematic way (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2008). It is important to note that 
the presence of multicollinearity on its own is not a problem. The problem is the degree of 
collinearity, and it does become problematic once the correlations exceed 0.80 (Kao, 2007). 
Consequences of collinearity of the independent variables include large variances and 
standard errors which makes it more difficult to estimate the true population parameters, 
wider confidence intervals due to large standard errors, which further reduces the accuracy of 
the model‟s ability to estimate population parameters, insignificant t-ratios which make it easy 
to jump to the conclusion of chance variation when in fact there is no chance variation and 
high r 2 which may overestimate the variations of the dependent variables explained by the 
model (Gujarati, 2006). It is clear that multicollinearity has far reaching implications for the 
success of the population parameter estimation process. It must therefore be detected and 
corrected before the formal estimation process gets underway. 
Multicollinearity can be detected through a number of ways. High r 2 but few significant t- 
ratios as well as high pair-wise correlations (in excess of 0.80) among explanatory variables 
may signal the presence of multicollinearity (Zikmund, 2003). Gujarati (2006) recommends 
the use of the variance inflation factor (VIF), which measures the strength of the relationship 
between a single independent variable and other independent variables in the regression. The 
VIF is computed by regressing each of the independent variables against other independent 
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variables and the coefficient of determination for each regression (r 2 ) observed. For example, 
for a given explanatory variable Xj, the coefficient of determination (r 2j ) will be obtained and 
this will be done for all explanatory variables (Xj
s
).  The VIF for the variable Xj is: 
2
1
1
j
j
VIF
r


 
Equation 4-5: Variance Inflation Factor 
When there is no relationship the r 2j = 0.0 and VIF = 1, hence the absence of 
multicollinearity. The VIF therefore increases as r 2j increases or as more and more variation in 
one of the independent variables (tested as a dependent variable) increases, suggesting 
increasing collinearity. A VIF value of above 10 indicates the potential presence of 
multicollinearity (Pallant, 2007). This research used SPSS to test for multicollinearity. The 
SPSS collinearity diagnostics were examined for any possible correlations above 0.80. 
Further, the output was assessed for exceedingly high coefficient of determination (r 2 ) as 
well as check for few significant t ratios. In addition, the VIF values were examined to 
ascertain that the values were less than 10. In all regression models, no multicollinearity was 
detected. Chapter five reports on the VIF statistics for all the models and there is no indication 
of the presence of multicollinearity as all the VIF values are less than 1.5. 
4.4.5.3 Linearity 
The relationship between the dependent variable and independent variable(s) should be linear. 
Such a relationship exists when a difference in the value of one variable is associated with a 
consistent difference in the value of another variable (Sweet & Grace - Martin, 2008). 
Linearity can be assessed through the pearson correlation coefficient. The coefficient can have 
values from -1 to +1, where a coefficient of 0 shows that there is no linear relationship 
between the variables and -1 shows perfect negative correlation and +1 shows perfect positive 
correlation. A correlation of 0.30 is considered good and a correlation of 0.40 is considered 
strong (Sweet & Grace - Martin, 2008). Statistical significance can be used to determine 
whether the relationship occurred by chance. Another test for linearity is the relationship 
between the residuals and the predicted dependent variable scores. If the data exhibits 
linearity, the residuals should have a straight line relationship with the predicted dependent 
variable scores (Pallant, 2007). This research inspected the residual scatter plot against the 
predicted dependent variable scores and was satisfied that there existed significant linear 
relationships between the research‟s dependent and independent variables. The pearson 
coefficients were not calculated because the residual scatter plots were clearly linear which 
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made the researcher confident that all the models met the linearity condition (Appendices 2a 
and 2b).  
 
4.4.5.4 Normality 
The residuals should follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero (Sweet & Grace - 
Martin, 2008). Normality is usually tested through the visual examination of the residual plots 
histogram and normality probability plots. These tests were undertaken for this research and 
the study was satisfied that the normality assumption was met (See appendices 3a and 3b). 
 
4.4.5.5 Error Term Independence 
Error term independence implies that the residuals should not be correlated and a commonly 
used statistic for the detection of error independence is the Durbin-Watson statistic (Maddala, 
2001). The statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the residuals from the ordinary least 
squires are not autocorrelated. The Durbin-Watson statistic ranges from 0 (positive 
correlation) and 4 (negative correlation). A value close to 2 indicates no or little correlation. 
The test has established tables from which given the sample size (N) and the number of 
independent variables (K), critical values produced when testing the model can be cross 
checked against the lower (DL) and upper (DU) values published in the tables. The null 
hypothesis is not rejected when the test statistic is above the upper limit. The Durbin-Watson 
test results for the five models that were used to test the hypotheses are summarised in table 
4.1 below.  
 
Table 4-1: The Durbin -Watson test statistics for Error Term Independence 
 
 
Mode
l 
no 
 
 
K# 
 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Test Statistic Critical Value  
(at 1% level) 
South 
Africa 
New Zealand DL DU 
1 7 Contract 1.901 2.028 1.578 1.805 
2 7 Spot market 1.930 2.287 1.578 1.805 
3 6 Vertical Integration 1.914 1.951 1.598 1.785 
4 6 Monitoring 2.415 2.412 1.598 1.785 
5 4 Incentives 2.151 2.351 1.635 1.746 
# K = no of independent variables. N = 111 and 116 for South Africa and New Zealand 
respectively. 
 
All the models show that the test statistic is above the upper bound of the critical range and 
are all closer to 2. Hence the research is confident that the assumption of error term 
independence was satisfied for all the models. 
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4.4.5.6 Error Term Homoscedasticity 
Error term homoscedasticity implies that the error terms are expected to have equal variance 
across all levels of the independent variable(s) (Hair et al., 2010). Homogeneity of variance is 
usually tested through the visual plot of standardised residuals or errors against the regression 
standardised predicted value (Kao, 2007). Homoscedasticity is detected by randomly scattered 
residual plots with no indications of increasing or decreasing patterns. Scattered residual plots 
were produced for this research and the residuals appeared to scatter randomly and did not 
show any pattern, which suggests that the error terms were homoscedastic (Appendices 4a 
and 4b). 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided the methods used for undertaking this research. It discussed the 
development of the questionnaire, which included literature search, drafting, input from 
industry experts and pilot testing. Variables within the questionnaire were largely drawn from 
previous studies with some modifications made where necessary. The chapter also addressed 
sampling issues, indicating that contact details were obtained from country industry bodies 
and that questionnaires were sent to all wineries whose contacts were provided by the industry 
bodies. Further, the chapter elaborated upon statistical analysis that were undertaken to ensure 
instrument validity, reliability and hypothesis testing. It concludes that the data are suitable 
for the analytical techniques used in this research and meets all a priori assumptions. The next 
chapter uses the methodology developed in this chapter to conduct hypotheses tests and 
presents tests results. 
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     Chapter 5 
Data Analysis and Hypothesis Testing 
5.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter developed the methods for undertaking this research including 
procedures for ensuring instrument validity and reliability, data analysis and hypothesis 
testing. This chapter employs these procedures to analyse the data, perform hypothesis tests 
and report the research results. The first section of this chapter reports on the sample response 
rates, respondent firms‟ demographics and on construct descriptives. The second section 
reports on the results of the instrument validation tests, exchange coordination strategies in 
the two countries and the testing of hypotheses. This is followed by the main results summary 
and the overall chapter summary.  
 
The data analysis process was undertaken to help address this research‟s objectives, which 
are: 
 
(a) To integrate the TCE, agency theory, relational exchange theory and the contract 
enforcement mechanism of the legal system and develop a multi-paradigm governance 
framework that is more effective in protecting exchange relationships than any exchange 
protection framework in isolation. 
 
(b) To use the multi- paradigm governance framework developed in (a) above to help explain 
why firms use incomplete contracts despite their vulnerability to ex post opportunism.  
 
(c) To investigate the structure of, and the differences between the South African and New 
Zealand wineries‟ grape sourcing strategies. 
 
The first research objective was achieved through the analysis of the grape sourcing strategies 
(Section 5.6.1) and the second and third research objectives were achieved through the 
hypothesis testing phase (Section 5.6.2).  
5.2  Sampling and Response rates 
A total of 585 questionnaires were distributed to the South African wineries. The figure 
represents the total population of South African wineries. 111 usable responses were received; 
representing an 18.9% response rate. In New Zealand, 580 questionnaires were distributed. A 
total of 116 responses were usable, representing a 20.0 percent response rate. The response 
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rates are within the expected range of mail surveys (Zikmund, 2003) and are also in line with 
other wine industry surveys (Fraser, 2005; Goodhue et al., 2003) that had response rates of 
around 20.0 percent. The response rates are also in line with other marketing surveys such as 
Cao (2001) who studied the influence of electronic commerce to business performance and 
reported a 21.0 percent response rate, and John (1984), who investigated the antecedents of 
opportunism in marketing channels and reported a 15 percent response rate.  
 
With response rates of around 20.0%, non-response bias was a concern because it (non-
response bias) does not allow the researcher to say with confidence how the entire sample 
would have responded if all sample members had responded. This research tested for no-
response bias through the independent samples t-tests which enabled the comparison of means 
from first mailing responses with means of the after reminder responses. With the South 
African data, there were 73 responses after the first mailing and 38 responses after the 
reminder had been issued, while for New Zealand, the first mailing and second mailing 
resulted in 81 and 35 usable responses respectively. The results of the test for equality of 
means are summarised in Table 5.1 below.  
Table 5-1: Independent samples t-test for the equality of means (non-response bias) 
 South Africa New Zealand 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
difference 
t-test for the Equality 
of means 
(Sig. At 5% level) 
 
Mean 
difference 
t-test for the Equality 
of means 
(Sig. At 5% level) 
t Sig. (2 
tailed) 
t Sig. (2 
tailed) 
Spot market 0.002 0.047 0.962 0.042 0.728 0.468 
Contract 0.432 1.902 0.060* -0.150 -0.706 0.482 
V.Integration 0.088 0.242 0.809 -0.138 -0.602 0.548 
Item Criticality 0.007 0.050 0.960 -0.130 -1.107 0.271 
Incentives 0.039 0.223 0.824 -0.269 -2.582 0.011* 
Monitoring -0.039 -0.219 0.827 0.057 0.249 0.803 
Trust -0.017 -0.157 0.876 0.170 1.385 0.169 
Legal system -0.067 -0.423 0.673 -0.024 -0.473 0.637 
Size 0.005 0.016 0.987 0.304 2.172 0.032* 
*(p<0.10) 
The results generally show that for both countries, there is insignificant mean difference (p < 
0.05 with a two tailed t-test) between responses obtained from the first and second mailings. 
In the case of South Africa, the significance level for all the variables is greater than 0.05, 
which suggests that there is no significant difference between the means. The contract 
governance mode is however significant at the (p < 0.10 level). Its p value = 0.060 but it is a 2 
tailed test. Converting this to a one tailed test requires multiplying the p value by 2 and this 
yields (p = 0.12), which suggests that the hypothesis that there are differences in the mean 
values for the first and second responses for the contract variable is also rejected.   
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The New Zealand data shows that there are no significant differences for all the variables 
except incentives and size. It is however important to note that these are only two variables 
out of a total of nine variables. These appeared rather random and were expected not to cause 
any major concern. The responses were therefore generally representative of the sample 
frame. This research therefore confidently concludes that the responses are sufficiently 
representative of the sample to allow for the generalisation of the results to the sample frame.  
5.3 Respondent Firm Demographics 
5.3.1 Size of the Respondent Firms 
The size of the firms is reported differently in the two countries. In South Africa, firm size is 
reported as tons of grapes crushed, while in New Zealand size is reported in annual sales in 
litres of wine. The South African size classification (SAWIS, 2009) does not provide for the 
conventional size categories of small, medium and large. Instead, the wineries are classified 
according to tons crushed in the last year in the following order: (1-100 tons), (>100 – 500 
tons), (>500 – 1,000 tons), (>1,000 – 5,000 tons), (>5,000 – 10,000 tons) and (>10,000 tons).  
Based on these categories, a decision was made to combine some categories in such as way 
that a small, medium and large classification would be achieved without losing the original 
incremental order of the categories. The first two categories were combined and classified as 
small (1-500 tons), the third and fourth categories were combined to capture the medium class 
(> 500-5000) and the last two categories were combined to capture large wineries (> 5000).   
The New Zealand classification is as follows: Small wineries are those with annual sales of < 
200,000 litres of wine, medium wineries have annual sales ranging from 200,000 – 4,000,000 
litres and large wineries have annual sales exceeding 4,000,000 litres (NZWINE, 2009). Table 
5.2 below summarises the size distribution of respondent wineries. 
Table 5-2: Size of respondent firms 
South Africa New Zealand 
Tons Crushed 
last year 
No Percent* Litres (000) 
sold last 
year 
No Percent* 
1- 500 75 67.6 (71.2) < 200 79 69.0 (84.4) 
> 500 - 5000 29 26.1 (19.4) 200 – 4,000 28 24.1 (9.3) 
> 5000 7 6.3 (9.4) > 4,000 8 6.9 (1.0) 
Total 111 100 Total 116 100 
*Population proportions are in parenthesis. 
 
The results show that the majority (67.6 percent) of the South African respondent firms were 
small wineries; while 26.1 percent were medium sized and the remaining 6.3 percent were 
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large wineries. The response pattern almost mirrors the population distribution. For example, 
according to SAWIS (2009), firm distribution in South Africa is as follows: 71.2 percent are 
small wineries, 19.4 percent are medium scale wineries and 9.4 percent are large wineries. 
This is in line with the response rates where 67.6 percent of responses are small firms, 26.1 
percent are medium sized firms and 6.3 percent are large firms. 
 
Likewise, the majority of New Zealand respondents (69.0 percent) were small wineries, 
followed by medium scale wineries (24.1 percent). Large wineries accounted for 6.9 percent 
of respondents. Although not as close as the South African case, the response distribution in 
New Zealand is also generally in line with the population distribution where 88.4, 9.3 and 1.0 
percent of wineries are small, medium and large wineries respectively. In New Zealand, 
medium sized firms (24.1 percent) were more represented in the sample than reflected in the 
population (9.3 percent). This may be due to the fact that some firms reported a different size 
from what the published data suggested is their size. This meant that what they report as their 
size puts them in a different category to that which the published data puts them. On follow 
up, it emerged that size varies from one year to the next depending on harvest quantities and 
sales volume with marginal firms switching from one category to another as their output 
increases or decreases, even if the change is minuscule. This also applies to the South African 
case. 
5.3.2 Age of the Respondent Firms  
Table 5-3: Age of wineries (years in operation) 
South Africa New Zealand 
Age (yrs) No Percent Age (yrs) No Percent 
< 1 yr 0 0 < 1  1 0.9 
> 1 – 5  13 11.7 > 1 – 5 21 18.1 
> 5 – 10  23 20.7 > 5 – 10  33 28.4 
> 10  75 67.6 > 10  61 52.6 
Total 111 100  116 100.0 
 
In terms of the age distribution of firms, 67.6 percent of the South African respondent 
wineries have been operating for over 10 years, while 20.7 percent of the respondents have 
been operating for between 5 and 10 years. The remaining 11.7 percent have been operating 
for less than 5 years. The same pattern is observed for the New Zealand wineries, where the 
majority (52.6 percent) have been operating for more than 10 years. Those that have been 
operating for 5-10 years accounted for the second largest responses (28.4 percent), and those 
that have been in operation for 5 years or less accounted for 19.0 percent of all responses.  
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5.3.3 Ownership Structure of the Respondent Firms 
Table 5-4: Ownership structure of wineries 
South Africa New Zealand 
Structure No Percent Structure No Percent 
Sole Ownership 15 13.5 Sole Ownership 31 26.7 
Partnership 22 19.8 Partnership 20 17.2 
Family owned 38 34.2 Family owned 57 49.1 
Controlling 
interest 
5 4.5 Controlling 
interest 
4 3.4 
Non Controlling 
interest 
31 27.9 Non Controlling 
interest 
4 3.5 
Total 111 100 Total 116 100 
 
In terms of the ownership structure, most of the wineries in both countries were family 
owned, with this category accounting for 34.2 and 49.1 percent for South Africa and New 
Zealand respectively. The next most popular ownership mode in South Africa was the non-
controlling interest (27.9 percent). These are essentially cooperatives that source grapes from 
shareholder growers. In New Zealand the next popular ownership mode was sole ownership 
(26.7 percent). Controlling interest was not common in either country, accounting for 4.5 
percent and 3.5 percent in South Africa and New Zealand respectively.  
5.3.4 Cross Tabulations: Age and Ownership Structure of Respondent Firms 
Table 5-5: Cross tabulations between age of the firm and ownership structure (%) 
South Africa 
Years 
(yrs)/Ownership 
Structure 
Sole 
Ownership 
Partnership Family 
owned 
Controlling 
Interest 
Non 
Controlling 
Interest 
Total 
>1- 5  2.7 2.7 4.5 0.0 1.8 11.3 
> 5 – 10  3.6 3.6 7.2 0.9 5.4 20.7 
> 10  7.2 13.5 22.5 3.6 20.7 67.6 
Total 13.5 19.8 34.2 4.5 27.9 100.0 
New Zealand 
Years/Ownership 
Structure 
Sole 
Ownership 
Partnership Family 
owned 
Controlling 
Interest 
Non 
Controlling 
Interest 
Total 
< 1 yr 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.9 
>1- 5 yrs 5.2 3.4 7.8 1.7 0.0 18.1 
> 5 – 10 yrs 9.5 5.2 11.2 0.0 2.6 28.4 
> 10 yrs 12.1 8.6 29.3 1.7 0.9 52.6 
Total 26.7 17.2 49.1 3.4 3.4 100.0 
 
The cross tabulations between age of firms and ownership structure shows that the majority of 
the South African firms (22.5 percent) were family owned wineries that have also been 
operating for more than 10 years. The next popular combination was firms that have been 
operating for more than 10 years and were held under the non controlling interest ownership 
mode. Only 0.9 percent of the firms that have been operating for between 5 and 10 years were 
also held under the controlling interest ownership mode. The New Zealand firm 
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age/ownership structure cross tabulation results show that like in South Africa, the majority of 
the wineries (29.3) were family owned firms that have also been operating for more than 10 
years. 
5.4 Construct Descriptive Statistics  
The mean values were calculated to provide a general picture or central tendency of the 
respondents‟ opinions on the independent variables. For example, the mean for the trust 
variable gives a general picture about the degree to which wineries trust growers. These 
descriptives are only done on the independent variables because the dependent variables are 
dealt with in the substantive question of what coordination strategies wineries in South Africa 
and New Zealand employ.  
Table 5-6: Construct descriptive statistics and their t-test for equality of means 
  
Mean 
NZ# 
 
Mean 
SA# 
 
 
t 
 
 
Sig. 
 
Mean 
difference 
 
Std. 
error 
t-test for equality of means 
(95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference) 
Trust 3.977 3.923 0.879 0.374 0.054 0.061 -0.066 0.174 
Monitoring 4.010 3.901 0.809 0.417 0.109 0.134 -0.155 0.372 
Incentives 3.496 2.992 8.685 0.000* 0.503 0.058 0.389 0.617 
Item 
Criticality 
4.241 4.254 -0.155 0.877 -0.012 0.079 -0.168 0.143 
Legal System 3.168 3.004 2.403 0.017** 0.164 0.078 0.0103 3.181 
Size 2.397 3.135 4.588 0.008** -0.739 0.016 0.421 1.056 
*(p<0.001); ** p<0.05; # NZ - New Zealand and SA - South Africa     
 
For South Africa, grape quality as measured by Item criticality together with Monitoring and 
Trust scored favourably (mean ≈ 4). This suggests that the grape quality was generally 
perceived as very important to the wineries‟ operations, there were high levels of trust 
between wineries and grape growers and there were high levels of monitoring of grape 
growers/vineyards by wineries. The same can be said for the New Zealand wineries as the 
mean score for these variables is also ≈ 4.  The Independent t-test for equality of means shows 
that there are no significant differences on these variables between the two countries. That is, 
perceptions about the importance of grape quality in South Africa are the same as those in 
New Zealand so are the perceptions about levels of trust and monitoring in the two countries.   
 
With a mean score of 2.992 and 3.495 for South Africa and New Zealand respectively, 
incentives were only used sometimes in South Africa and more often in New Zealand. This 
represents are significant (p <0.001) difference in the use of incentives to encourage grower 
performance in the two countries. Wineries in New Zealand tend to use incentives more often 
than their South African counterparts. Further, in line with the research‟s initial expectation 
that the effectiveness of the legal system in New Zealand would be perceived more 
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favourably than that of South Africa in protecting exchange relationships, the mean score for 
New Zealand is just above that of South Africa, and the difference in the perceptions about 
the ability of the legal system to protect exchange relationships is significant at the (p < 0.05) 
level. Lastly, the average winery is significantly smaller in New Zealand than in South Africa. 
5.5  Instrument Validity and Reliability 
Instrument validity for this study was ascertained through content/face validity, criterion 
related validity and construct validity. Instrument reliability was measured through the 
cronbach alpha and item-to-total item correlations. 
5.5.1 Instrument Validity 
Content/face validity: Content validity of the scale was achieved through peer review with 
other researchers within the Lincoln University Faculty of Commerce. The instrument was 
also reviewed by researchers within the Department of Agricultural Economics at the 
University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. In addition, the scale was piloted with 21 wineries 
in New Zealand. The researchers and the winery managers were of the view that the 
instrument measured what it intended to measure.    
 
Criterion related validity:  In order to achieve criterion related validity, this research relied 
heavily on scales that have been used in previous studies. For example, monitoring, incentives 
and item criticality were adapted from Fraser (2005), trust was adopted from Kumar, et al., 
(1995) and the legal framework from the World Bank (2003).  
 
Construct validity:  This measure attempts to identify or establish the underlying construct 
being measured and is usually captured through the unidimensionality test (Cao, 2001). As 
stated in Chapter four, exploratory factor analysis was used to assess unidimensionality. For 
each country, tests were carried out on the data to determine whether items constituting the 
key variables of trust, monitoring, incentives, the legal system as well as the control variable 
of item criticality would be grouped into independent factors. However, before performing the 
exploratory factors analysis on the constructs, the research had to first ensure that the data was 
suitable for factor analysis. The KMO measure of sampling adequacy and the Bartlett‟s test 
for Sphericity were used to achieve this task. 
 
For both countries, the factor solutions showed a KMO measure of sampling adequacy above 
the acceptable 0.6 level (Pallant, 2007) and a significant (p < 0.001) Bartlett‟s test for 
Sphericity (see tables below). These statistics confirmed that the data was appropriate for 
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factor analysis. The cut-off for factor loading was set at 0.550 so as to ensure that the analysis 
could only capture scales that loaded strongly on their factors. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 present the 
exploratory factor solutions for South African and New Zealand respectively. The South 
African and New Zealand factor solutions produced different order of items and are reported 
as per the solutions. 
Table 5-7: Exploratory factor solutions for South Africa 
 
Items 
Components (factors) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mon1 0.884          
Mon2 0.923          
Mon3 0.885          
Mon4 0.827          
Mon5 0.760          
Mon6 0.844          
Mon7 0.812          
Mon8 0.885          
Mon9 0.844          
T1        0.769   
T2       0.634    
T3       0.714    
T4  0.575         
T5  0.920         
T6  0.784         
T7  0.809         
T8  0.835         
T9  0.925         
T10  0.861         
Inc1   0.634        
Inc2   0.789        
Inc3   0.613        
Inc4   0.851        
Inc5   0.773        
Inc6   0.825        
Inc7   0.692        
Inc8   0.570        
L1    0.852       
L2    0.856       
L3          0.598 
L4         0.866  
L5    0.701       
L6    0.839       
IC1*           
IC2     0.794      
IC3     0.713      
IC4     0.686      
IC5     0.645      
IC6     0.933      
IC7      0.760     
IC8      0.624     
% of variance explained = 72.198. * factor loadings are below the 0.55 cut off and are not 
reported. KMO = 0.711.     BTS (p < 0.001) 
Note: KMO = KMO measure of sampling adequacy and BTS = Bartlett‟s test for Sphericity. 
      
The South African data was appropriate for exploratory factor analysis (KMO = 0.711 and 
BPS is significant (p < 0.01). The factor solution came up with ten factors. Factors one to five 
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loaded with the acceptable three or more items and factors six to ten loaded with the un-
acceptable two or less items. The items that loaded on factors six to ten were therefore 
dropped from further analysis. This resulted in a five factor solution for the South African 
data. In particular, the monitoring variable wholly loaded on factor 1 and this research felt 
comfortable that the variable measured what it intended to measure.  
 
The trust variable generally loaded on factor two as seven out of a total of ten trust items 
loaded on this factor. Item one loaded on factor eight and items 2 and 3 on factor seven. These 
were dropped from the analysis and factor two was presumed to measure what the trust 
variable intended to measure. It is not immediately clear why items 1, 2, and 3 did not hang 
together with the items that loaded on factor two. However, since trust is a multidimensional 
concept (Ring & Ven, 1992; Sako, 1992), it is most probably that factor one items captured 
one dimension of trust and the others captured a different dimension. For example, factor one 
items are more in line with Sako‟s (1992) good will trust, where parties are expected to make 
an open ended endeavour to take initiatives that benefit both parties. The other factors are 
more aligned to Sako‟s (1992) contractual trust, which emphasises confidence that the partner 
is predictable and can therefore be relied upon. The research however only used factor one 
because the other two factors did not constitute the minimum required items of three.  
 
Factor three loaded with all the items that constituted the incentives variable. This satisfied 
the research that in South Africa, the incentive variable measured what it was intended to 
measure. Factor four loaded with four of the six items intended to capture the legal system 
construct. The other two items loaded on factors nine and ten but were dropped from further 
analysis. The research was therefore satisfied that factor four measured what the legal system 
construct intended to measure. South Africa was considered to have a weak legal system as 
compared to New Zealand. This was because, for example, it takes 600 days on average to 
enforce a contract in South Africa as compared to only 216 days in New Zealand (World 
Bank, 2010). The perceived weakness of the legal system may have influenced the factor 
allocation of items, and although not the objective of this research, it may have also helped 
identify where the weaknesses lie within the system. For example, factor four (the factor 
considered to measure the legal system‟s enforcement mechanism) loaded with items that 
may be classified as strengths of the legal system when it comes to enforcing contracts such 
as being fair, honest, consistent and credible. However, items that did not load on this factor 
may be classified as problems with enforcing contracts such as low speed of contract 
enforcement (as stated above, it takes 600 days to enforce contracts) and high litigation costs. 
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This implies that the legal system loaded mainly with what was perceived as the positives or 
strengths of the South African legal system, and the perceived weaknesses loaded elsewhere 
and were thus dropped from further analysis.  
 
The fifth factor loaded with five of the eight items intended to measure item criticality. Two 
other items loaded on factor six and one item (item 1) did not load at the 0.555 loading cut 
off. The two items that loaded on factor six and the item that did dot load at the 0.555 cut off 
were therefore dropped from further analysis. This research was satisfied that factor five 
captured what item criticality intended to measure. An important observation is that factor 
five items were generally captured with the chemical and taste quality attributes such as sugar 
content, acidity, flavour and tannins. Items that did not load on factor five are more aligned to 
physical quality attributes such as material other than grapes, physical damage and disease 
damage. Two of these items, physical damage and disease damage loaded on factor five. This 
suggests that the item criticality items could be split into two constructs, one constituting 
chemical attributes and the other constituting physical attributes. This research settled for the 
factor that constituted chemical attributes because it met the minimum requirements of the 
number of items and the factors that constituted the physical attributes did not, and were 
therefore dropped from further analysis.  
 
What the South African data factor solutions reveal is that items that were intended to capture 
the monitoring variable loaded on factor one. Generally, items that were intended to capture 
trust, incentives, the legal system and item criticality loaded on factors two, three, four and 
five respectively. The other five factors loaded with one or two items only and were 
subsequently dropped from the analysis. There were, however, some interesting observations 
on the dropped factors such as items having different quality attributes to those retained for 
further analysis which points to directions of further research. These are discussed in the next 
chapter.  Having reported on the results of the South African exploratory factor solutions, the 
focus is now turned to the New Zealand factor solutions. These are presented on table 5.8 
below.  
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Table 5-8: Exploratory factor solitions for New Zealand 
 
Items 
Components (factors) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mon1 0.929         
Mon2 0.913         
Mon3 0.701         
Mon4 0.720         
Mon5 0.697         
Mon6 0.819         
Mon7 0.790         
Mon8 0.830         
Mon9 0.666         
T1*          
T2*          
T3  0.704        
T4  0.691        
T5  0.846        
T6  0.886        
T7  0.826        
T8  0.841        
T9  0.750        
T10  0.824        
Inc1   0.869       
Inc2   0.688       
Inc3   0.927       
Inc4   0.670       
Inc5   0.738       
Inc6   0.902       
Inc7        0.828  
Inc8        0.804  
IC1         0.771 
IC2    0.550     0.646 
IC3    0.910      
IC4    0.631      
IC5    0.749      
IC6    0.873      
IC7       0.802   
IC8       0.821   
L1      0.815    
L2      0.887    
L3     0.808     
L4     0.830     
L5     0.696     
L6     0.642     
% of variance explained = 71.950. * factor loadings are below the 0.55 cut off and are 
not reported. KMO = 0.702.  BTS (p < 0.001). 
Note: KMO = KMO measure of sampling adequacy and BTS = Bartlett‟s test for 
Sphericity. 
 
With a KMO measure of sampling adequacy of 0.702 and a significant Bartlett‟s test for 
Sphericity, the New Zealand data was also found to be appropriate for factor analysis. The 
factor analysis produced a ten factor solution and the first five factors corresponded with the 
intended variables of monitoring (factor one), trust (factor two), incentives (factor three), item 
criticality (factor four) and the legal system (factor five). The other five factors represented 
either cross loadings or loadings with only two items or less.  
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In particular, like with the South African case, items intended to measure the monitoring 
variable loaded on factor one. Eight of the ten items intended to measure the trust variable 
loaded on factor two. Items one and two did not load at the 0.550 loading cut off point. The 
research was therefore satisfied that the eight items that loaded on factor two measure what 
the trust variable intended to measure. Other factors were dropped from the analysis as they 
were loaded with only one and two items. As with the South African case, factor two items 
are more in line with Sako‟s (1992) good will trust and the other factors are more aligned to 
Sako‟s (1992) contractual trust. Further empirical work may therefore have to take the 
different dimensions of trust into account.  
 
Factor three was loaded with six of the eight items that were meant to capture the incentives 
variable. The other two items loaded on factor eight. This factor was therefore dropped from 
the analysis and the research was satisfied that factor three measured what the incentives 
variable intended to measure. The two items that loaded on factor eight were mainly those 
related to the provision of incentives to ensure grapes‟ physical qualities of damage and 
disease control. As with the South Africa case, this may suggest that further research may 
need to separately consider chemical and physical attributes of grapes. 
  
Four of the eight items meant to capture the item criticality variable loaded on factor four. 
Item two cross loaded on factors four and nine. Item one loaded on factor nine while items 
seven and eight loaded on factor seven. Factor four was therefore presumed to measure what 
the item criticality variable intended to measure. The other factors were not considered for 
further analysis because they loaded with fewer than the required three items.  
 
A total of four out of the six items that constituted the legal system variable loaded on factor 
five. This factor was therefore considered to measure what the legal system intended to 
measure. Items one and two loaded on factor six and this factor was subsequently dropped 
from further analysis. It is not clear why these two items were misaligned with the other four 
items. However, the two items are more aligned to the judicial systems‟ moral standing such 
as fairness and impartiality and the other items seem to be aligned towards judicial systems‟ 
effectiveness such as speed of resolving disputes, cost effectiveness of the legal system and its 
ability to enforce decisions.  
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What emerges from the New Zealand exploratory factor analysis is that items that were 
intended to measure the monitoring variable loaded on factor one. Generally, and those that 
were intended to measure trust, incentives, item criticality and the legal system loaded on 
factors two, three, four and five respectively. The other five factors loaded with one or two 
items only and were therefore dropped from the analysis. 
 
Lastly, what is clear from the South African and New Zealand exploratory factor analysis 
process is that items that were intended to capture a given variable heavily loaded on one 
factor. As a result, the research was able to derive five factors in both countries and these 
factors were identified with the intended variables of monitoring, trust, incentives, the legal 
system and item criticality. In the two countries, the other five factors loaded with only one or 
two items and were subsequently dropped from the analysis. There was however some 
interesting observations on the dropped factors such as items having common attributes 
among themselves but different attributes to those retained for further analysis. This may 
suggest possibilities for further refinements of the constructs. This point is discussed in the 
next chapter. The factors that were considered to capture the intended variables were carried 
over for further analysis and were subjected to the reliability test.  
5.5.1.1 Scale Reliability Assessment 
 
The Cronbach‟s alpha (α) is the most commonly used method of assessing reliability in 
empirical research (Kao, 2007). In this research, Cronbach‟s alpha was derived for all the 
constructs of interest. It was supplemented by item-to-total correlation scores. Table 5.9 
below presents results of the reliability tests. It is important to note that some items that were 
carried over for further analysis during the validity procedure were dropped after subjecting 
the constructs to reliability test because this test allows for further refinement of the scales. 
Table 5.9 below presents the reliability test results. 
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Table 5-9: Scale reliability measures (α) 
South Africa New Zealand 
Construct 
and α 
 
Items α if item 
deleted 
Item to total 
correlation (r) 
Construct 
and α 
 
Items α if item 
deleted 
Item to total 
correlation (r) 
Trust 
α = 0.956 
(6 items) 
 
T5 0.910 0.868 Trust  
α = 0.917 
(6 items) 
T5 0.901 0.792 
T6 0.924 0.748 T6 0.887 0.869 
T7 0.927 0.749 T7 0.906 0.788 
T8 0.921 0.768 T8 0.900 0.790 
T9 0.908 0.870 T9 0.916 0.656 
 T10 0.915 0.815  T10 0.902 0.777 
 
Monitoring 
α = 0.951 
(9 items) 
Mon1 0.944 0.848 Monitoring 
α = 0.913 
(5 items) 
Mon1 0.887 0.872 
Mon2 0.942 0.898 Mon2 0.902 0.845 
Mon3 0.943 0.860 Mon6 0.924 0.668 
Mon4 0.948 0.784 Mon7 0.925 0.657 
Mon5 0.951 0.701 Mon8 0.909 0.646 
Mon6 0.946 0.702    
Mon7 0.948 0.762    
 Mon8 0.944 0.850     
 Mon9 0.946 0.797     
 
Incentives 
α = 0.868 
(8 items) 
Inc1 0.861 0.539 Incentives 
α = 0.966 
(3 items) 
Inc1 0.909 0.960 
Inc2 0.842 0.709 Inc3 0.951 0.930 
Inc3 0.864 0.524 Inc6 0.920 0.951 
Inc4 0.831 0.787    
 Inc5 0.846 0.678     
 Inc6 0.839 0.732     
 Inc7 0.858 0.572     
 Inc8 0.866 0.483     
 
Legal  
α = 0.870 
(3 items) 
L1 0.766 0.823 Legal  
α = 0.754 
(4 items) 
L3 0.638 0.651 
L2 0.826 0.916 L4 0.692 0.558 
L6 0.851 0.905 L5 0.704 0.536 
   L6 0.744 0.460 
 
Item 
criticality 
α = 0.830 
(3 items) 
IC1 0.742 0.712 Item 
criticality 
α = 0.838 
(5 items) 
IC2 0.841 0.578 
IC2 0.821 0.645 IC3 0.768 0.839 
IC5 0.727 0.762 IC4 0.848 0.544 
   IC5 0.842 0.572 
   IC6 0.785 0.782 
 
Reported in pairs of South Africa (SA): New Zealand (NZ), the following cronbach alphas 
were attained, Trust (SA=0.956: NZ=0.917), Monitoring (SA=0.951: NZ=0.913), Incentives 
(SA=0.868: NZ=0.966), legal system (SA=0.870: NZ=0.754) and Item criticality (SA=0.830: 
NZ=0.838). All were above the acceptable levels of 0.70 (George & Mallery, 2009). The 
item-to-total correlations are also very high. They were all above the acceptable 0.30 rule of 
thumb level for this test (Cao, 2001). This shows that the items building all the variables 
generally follow the same direction or hang together.  
5.6 The Main Research Results 
The main results of this research aim at achieving the research objectives. These are:  
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(a) To integrate TCE theory, agency theory, relational exchange theory and the contract 
enforcement mechanism of the legal system and develop a multi-paradigm governance 
framework that is more effective in protecting exchange relationships than any exchange 
protection framework in isolation. 
 
(b) To use the multi- paradigm governance framework developed in (a) above to help explain 
why firms use incomplete contracts despite their vulnerability to ex post opportunism.  
 
(c) To investigate the structure of, and the differences between the South African and New 
Zealand wineries‟ grape sourcing strategies. 
 
The third research objective was achieved through the analysis of the coordination strategies 
employed by wineries in the two countries and the second research objective was achieved 
through the hypotheses testing phase. The first research objective was achieved through the 
development of the multi-paradigm framework in chapter three.  
5.6.1 The Coordination Strategies: Options, Differences and Similarities 
Three key coordination strategies of hierarchy, contract and the spot market have been found 
to be common within the wine industry (Scales et al., 1995; Somogyi et al., 2010). The 
presence or use of these strategies to coordinate grapes sourcing was therefore investigated for 
this research. Also investigated were the differences and similarities in the coordination 
strategies employed in the two countries. This helped achieve the third research objective.  
5.6.1.1 Coordination Options  
The proportion of grapes sourced through a given coordination strategy was coded on a scale 
of 1 - 5 where (1-19 percent was coded as “1” and 80-100 percent was coded as “5”). The 
actual proportions were also asked for and were provided in the majority of cases (Appendix 
1, question one shows the coding details). The results confirmed that indeed wineries use the 
coordination options of hierarchy, contract and the spot market to source their grapes. Table 
5.10 below shows the contribution of the three strategies to total grapes requirements in the 
last harvest year. 
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Table 5-10: Contribution of grape coordination strategies to total grape requirements 
 
Coordination 
strategy 
South Africa New Zealand 
Mean Std Dev. Contribution 
to total grapes 
Mean Std. Dev. Contribution 
to total grapes 
Spot Market 1.189 0.393 15.806 1.181 0.387 14.435 
Vertical Integration 3.550 1.777 47.182 4.362 1.058 53.319 
Contract 2.784 1.147 37.011 2.638 1.050 32.245 
 Total 100.00*  Total 100.00* 
*Totals may not add up due to rounding up. 
 
The spot market mean value of 1.189 and 1.181 for South Africa and New Zealand suggests 
that the spot market was used to source 15.81 and 14.44 percent of total grapes for the two 
countries respectively. Internal production of grapes contributed the highest share of grape 
needs for wineries in both countries, accounting for 47.18 and 53.32 percent for South Africa 
and New Zealand respectively. Grapes sourced through a contract were 37.01 percent of 
South African total grape requirements and 32.25 percent for New Zealand‟s grape 
requirements. These results are in line with Scales et al.,’s (1995) findings that wineries 
typically use a combination of the three grape sourcing strategies of the spot market, contract 
and own production to meet their grape needs. Further, the small contribution of the spot 
market relative to that of contracting and own production to the total grape requirements is in 
line with Drabenstott (1995) who argued that industrialisation of the agricultural sector has 
brought a shift from spot market transactions to more direct market channels such as 
production contracts and vertical control. This shift is said to have been a result of emerging 
market forces (Barkema, Drabenstotott, & Welch, 1991; Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002) where the 
new consumer is a highly demanding one who demands the best quality and the new producer 
is the one who designs their governance structure in a way that allows them to have control 
over quality and their marketing strategies. Responses given to this research for the 
dominance of the internal production of grapes corroborated the above argument as they 
centred on issues related to quality control. Firms noted that own production of grapes was a 
strategy of choice because it ensured access to high quality grapes. Further, it was said to be 
an effective marketing tool as wineries will advertise that they “grow” and “process” their 
own grapes. This, they argued, would show that they are indeed in control of the quality of 
their wines. In addition, many wineries under family and/or sole ownership noted that they are 
boutique wineries, indicating that they have their own piece of land and they produce their 
own unique wines. The fact that they have their own land allows them to produce grapes that 
meet the specifics of their unique wines. Lastly, over and above quality, some wineries noted 
that own production of grapes ensures the security of supply of grapes. That is over and above 
quality issues; own production of grapes assured them that there will be grapes available for 
use by the winery.     
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This notwithstanding, contracts were still seen as an important governance mode. As noted 
above, they accounted for over 30 percent of grape requirements in both countries. Major 
reasons for engaging in contractual relationships had to do with costs and quality. Contracting 
was said to help in ensuring the supply of quality grapes. Perhaps, not of the same quality as 
those produced in house but still good enough to produce a marketable product. Second, 
contracts were said to allow different terrior benefits in that the winery can have contracts 
with growers producing grapes on different regions with different soil and weather and soil 
conditions and this helps in the diversification of the final product. Different varieties require 
different soil and weather conditions and the only way wineries can produce different 
varieties that grow in different terriors is through geographically spreading the sources of 
grapes. Lastly, and probably most importantly, contracts were said to be a cost effective way 
of sourcing grapes. They were said to help transfer risk (mainly climatic risk) from the winery 
to the grower(s) and also help wineries save on capital inputs.  
 
Accounting for only 13 - 14 percent of total grapes requirements in both South Africa and 
New Zealand, the spot market was unsurprisingly not seen as the governance mode of choice. 
This is because as observed above, the focus has turned towards customising exchange 
relationships in such a way that producers have control over the quality of their final product. 
For example, one winery noted that sourcing grapes from the spot market is not aligned with 
its “long term‟ philosophy. In South Africa, many growers are shareholders of wineries. 
These growers supply the wineries with grapes and this reduces spot market trade. The spot 
market nevertheless serves some purpose, that of filling the gaps when there are shortfalls 
from both own production and contractual arrangements and also for blending purposes. 
Some wineries noted that the spot market becomes handy when they need grapes for blending 
purposes, as these grapes may be used to add more complexity to the flavour and texture of 
the dominant varieties. The next section identifies the similarities and differences in the grape 
sourcing strategies and thus helps to address the research question that sought to establish 
similarities and differences between the South African and New Zealand grape sourcing 
strategies.  
5.6.1.2 Similarities and Differences between Coordination Strategies by South 
African and New Zealand wineries 
In order to identify the similarities and differences between the South African and New 
Zealand winery grape sourcing strategies, the Independent samples t-tests were used to test 
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for the statistical differences between governance strategies employed in the two countries. 
The results are presented in table 5.11 below. 
 
Table 5-11: The independent samples t-tests for the equality of means of governance 
structures 
  
Mean 
NZ# 
 
Mean 
SA# 
 
 
t 
 
 
Sig. 
 
Mean 
difference 
 
Std. 
error 
t-test for equality of means 
(95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Spot Market 1.181 1.189 -0.157 0.875 -0.008 0.052 -0.110 0.094 
Contract 2.784 2.638 -0.998 0.318 -0.146 0.146 -0.433 0.142 
Vertical 
Integration 
4.362 3.550 4.162 0.000* 0.813 0.195 0.432 1.198 
# NZ - New Zealand; SA - South Africa, *Significant at the (p < 0.001) level. 
 
The governance modes were all measured on a scale of 1-5, where “1” represents the lowest 
score and “5” represents the highest score of a given mode. The results show that there are no 
significant differences between the two countries‟ spot market and contracting governance 
strategies. However, some significant difference was found in the vertical integration strategy, 
with New Zealand wineries relying more on own production of grapes than the South African 
wineries. This is not very surprising because 49.1 percent of wineries in were family owned as 
compared to 38.0 percent for South Africa. The New Zealand firms emphasised the fact that 
they are boutique wineries that produce their own grapes.  
5.6.2 Hypothesis Testing: Multiple Regression Analysis and the Independent 
Samples t-test. 
This section tested the hypotheses developed in Chapter three. A total of nine hypotheses 
were tested using five multiple regression models and one Independent samples t-test. The 
multiple regression analysis is a statistical technique that can be used to analyse the relation 
between a single dependent variable and two or more independent variables (Hair et al., 
2010). All hypotheses except H 2b  were tested through the multiple regression technique while 
H 2b was tested through the independent samples t-test. This test is useful when the objective is 
to compare the mean values of two different groups. It was used to test whether or not the 
South African legal system is statistically different from the New Zealand legal system. The 
multiple regression analysis technique was used to objectively assess the relationships 
between the dependent variables and the independent variables by estimating the predictive 
powers of the independent variables. It was used in hypotheses that helped explain why firms 
use incomplete contracts despite their vulnerability to ex post opportunism.  
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5.6.2.1 Results of the Hypotheses Tests 
As stated above, five models were used to test the nine hypotheses. The testing process did 
not follow the numbering order of the hypotheses. Instead, hypotheses with a common 
dependent variable were grouped and tested through a single model. For example, hypotheses 
one used contracting as the dependent variable and was tested through the first model 
(labelled model 5.1). The first part of hypothesis two (H2b) and hypothesis three used spot 
market as the dependent variable and were both tested through the second model (5.2). 
Hypotheses four, seven, eight and nine used vertical integration as the dependent variable and 
were collectively tested through the third model (5.3). The fourth (5.4) and fifth (5.5) models 
used monitoring and incentives as dependent variables and were used to test hypotheses five 
and six respectively.  
Hypothesis One 
This was the research‟s main hypothesis and it directly helped achieve the research‟s second 
objective of explaining why contracts are widely used even though they expose exchange 
relationships to opportunism. This hypothesis emanated from an observation during the 
literature review that although incomplete contracts associated with the TCE expose 
transactions to exchange hazards, they (contracts) are still widely used as a governance 
mechanism (Fraser, 2005). This has also been confirmed by the current research. It has been 
found that contractual use is the second most popular governance mode after vertical control 
in both South Africa and New Zealand. This is surprising, more so that there are other 
supposedly cheaper and less hazardous governance options such as transacting with trusted 
partners (relational exchange theory) and monitoring and providing incentives to trading 
partners to encourage their performance (agency theory). This research suggests that the 
continued use of incomplete contracts is partly due to the fact that they are in fact 
complimented by the exchange safeguards associated with relational norms such as trust as 
well as monitoring and incentives. The research extends the argument by proposing that, in 
addition, the legal system also gives assurances that recourse to the law provides added 
safeguards against trading partners‟ opportunistic behaviour. Contracting is therefore 
encouraged and complemented by trust, monitoring, incentives and the legal system. Hence, 
 
H1: Monitoring, incentives, trust and the legal system encourage contracting. 
 
In testing this hypothesis, the contracting governance mode was the dependent variable and 
the key independent variables were trust, monitoring, incentives, and the legal system. A 
positive relationship was expected between the dependent variable and the key independent 
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variables.  Item crititicality, firm size and age were the control variables. The hypothesis was 
tested through model 5.1 below: 
 
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 i
Contracting Trust Monitoring Incentives Legal
Itemcriticality FirmSize FirmAge
    
   
     
  
 
Equation 5-1: Contracting regression model 
 
The regression results of the above model are presented in table 5.12 below. 
 
Table 5-12: Model 5.1 regression results 
South Africa New Zealand 
Variables   t Sig VIF Variables   t Sig VIF 
Constant -3.795 -2.048   Constant -3.212 -2.360   
Trust 0.748 1.869 0.064*** 1.302 Trust 0.280 1.883 0.062*** 1.195 
Monitoring 0.271 2.368 0.020** 1.247 Monitoring 0.354 4.691 0.000* 1.081 
Incentives 0.463 1.740 0.085*** 1.141 Incentives 0.411 2.616 0.010** 1.074 
Legal  0.294 2.319 0.022** 1.175 Legal  0.631 1.815 0.072*** 1.156 
Item 
criticality 
-0.313 -1.993 0.049** 1.043 Item 
criticality 
-0.042 -0.299 0.765 1.049 
FirmSize 0.179 1.858 0.066*** 1.113 FirmSize 0.223 1.735 0.086*** 1.094 
FirmAge 0.378 2.782 0.006** 1.067 FirmAge -0.075 -0.729 0.468 1.043 
r
2
= 0.343.  F = 7.087*. r
2
= 0.361.  F = 8.714* 
Significant at the *(p<0.001); ** p<0.05 and *** (p<0.010) levels. 
 
Results: The two countries have significant F values (p < 0.05). This suggests that at least one 
of the independent variables explains variations in contracting as a governance mode. This 
gives affirmation that the regression coefficient of determination (r 2 ) is not zero. It is 
therefore not surprising that the r 2 for South Africa is 0.343 and for New Zealand is 0.361. 
This implies that the model explains 34.3 percent and 36.1 percent of variation in contracting 
in South Africa and New Zealand respectively. The beta coefficients for the key independent 
variables of trust, monitoring, incentives and the legal system take the expected positive sign 
for both countries. The p-values for trust and incentives are significant at (p < 0.10) and those 
of monitoring and the legal system are significant at the (p < 0.05) level for South Africa. 
Hypothesis one was therefore supported by the South African data. The control variables of 
firm size (p < 0.10) and age (p < 0.05) had a positive and significant (p < 0.05) relationship 
with contracting, while item criticality had a negative and significant relationship with 
contracting.   
 
With the New Zealand data, the p-values for monitoring and incentives are significant at the 
(p < 0.01) and (p < 0.05) levels respectively. The trust and the legal system variables are 
significant at the (p < 0.10) level. This shows that hypothesis one is also supported by the 
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New Zealand data. As for the control variables, firm size is positively correlated with 
contracting and is significant at (p < 0.10). Item criticality and firm age have a negative but 
insignificant relationship with contracting.  
 
Since the hypothesis is supported for both countries, there is strong support for the argument 
that contracting is encouraged and complemented by trust, incentives, monitoring and the 
legal system. This provides insights into why contracts are widely used despite their obvious 
limitations of exposing transactions to opportunism. This research argues that because of the 
positive correlation between contracting (dependent variable) and the independent variables 
of trust (relational exchange theory), monitoring and incentives (agency theory) and the 
contract enforcement mechanism provided by the legal system, the independent variables 
complement contracting in protecting exchange relationships against opportunism. While no 
other study was found to have simultaneously tested the relationship between contracting and 
the above exchange protection frameworks, the results are in line with various studies that 
have tested the contractual relationships that used the different exchange protection 
frameworks or used a narrower theoretical perspective.  
  
For example, Logan (2000) used agency theory to try to answer two pertinent questions of 
what can the transport user do to encourage quality service and fair treatment by the transport 
provider and, what can the provider do to satisfy the demands of the user without 
compromising it‟s own goals? She concludes that both the behaviour based (monitoring) and 
outcome based (incentives) contracts should be used since the former favours the service 
provider and the latter favours the service user. Poppo & Zenger (2002) found a positive 
relationship between contracting and relational governance (trust) within the information 
services exchanges. Managers were found to couple customised contracts with high levels of 
relational   governance. A related study on the strategic relationships between French firms by 
Beave & Saussier (2010) found that contracts could serve as a framework for guiding the 
course of cooperation and cooperation helps firms overcome the adaptive limits of contracts. 
The latter studies not only show the successful use of contracts by firms to protect exchange 
relationships but also show that different exchange protection mechanisms can be used in a 
complementary manner, such as formal contracts being used to develop and nurture 
cooperation and cooperation helping firms resolve any contractual disputes. Further, Mina 
(2006) investigated the importance of contract enforcement in international lending and found 
that improvement in contract enforcement seemed to increase the level of the country‟s 
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lending ability as this gave the creditors some assurance that the lending contract would most 
likely be honoured within an improved legal framework.  
These studies suggest that aspects of agency and relational exchange theory as well the legal 
system provide exchange protection, and that these frameworks complement each other in 
protecting exchange relationships. Incomplete contracts may therefore be widely used without 
the expected transaction hazards because they are partly protected by trust, monitoring and the 
legal system.  
Hypothesis Two and Three 
Hypothesis two and three used the spot market as the dependent variable. They were 
essentially concerned with factors that influence variations in the spot market governance 
mode. The second hypothesis was based on the premise that, as suggested by hypothesis one, 
the legal system protects exchange relationships against opportunism. It gives assurances that 
spot market players that act opportunistically would be prosecuted. Thus, it encourages spot 
market transactions as it acts as a guarantor of exchange performance. The spot market here 
does not envisage discrete transactions where each party is certain never to meet the other 
party (Macneal, 1978), but rather arms length exchanges without any close relationship or 
joint commitment (Lambert et al., 1996) but with possibilities for repeated transactions 
(Webster, 1992). Hence; 
 
H 2a : The legal system encourages spot market transacting. 
 
This research is of the view that a strong legal system protects exchange relationships better 
than a weak legal system. For this reason, the stronger New Zealand legal system (World 
Bank, 2008) is expected to provide better protection to exchange relationships than the 
weaker South African legal system. Hence, 
 
H 2b : A stronger legal system (New Zealand) better protects exchange relationships than a   
weaker (South African) legal system. 
 
Hypothesis three was influenced by the fact that spot market actors generally have arms 
length relationships in which trust plays little or no role in facilitating exchange between 
partners (Lambert et al., 1996). On the other hand, monitoring and incentives assume a 
continuous relationship in which performance is continually evaluated and punishments and 
rewards applied by participants when the need arises. Since arms length transactions do not 
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allow for planned incessant interaction between the parties, monitoring and incentives are not 
expected to have any meaningful exchange protection qualities for spot market/arms length 
transactions. They are therefore expected to provide exchange protection in contractual 
arrangements and offer no or little protection to the spot market transactions. This again 
discourages spot market transacting. Hence, 
 
H
3
: Trust, monitoring and incentives discourage spot market transacting. 
 
In testing H
2a
the spot market governance mode was the dependent variable and the legal 
system was the independent or explanatory variable. A positive relationship was expected 
between the two countries‟ legal systems and the spot market. The spot market was still the 
dependent variable in the test for H 3 . The independent variables were trust, monitoring and 
incentives. A negative relationship was expected between the spot market and the independent 
variables. Model 5.2 below was used to test H 2a and H 3 . Item criticality, firm size and age 
were the control variables. 
 
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 i
SpotMarket Trust Monitoring Incentives Legal
ItemCriticality FirmSize FirmAge
    
   
     
  
 
Equation 5-2: Spot market resgression model 
 
The results of testing model 5.2 are presented in table 5.13 below. 
 
Table 5-13: Model 5.2 regression results 
South Africa New Zealand 
Variables   t Sig VIF Variables   t Sig VIF 
Constant -0.021 -0.030   Constant -0.504 -1.002 0.319  
Trust 0.297 1.967 0.052*** 1.302 Trust 0.307 5.600 0.000* 1.195 
Monitoring 0.014 0.317 0.752 1.247 Monitoring -0.014 -0.488 0.626 1.081 
Incentives -0.49 -0.491 0.625 1.141 Incentives -0.151 -2.604 0.011** 1.074 
Legal 0.175 3.647 0.000* 1.175 Legal 0.231 1.801 0.074*** 1.156 
Item 
criticality 
-0.087 -1.464 0.146 1.043 Item 
criticality 
0.011 0.217 0.829 1.049 
Size -0.012 -0.329 0.743 1.113 Size 0.131 2.752 0.007** 1.094 
Age-Co 0.001 0.011 0.991 1.067 Age-Co 0.025 0.658 0.512 1.043 
r
2
= 0.202.  F = 3.733* r
2
= 0.358.  F = 8.590* 
Significant at the *(p<0.001); ** p<0.05 and *** (p<0.010) levels. 
   
 
Results: The F statistic is significant (p < 0.01) for the two countries. Hence the model 
explains some variation in the spot market transacting decisions. The r 2 for South Africa 
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suggests that 20.2 percent of the variation in the South African spot market mode is explained 
by the model. The statistic stands at 0.358 for New Zealand, which suggests that 35.8 percent 
of the variation in the spot market transacting is explained by the model.  
 
The beta coefficients for the legal system are positive and significant for South Africa (p < 
0.001) and New Zealand (p < 0.10), a suggestion that indeed the legal system encourages spot 
market transacting in both countries. H
2a
 is therefore supported in both South Africa and 
New Zealand. H 2b  purports a strong legal system as a better protector of exchange 
relationships than a weak legal system. This hypothesis was tested through the Independent-
Samples t-test approach. However, before reporting the results of the Independent samples t-
test, results of hypothesis three are first reported because this hypothesis was tested through 
the model that was used to test H 2a . That is, the model that used the spot market as its 
dependent variable. 
 
The results for hypothesis three show that for South Africa, the beta coefficients for trust and 
monitoring take the unexpected positive signs. However, only trust is significant at the (p < 
0.10) level but as noted above, it is in the wrong direction. The incentive variable takes the 
expected negative sign but is insignificant. Hypothesis three is therefore not supported by the 
South African data. The positive and significant trust variable raises important issues that will 
be discussed shortly. In New Zealand, the incentives variable takes the expected negative sign 
and is significant (p < 0.05). Monitoring takes the expected negative sign but is insignificant. 
Similar to the South African data, trust takes the unexpected positive sign and is significant (p 
< 0.01). The hypothesis is therefore partially supported for New Zealand. The trust variable 
follows the South African case and takes a positive (wrong direction) and significant sign. 
The significance of the unexpected relationship between trust and the spot market in both 
countries implies that the results did not occur by chance and thus warrant an explanation. A 
look at the organisational structures of the wine industries in the two countries may shed light 
on the behaviour of the spot market-trust relationship in the two countries. In both countries, 
wineries and growers are members of their respective national winery associations and these 
associations have some control on the behaviour of members (NZWINE, 2009; SAWIS, 
2009). Since the wineries and growers are members of the same organisation, and in line with 
Lambert et al., (1996), it may be inappropriate to classify non-contracted but externally 
sourced grapes as strictly “spot market sourced”. This is because these grapes are essentially 
sourced from growers that are within the inner circle of wineries, and may therefore be known 
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to the wineries. Under such circumstances, it may not mean that the wineries go to the 
conventional spot market to source extra grapes, but rather acquire grapes from growers that 
the wineries‟ did not have an active supply contract with but still known to the wineries. 
There is also a high likelihood that they would have purchased from them before. 
 
Further, one of the main objectives of the umbrella wine organisations is to drive and promote 
quality within the two countries‟ wine industries. For example, the NZ WINE annual report of 
(2009) notes that New Zealand wine is marketed as a national brand and states in clear terms 
that “protecting and promoting that brand is essential for each individual grower and winery 
and for the industry as whole and for the national organisation” (p. 6). Likewise, according to 
the South African Wine and Brandy Company (SAWB) (2003), the core of the South African 
wine industry marketing strategy is to promote the South African wine as a national brand 
called „Brand South Africa‟ and every member is expected to play a part in making this 
strategy a success. Therefore, mutual membership of the wider organisation seems to suggest 
informally agreeing to produce a certain level of quality, the level that is acceptable to the 
national organisation, the same way contracting parties would agree to maintain certain 
quality levels. Membership of the same organisation by wineries and growers therefore points 
to a silent but effective unwritten contractual agreement.  
 
Hence, the existence of national organisations in each country seem to suggest that the spot 
market in both countries is not a typical spot market that is characterised by one off 
interactions without any expectations of future interactions. It seems it functions like a 
contractual agreement of some sort where the contract is represented by the collective 
belonging of the firms to the wider industry organisation. Thus, since spot market transactions 
may represent some form of a pseudo contractual relationship that is enforced by collective 
belonging to the organisation, then the unexpected positive relationship between the spot 
market (pseudo contract) and trust would be in line and supportive of hypothesis one where 
the results showed a significant positive relationship between contracting and trust. That is, 
while the relationship between spot market and trust was unexpected, it may well have been 
supportive of this research‟s main theoretical stand point that contracts are supported by other 
exchange frameworks including relational norms. In addition, growers in both countries have 
no alternative market for their grapes. They are captive to the wineries, especially the big ones 
that dictate or determine grape prices. Growers are therefore forced to tore the wineries‟ line 
and this may be seen by wineries as the existence of trusting relationships between growers 
and wineries. A discussion with growers may portray a different picture.   
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This argument is in line with the transaction governance literature. Webster (1992) observes 
that pure spot market transactions are rare, and that their importance as the beginning of the 
transaction continuum is for theoretical rather than practical reasons. What is observed in the 
real world is arms-length transactions (Lambert et al., 1996) or repeated transactions 
(Webster, 1992), where exchange partners may engage in single or repeated transactions but 
without any meaningful ongoing relationship between them. Such relationships have 
rudimentary levels of credibility and may therefore not be treated as purely spot market 
relationships. This may therefore explain the positive and significant relationship between 
spot market (arms-length) transactions and trust. Thus, the fact that wineries belong to the 
same wider organisation may act as a pseudo contractual relationship and hence the positive 
relationship with trust. This suggests that, as with hypothesis one, trust encourages the 
contractual relationships, which in this case are pseudo contractual relationships represented 
by mutual membership of the same national organisation by wineries and growers. This 
therefore provides further support to hypothesis one that contractual performance is 
encouraged by other exchange protection frameworks.  
 
Returning to H 2b , this hypothesis argues that a strong legal system better protects exchange 
relationships than a weak legal system. This hypothesis was tested through the Independent-
Samples t-test technique. This technique is useful when a researcher wants to compare the 
mean scores of two different groups. In this case, the research compared the mean score of the 
legal system variable in South Africa with that of New Zealand. The key objective was to 
establish whether the mean score of the New Zealand legal system is significantly higher than 
the mean score of the South African legal system. The results are presented in table 5.14 
below.  
Table 5-14: Independent t-test for the equality of means – the legal system 
Mean 
#NZ 
Mean 
#SA 
t Sig  
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
difference 
Std 
Error 
t - test for equality of means (95% 
Confidence Interval of the Difference) 
Lower Upper 
3.168 3.004 2.148 0.017* 0.164 0.076 0.014 0.315 
#NZ - New Zealand; SA - South Africa, Significant at the (p < 0.05) level. 
 
The results show that the mean score for New Zealand (3.168) is 0.164 larger than that of 
South Africa (3.004), an indication that the New Zealand legal system was perceived to offer 
better protection to exchange relationships than that of South Africa. This result is statistically 
significant (p < 0.05), which shows that the difference in opinions about the performance of 
the legal systems in both countries did not occur by chance. This shows that the New Zealand 
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legal system better protects exchange relationships than the South African legal system. 
H 2b was therefore supported.  
  
Hypotheses Four, Seven, Eight and Nine 
 
Hypotheses four, seven and eight had vertical control as the dependent variable. They helped 
the research explore the causes of variations within the vertical integration governance mode. 
Hypothesis four was based on the premise that since monitoring and incentives are contractual 
safeguards, they offer firms an alternative governance mode to vertical control. That is, 
monitoring and incentives would help firms transfer transactions that are not suitable for 
execution within the firm to the market through monitoring and incentives supported 
contractual arrangements. Since monitoring and incentives provide firms with an option of 
contracting out functions that are not suitable for internalisation within the firm, it is fair to 
expect these variables (monitoring and incentives) to discourage vertical control. A negative 
relationship was therefore expected between vertical integration and monitoring and 
incentives. Further, since the legal system mainly plays a role in facilitating transactions 
between two independent entities, it encourages inter-firm contractual and spot market 
transactions. That is, the legal system encourages firms to transfer transactions that are better 
handled by the market to the market and hence discourages firms from internalising such 
transactions. A negative relationship was therefore expected between vertical control and the 
legal system, therefore;   
 
H 4 : Monitoring, incentives and the legal system discourage vertical integration.  
 
Hypothesis seven was a control hypothesis. The hypothesis main influence was the various 
perceptions in the literature about other factors that may affect the choice of coordination 
measures. While there may be many such factors, this research restricted itself to firm size, 
age and the importance of the sourced input (item criticality). Larger firms are said to be more 
likely to do everything themselves as a way of reducing per unit costs (Scherer & Ross, 
1990). Further, the choice of governance mechanism may be influenced by the differentiation 
of the sourced item (Fernández-Olmos et al., 2009).  As such, wineries producing wine for the 
premium market are more likely to internalise the grape production process as a mechanism 
of ensuring that the grapes they use are of high quality. Lastly, mature firms are more likely to 
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integrate because they have more resources to do everything themselves (Everaert et al., 
2010). Hence; 
 
H
7
: Vertical integration is positively correlated with firm size 
H
8
:  Vertical integration is positively correlated with item criticality. 
H
9
 Vertical integration is positively correlated with firm size 
 
Model 5.3 was used to test the above four hypotheses. The model examined the relationship 
between internalisation of transactions or vertical integration (VI) with six independent 
variables, monitoring, incentives, the legal system and controlled for item criticality, firm 
size, and age. Model 5.3 takes the form: 
 
1 2 3 4
5 6 i
Vertical Integration Monitoring Incentives Legal ItemCrtiticality
FirmSeze FirmAge
    
  
     
  
 
Equation 5-3: Vertical integration regression model 
 
Table 5.15 below summarises the results obtained from running model 5.4. 
 
Table 5-15: Model 5.3 regression results 
South Africa New Zealand 
Variables   t Sig VIF Variables   t Sig VIF 
Constant 5.670 3.080   Constant 7.314 5.173 0.000  
Monitoring -0.128 -0.752 0.454 1.111 Monitoring -0.044 -0.559 0.577 1.064 
Incentives -3.330 -0.792 0.430 1.130 Incentives -0.217 -1.330 0.186 1.033 
Legal -0.580 -2.922 0.004** 1.164 Legal -1.025 -2.869 0.005** 1.085 
Item 
criticality 
0.857 3.507 0.001* 1.025 Item 
criticality 
0.468 3.193 0.002** 1.026 
Firm Size -0.505 -3.390 0.001* 1.078 Firm Size -0.437 -3.215 0.002** 1.093 
Firm Age -0.485 -2.290 0.024** 1.046 Firm Age -0.043 -0.395 0.693 1.042 
r
2
= 0.316. F = 8.017* r
2
= 0.287.  F = 7.318* 
Significant at the *(p<0.001); ** p<0.05 and *** (p<0.010) levels. 
 
Results: The F statistic for both countries is significant (p < 0.01), which supports the model 
fit. The r 2 for South Africa suggests that 31.6 percent of the variation in vertical integration 
decisions is explained by the model. The r 2 for New Zealand shows that the model explains 
28.7 percent of the variation in vertical integration decisions in New Zealand. 
 
Hypothesis four results show that the legal system has a negative and significant (p < 0.05) 
correlation with vertical control in both South Africa and New Zealand. Hence, the legal 
system discourages vertical control in both countries. This may primarily be because since the 
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legal system helps reduce transaction uncertainties (Cungu, Gow, Swinnen, & Vranken, 2008; 
Mina, 2006), it may help keep transactions within the contractual and spot market 
arrangements. Again these results may provide support for hypothesis one that argued that the 
legal system encourages contractual arrangements. That is, holding everything constant, the 
legal system would help keep transactions within the market through contractual 
arrangements rather than push them to internal organisation of the firm. Other hypothesised 
relationships within hypothesis four, namely, monitoring and incentives also assumed the 
expected negative relationship but were insignificant. The insignificance of these variables 
may be explained by the fact that theoretically they are not important antecedents of the 
vertical control governance mode. They are traditionally formal contract enforcement 
mechanisms (Bergen et al., 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989) and while they may generally be 
negatively correlated with vertical control, they may not have any significant role to play in a 
unified firm, and thus of little relevance in the vertical integration discussions.  
 
The test results for hypothesis seven show the unexpected negative and significant (p < 0.01) 
correlation between vertical integration and firm size in South Africa. The same results were 
obtained for New Zealand, except that the significance level was (p < 0.05). The hypothesis 
was therefore not supported for either country. However, these results are in line with those of 
Diez-Vial  (2009) who found that vertical integration is more noticeable in small firms than in 
large firms. In particular, they support Fernandez – Olmos et al.,’s (2009) findings on the 
determinants of vertical integration in the wine industry who found that size of the winery is 
negatively related to vertical integration and argue that this is because it is a disincentive for 
large wineries to produce their own grapes because managers would have to spend a lot of 
time visiting their vineyards. The reason why the hypothesis was not supported may simply 
be that the literature (Scales et al., 1995) which guided the hypothesis may have focused more 
on the economies of scale as a determinant of vertical control and paid little attention to issues 
of quality and the orientation of small wineries. Recent literature (Diez - Vial, 2009; 
Fernández-Olmos et al., 2009) suggests that small wineries seem to be family owned with 
own vineyards therefore are more likely to produce own grapes than larger wineries as this 
offers them the advantages of lower grower dependence and better exploitation of existing 
capabilities.     
 
The eighth hypothesis envisaged a positive relationship between item criticality and vertical 
integration. The results showed support for this hypothesis in both countries. These results 
were in line with those of  Fernandez – Olmos et al., (2009) who found that wineries that 
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produce high quality wines are more likely to integrate their grapes production than wineries 
that produce low quality wines because they seek maximum control of the wine supply chain 
so as to minimise the chance of losing reputation. The results are also consistent with 
Goodhue et al., (2003) who found that growers that produce high quality grapes are more 
likely to use formal written contracts than growers who produce low quality grapes. The ninth 
and last hypothesis investigated the relationship between vertical integration and firm 
maturity. The results were significant (p < 0.05) but assumed the wrong sign.  
 
Hypothesis Five 
The background of this hypothesis was that incentives and monitoring encourage contracting 
in that the principal‟s and the agent‟s interests are aligned, therefore making it less appealing 
for the agent to behave opportunistically. But this is costly as it involves the monitoring and 
incentive costs which arise due to environmental uncertainty. These can be partially addressed 
by trust, in that trust reduces the need to check if the other party is really doing what they 
promised to do. The legal system also plays an important role as it also complements 
monitoring. Further, incentives are likely to align the interests of the principal with those of 
the agent, and hence complement monitoring in ensuring goal alignment between agents and 
principals and thus reduce the associated monitoring costs. That is, trust, incentives and the 
legal system complement monitoring and thus reduce monitoring costs. Hence; 
 
H5:  Trust, the legal system and incentives complement monitoring. 
 
Model 5.4 was used to test this hypothesis. The model examined the relationship between 
monitoring as the dependent variable and trust, the legal system and incentives as the key 
independent variables. Item criticality and firm size and age were used as control variables. 
The model takes the form: 
 
1 3 4 5 6
7 .i
Monitoring Trust Incentives Legal ItemCriticality FirmSize
FirmAge
     
 
     
 
 
Equation 5-4: Monitoring regression model 
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Table 5.16 below summarises the results from testing hypothesis five. 
 
Table 5-16: Model 5.4 regression results 
South Africa New Zealand 
Variables   t Sig VIF Variables   t Sig VIF 
Constant -1.851 -1.173   Constant 2.005 1.167   
Trust 1.154 3.563 0.001* 1.160 Trust 0.243 1.296 0.198 1.177 
Incentives 0.240 1.059 0.292 1.129 Incentives 0.230 1.160 0.248 1.061 
Legal 0.068 0.624 0.534 1.171 Legal 0.470 1.069 0.288 1.144 
Item 
Criticality 
0.181 1.360 0.177 1.025 Item 
Criticality 
-0.164 -0.928 0.355 1.041 
Firm Size 0.052 0.633 0.528 1.108 Firm Size -0.175 -1.079 0.283 1.083 
Firm Age -0.157 -1.357 0.178 1.048 Firm Age -0.094 -0.716 0.476 1.039 
r
2
= 0.198. F = 4.275* r
2
= 0.075.  F = 1.464 
*(p<0.001); ** p<0.05 and *** (p<0.010). 
 
Results: With a significant (p < 0.01) F value, the model fit suggests that at least one of the 
independent variables explains the variation in the monitoring variable in South Africa. 
Further, the r 2 shows that the model explains 19.8 percent of the variation in the monitoring 
variable. The hypothesis was partially supported for South Africa with the trust variable 
showing the expected positive and significant (p < 0.05) relationship with the monitoring 
variable. However, both incentives and the legal system assumed the expected positive 
relationship but were not statistically significant. The results for New Zealand showed the 
expected positive relationships but were nevertheless all insignificant. The positive and 
significant relationship between monitoring and trust for South Africa is consistent with this 
research‟s argument of complementarity between exchange protection frameworks. The 
results are therefore consistent with hypothesis one‟s results where monitoring (agency 
theory) was found to complement other exchange frameworks including trust (relational   
exchange theory) in protecting against exchange hazards associated with bounded rationality 
and opportunism. These results are also consistent with Ryall & Sampson‟s (2009) findings 
when they examined contracts for joint technology development in the telecommunications 
equipment industry with a view to determine how their content is affected by relational   
considerations. They found that the effects of prior dealing experience (relational 
considerations) on the probability that the firms‟ contracts contain three or more monitoring 
clauses were statistically significant. Further, they found that firms that had prior experience 
with any partner were 11% more likely to include monitoring provisions in their current deals. 
They argued that repeated interactions between firms allow them to learn from past 
interactions and helped them to include some monitoring contractual clauses that were not in 
the previous contracts. Further, Mayer & Argyres (2004) studied contracts from the personal 
computer industry and found that sometimes parties involved in an ongoing relationship, but 
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with the desire to have it continue into the future (relational), tend to incorporate adjustments 
made in past projects into future contractual arrangements. They argue that the adjustments 
would be made with the objective of preventing similar disputes from arising in the future.  
 
However, two important questions arise from the analysis of hypothesis five. First, why was 
the relationship between monitoring and trust significant in South Africa and not in New 
Zealand? Second, why were the relationships between the monitoring variable and incentives 
and the legal system not significant in both countries? This research cannot provide 
conclusive answers to these questions. However, a closer look at the data and the literature 
offers some useful insights. Raja and Schaefer (2007), Vinogradova (2006) and Woldie 
(2009) suggest that when the state is perceived as being incapable of fully guaranteeing 
contract enforcement, firms increasingly rely on alternative relational ways of enforcing 
business transactions. This then suggests that, while the legal system does provide some 
protection to exchange relationships in both South Africa and New Zealand, because of the 
perceived weakness of the South African legal system relative to the New Zealand legal 
system (H 2b ), the South African wineries are more likely to complement formal contractual 
exchange protection arrangements with relational contract enforcement than their New 
Zealand counterparts. This may explain why the monitoring (an aspect of formal contracting) 
and trust (relational) relationship was significant in South Africa and not in New Zealand.   
 
Another possible reason for the insignificant results for the relationship between monitoring 
and incentives in this study for both countries may be that, while the two variables 
complement each other in protecting exchange relationships, the fact that the wineries and 
growers belong to the same organisation may be providing another layer of goal alignment 
between wineries and growers and this may somehow water down the significance of the 
direct relationship between monitoring and incentives. Further, growers solely rely on 
wineries as the market of the product which may also align the behaviour of growers with the 
interests of the wineries and hence play down the importance of monitoring and incentives in 
the winery-grower relationship. 
 
As for the relationship between monitoring and the legal system, it appears little has been 
done in the literature to model this relationship. The literature on the relationship between 
contract complexity (including monitoring) and the state or performance of the legal system 
(contract enforcement) is very thin. Instead, the literature seems to have concentrated more on 
whether contractual complexity and trust are substitutes or complements with some 
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commentators suggesting that they are substitutes (Raja & Schaefer, 2007; Reuer & Arino, 
2007; Woldie, 2009) and some suggesting that they are complements (Argyres et al., 2007; 
Ryall & Sampson, 2009). This research therefore did not find any study that investigated the 
relationship between monitoring, let alone contractual complexity and contract enforcement 
or strength of the legal system.  
 
Hypothesis Six  
 
The background of this hypothesis is the argument that in a trusting relationship where the 
desire to create close ties between trading partners is key, the need for paying substantial 
incentive costs as a way of ensuring exchange performance would be reduced. Trust 
complements what incentives seek to achieve and thus reduces incentive costs. The research 
therefore hypothesises that; 
 
H 6 : Trust complements incentives.  
 
Incentives is the dependent variable and trust, together with the control variables of item 
criticality, firms size and age are the independent variables. The relationship between 
incentives and trust is expected to be positive because the two are complementary and seek to 
achieve a common goal of ensuring exchange performance, which is expected to ultimately 
reduce incentive costs. Model 5.5 was used to test this hypothesis and it takes the following 
form: 
 1 2 3 4 iIncentives Trust ItemCriticality FirmSize FirmAge            
Equation 5-5: Incentives regression model 
 
The results are presented in table 5.17 below. 
Table 5-17: Model 5.5 regression results 
South Africa New Zealand 
Variables   t Sig VIF Variables   t Sig VIF 
Constant 2.062 3.070   Constant 2.390 4.161   
Trust 0.265 1.884 0.062*** 1.105 Trust 0.202 2.403 0.018** 1.041 
Item 
Criticality 
-0.049 -0.826 0.411 1.017 Item 
Criticality 
0.028 0.327 0.745 1.039 
Firm Size -0.002 -0.053 0.958 1.068 Firm Size 0.033 0.429 0.669 1.045 
Firm Age 0.039 0.762 0.448 1.042 Firm Age 0.041 0.663 0.509 1.029 
r
2
= 0.044. F = 1.222 r
2
= 0.057.  F = 1.685 
** p<0.05 and *** (p<0.010). 
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Results: The beta coefficient of the trust variable is, as expected positive and significant for 
South Africa (p < 0.10) and New Zealand (p < 0.05). The hypothesis is therefore supported in 
both countries. The results are in line with prior research. Tzafrir (2005) investigated the 
relationship between human resource practices and managers‟ trust in their employees and 
found that organisations that exhibited high managerial trust in employees were found to base 
their compensation systems on performance. Hueth, Ligon & Melkonyan (2008) examined 
interactions among formal (including a measure of whether a formal contract adjusts payment 
for quality) and informal or relational contracting practices within the California fruit and 
vegetable markets and found a positive correlation between the two. They concluded that the 
findings suggest a complementary relationship between formal and informal contracts. This 
also supports hypothesis one‟s findings, where incentives and trust were found to complement 
each other in protecting exchange relationships through encouraging contractual performance. 
5.7  Summary of Hypothesis Tests 
This chapter has presented the results of implementing the research plan outlined on chapter 
four. The results show that all the constructs valid and reliable. The following table (5.18) 
summarises the results of the hypotheses tests and also provides a summary of comments on 
the results.  
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Table 5-18: Summary Results of Hypotheses Tests 
 
Hypotheses 
Test Results  
Comments South Africa New Zealand 
H1:Monitoring, incentives, trust, and 
the   legal    system encourage 
contracting 
Supported  Supported Test significant for both 
countries.  
H2a: The legal system encourages 
spot market transactions. 
Supported  Supported Test significant for both 
countries, and thus help 
explain why incomplete 
contracts are used despite 
their vulnerability to 
holdup. 
H2b: A strong legal system protects 
exchange relationships better than a 
weak legal system.  
Supported 
(Not country specific but comparative). 
Independent Samples t-
test significant.  
H3: Trust, monitoring and incentives   
discourage spot market transactions. 
Not supported  Partially supported. Unexpected signs and 
insig. for SA. One 
expected sign for NZ also 
significant. Raises some 
theoretical questions. 
H4: Monitoring, Incentives, and the 
legal system discourage vertical 
integration.  
Partially supported  Partially supported Expected signs but 
some coefficients insig. 
H5: Trust, the legal system and 
incentives complement monitoring 
Partially supported  Not supported One sig. variable for SA 
and all insig. variables for 
NZ. 
H6: Trust complements incentives.  Supported Supported. Sig. for both countries. 
H7: Vertical Integration is positively 
correlated with larger firms. 
Not supported Not supported Sig. for both countries. 
H8: Vertical integration is positively 
correlated with item criticality. 
Supported Supported. Sig. for both countries. 
H9: Vertical integration is positively 
correlated with age of firms. 
Not supported Not supported Sig. for SA and insig. 
For NZ. 
 
5.8 Chapter Summary 
In broad terms, this chapter covered instrument validation, determination of the wineries‟ 
grape coordination strategies and hypothesis testing. The instrument validity and reliability 
process yielded good constructs that facilitated the data analysis and the hypothesis testing 
process. What emerged from the exploratory factor analysis phase was that for both countries, 
items that were intended to capture a given construct heavily loaded on one factor. As a result, 
the research was able derive five factors for both countries and these factors were identified 
with the intended variables of monitoring, trust, incentives, the legal system and item 
criticality. Further, the results show that wineries in the two countries employ the three 
common coordination strategies (Scales et al., 1995) of the spot market, contracting and 
vertical control. However, vertical integration was found to be statistically more prevalent in 
New Zealand than in South Africa, and that there were no statistically significant differences 
in spot market transacting and contracting between South Africa and New Zealand. In 
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addition, the hypothesis testing showed a significant and positive relationship between 
contracting and trust, incentives, monitoring and the legal system in both countries. This 
supports this research‟s argument that relational norms, monitoring, incentives and the 
contract enforcement mechanism provided by the legal system complement contracting in 
protecting exchange relationships against opportunism. This provides insights into why 
contracts are widely used despite their obvious limitations of exposing transactions to 
opportunism. The chapter also showed that the New Zealand legal system‟s effectiveness was 
rated higher than the South African legal system. This was in line with this research argument 
that strong legal systems protect exchange relationships better than weak legal systems. The 
next chapter will discuss these results and derive theoretical and managerial implications from 
these research findings. 
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     Chapter 6 
Disussion of Results and Theoretical Implications 
6.1 Introduction 
The literature review revealed that TCEs incomplete contracting framework exposes 
transactions to opportunism (Williamson, 1979, 1985). This notwithstanding, incomplete 
contracts were found to be still widely used (Dawes et al., 2009; Goodhue et al., 2003). 
However, TCE does not provide a theoretical reason why incomplete contracts are still widely 
used despite their limitations. In view of the failures of TCE in fully protecting exchange 
relationships and the lack of an explanation for the use of incomplete contracts, this research 
has developed a multi-paradigm exchange protection framework with the twin objectives of, 
(a) providing better exchange protection than any theory in isolation, and in particular, TCEs 
incomplete contracting framework; (b) explaining why companies use incomplete contracts 
despite their vulnerability to holdup. The new framework was tested and applied on the South 
African and New Zealand wine industries. The research therefore started with the following 
research objectives:  
 
(a) Integrating TCE, agency theory, relational exchange theory and the contract enforcement 
mechanism of the legal system to develop a multi-paradigm governance framework that is 
more effective in protecting exchange relationships than any exchange protection 
framework in isolation. 
 
(b) Using the multi-paradigm governance framework developed in (a) above to help explain 
why firms use incomplete contracts despite their vulnerability to ex post opportunism.  
 
(c) Testing the framework by investigating the structure of, and the differences between the 
South African and New Zealand wineries‟ grape sourcing strategies. 
 
These objectives were addressed through the following research questions.  
 
(a) What governance strategies do firms in South Africa and New Zealand wine industries use 
to source their grapes? 
(b) Are there any differences or similarities between the South African and New Zealand 
grape sourcing strategies? 
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(c) Can the continued use of incomplete contracts be explained through the theoretical 
underpinnings of TCE, agency theory, relational exchange theory and the efficacy of the 
legal system? 
 
This chapter provides insights into the degree to which these research objectives have been 
achieved and the research questions addressed. The discussion is structured as follows. 
Section 6.2 will discuss the grape sourcing strategies adopted in both countries in terms of 
their contributions towards total grape requirements, reasons for their use as well as the 
similarities and differences of the strategies. This helped achieve the third research objective 
which aimed at investigating and explaining wineries‟ grape sourcing strategies. 
 
Section 6.3 will briefly touch on the multi-paradigm framework and also discuss the results 
associated with the explanation of incomplete contracts. These results were obtained by using 
insights from the TCE, agency theory, relational exchange theory as well as the credibility of 
legal system to empirically test for the determinants of the three governance choices. The 
hypotheses results helped achieve the key objective of this research, which is explaining the 
continued use of incomplete contracts despite their vulnerability to hold up.   
 
It has been noted that the first task of the current research was to use the literature within the 
exchange domains of TCE (Williamson, 1975, 1985), agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976), relational exchange theory (Macaulay, 1963; Uzzi, 1997) and the 
legal framework (Arrighetti et al., 1997; Vinogradova, 2006) to develop a multi-paradigmic 
framework that provides added safeguards to incomplete contracts, and therefore help explain 
the continued use of incomplete contracts. The development of the multi-paradigmic 
framework helped achieve the first objective of the current research.   
6.2 Grape Sourcing Strategies by the South African and New 
Zealand wineries 
This section has two broad foci of interest. First, discuss the grape sourcing strategies in the 
two countries and therefore address the first two research questions, one of which sought to 
find out what strategies were used by wineries in South Africa and New Zealand to source 
their grapes, and the other one which sought to identify the differences and similarities 
between the strategies in the two countries. The discussion in this section will also help 
achieve the second research objective, which is to investigate and explain the South African 
and New Zealand wineries‟ grape sourcing strategies. 
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6.2.1 Discussion of Grape Sourcing Strategies 
The results showed that wineries in both countries adopted three main governance structures. 
On average, contributions to total grape requirements in both countries were as follows: Spot 
market (13-15 percent), contracting (33-38 percent) and own production of grapes (47-53 
percent). The results corroborate the channel research literature (Lambert et al., 1996; 
Peterson et al., 2001) that argues that companies choose exchange coordination strategies 
from a wide range of options, and that it is possible for the different exchange mechanisms to 
be employed at the same time. The combination of the three governance modes allowed 
wineries to harness the advantages offered by each of the three governance modes, perhaps 
even ensuring that the right balance of the governance strategies was in place. In particular, 
they employed vertical control so as to harness its utility when it comes to ensuring quality of 
grapes, security of grape supply, and an added marketing leverage. They used contractual 
arrangements to help them minimise costs, transfer risk and ensure geographical 
diversification of sources of grapes, and they used the spot market to meet unforeseen grape 
shortages as well as a source of wine blending grapes. The governance structures are therefore 
not substitutes but instead allow wineries to use a mix of the three governance strategies in 
combinations that allow them to achieve optimal sourcing of grapes.  
 
Further, there were no significant differences in the spot market and contractual arrangements 
between the two countries but there were significant differences in the vertical control 
strategy, with the South African industry less vertically controlled than the New Zealand 
industry. The difference between the two countries‟ vertical control strategy may be 
influenced by the average size of firms. Hypothesis seven results showed that smaller firms 
are more likely to grow their own grapes than larger wineries. The independent samples t-tests 
showed that the New Zealand firms were significantly smaller than their South African 
counters parts (Table 5.11), which suggest that they are more likely to integrate than the South 
African wineries. This observation led to post hoc analyses with the objective of 
understanding the extent of vertical integration by size by country. Vertical integration was 
captured by asking wineries to indicate the proportion of grapes sourced through own 
production on a scale ranging from least vertically integrated (1-19 percent) to most vertically 
integrated (80 – 100 percent). The results of the post hoc analysis are presented in table 6.1 
below. 
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Table 6-1: Cross Tabulation of Vertical Control and Firm Size 
South Africa 
Extent of Vertical Control 
(percentage of grapes sourced through 
own vineyard) 
Firm Size 
 Small Medium Large Total contribution to 
vertically sourced grapes  
0 - 19 22.8 62.5 66.7 29.7 
20 - 39 3.3 0.0 0.0 2.7 
40 - 59 3.3 0.0 0.0 2.7 
60 - 79 15.2 0.0 0.0 12.6 
80-100 55.4 37.5 33.3 35.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
New Zealand 
0 - 19 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
20 - 39 8.6 8.3 45.5 12.1 
40 - 59 3.7 16.7 18.2 7.8 
60 - 79 11.1 16.7 9.1 12.1 
80-100 76.5 58.3 27.3 68.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 
 
The above table shows that small firms are more vertically integrated than medium and large 
firms in both countries, although more so in New Zealand than South Africa. For example, in 
New Zealand, 76.5 percent of all small firms are strongly vertically integrated, that is with 
internal grape production accounting for 80 – 100 percent of grape requirements. This 
compares favourably with the South African level of small firm integration where 55.4 
percent of small firms were strongly vertically integrated. Further, although mediums scale 
firms were less vertically integrated than small firms, they were strongly integrated (58.3 
percent) in New Zealand than in South Africa (37.5) whereas large firms were slightly more 
vertically integrated in South Africa (33.3 percent) than in New Zealand (27.3 percent). These 
results are against TCE predictions regarding vertical control and firm size. Williamson 
(1974) argues that large firms are more likely to integrate than small firms because 
diseconomies of scale limit integration. This view is supported by Shervani et al., (2007) who 
observe that as the firm‟s volume of business increases, its internal production costs are 
expected to decrease, hence encouraging the firm to internalise its activities. Thus, the current 
research‟s results on the effect of size on vertical integration have TCE theoretical 
implications that will be discussed in the section that covers the theoretical implications of 
this research. In addition to firm size, two other possible reasons for vertical integration that 
have emerged in this research are quality control and marketing purposes. The independent 
samples t-tests were used to determine whether there are differences in the importance of 
quality of grapes in the two countries. The results showed no statistical difference between the 
quality perceptions between the two countries (Table 5.6). However, having established that 
small wineries are more likely to integrate, further tests were conducted to determine whether 
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there are any differences on the importance of quality between the South African and New 
Zealand small wineries. That is, the focus turned exclusively to small wineries. Unfortunately 
this yielded an insignificant result (p = 0.289), indicating that small wineries have similar 
perceptions of quality as medium and large scale firms in both countries. Thus, the 
importance of quality does not explain why small firms are more vertically integrated than 
large firms. What remained was therefore testing for the effects of marketing strategies on the 
vertical integration decisions. However, this was not part of the current research, a suggestion 
that future research may include other parts of the wine value chain in the analysis of the 
theoretical framework developed for this research. The data collected for this research 
therefore could not explain why small wineries were more integrated than medium and large 
wineries. However, the literature provides useful insights as to why small firms are more 
integrated. Nooteboom (1993) argues that large firms are better placed to deal with the limits 
imposed by bounded rationality as they have greater capacity to identify, collect and absorb 
relevant external information because of the ability to employ specialised staff in different 
functional areas such as legal matters, finance, technology research and development and 
many others. This suggests that market transactions may be better handled by large firms as 
they are more likely to better deal with information asymmetry than small firms. Hence, in 
line with the current research‟s findings, the need for quality control and problems associated 
with market governance may actually lead to more internalisation of transactions by small 
firms than large firms. Further, Diez-Vial (2009) suggests that vertical control offers the 
advantages of lower provider dependence and better exploitation of existing capabilities. Thus 
small firms may be more integrated because they have limited capacity to control their trading 
partners or simply because they have capacities that they wish to exploit.  
 
In summary, the above discussion on the grape sourcing strategies of wineries in South Africa 
and New Zealand has shown that for both countries, vertical integration is the most dominant 
governance strategy, contracting is the second most popular strategy and the spot market is 
least popular strategy. Further, similarities and differences have been discussed. This section 
has therefore achieved the twin objectives of explaining and discussing the grape sourcing 
strategies used by wineries in South Africa and New Zealand. This helped achieve the third 
objective of the current research, which is to investigate and explain the South African and 
New Zealand wineries‟ grape sourcing strategies. 
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6.3 The Multi-Paradigm Framework and the Use of Incomplete 
Contracts 
6.3.1 The Multi-Paradigm Framework 
In order to explain the use of incomplete contracts, this research used insights from TCE, 
agency theory, relational exchange theory and the legal system to develop a multi-paradigm 
framework that improves exchange safeguard properties of incomplete contracts and therefore 
help explain their continued use. The development of the framework achieved the first 
objective of this research, which is to integrate the TCE, agency theory, relational exchange 
theory and the contract enforcement mechanism of the legal system. Detailed discussion of 
this multi-paradigm framework is presented in Chapter three and the summary framework is 
re-produced and further discussed in section 6.4 of this chapter (Theoretical Implications). 
6.3.2 Why Firms use Incomplete Contracts despite their Vulnerability to 
Opportunism 
The hypotheses testing phase used the multi-paradigm framework and to provide reasons for 
the use of incomplete contracts. While nine hypotheses were tested to help provide reasons for 
use of incomplete contracts, hypothesis one was the most important, and all other hypotheses 
were meant to help add clarity and meaning to what it intended to test. The premise of this 
hypothesis was that incomplete contracting is aided by the monitoring of the trading 
partner(s) behaviour, provision of incentives to the trading partner(s) and the building of norm 
based relationships between the trading partners as well as the efficacy of the legal system (all 
with the objective of encouraging trading partner(s) not to behave opportunistically). For the 
current study, the results showed that in South Africa, contracting for grapes was positively 
correlated with trust (p < 0.05), which is a relational exchange variable, monitoring (p < 0.1) 
and incentives (p < 0.1), which are agency theory variables and the legal system (p < 0.05). 
Likewise, for New Zealand, contracting was positively correlated with monitoring (p < 
0.001), incentives (p < 0.05), trust (p < 0.05), and the legal system (p < 0.05). The hypothesis 
was therefore supported for both countries, which confirms that contracting is supported by 
monitoring, incentives, relational norms and the contract enforcement mechanism of the legal 
system. Incentives and trust were also found to discourage vertical integration and instead 
keep transactions within the market through contractual arrangement rather than push them 
into the internal organisation of the firm (H4 and H5). This further gave support to the 
argument that trust and the legal system are among the exchange protection mechanisms that 
help contractual stability. These results therefore show that wineries protect their contractual 
relationships with their growers through providing the growers with incentives and 
 135 
monitoring them when necessary, building trusting relationships with the growers and relying 
on the court enforcement mechanism of the law to ensure grower compliance. The 
simultaneous building of trust with growers and monitoring of growers by wineries is against 
the propositions of the literature (Granovetter, 1985; Dyer & Sign, 1998) that argues that 
formal and relational governance measures are substitutes. The current research is in line with 
the literature (Argyres et al., 2007; Ryall & Sampson, 2009) that views formal and relational 
governance measures as compliments. Thus, the monitoring is not adversarial but rather 
tailored to benefit both parties, and both parties‟ trust is perhaps in line with Sako‟s (1992) 
goodwill trust which implies that parties will make an open ended endeavour to take 
initiatives for the benefit of both parties and will not act opportunistically. Formal contracts 
help guide cooperation (Luo, 2002) and relational norms help improve the results of formal 
agreements (Beave & Saussier, 2010). Hence, in line with Lambert et al.,’s (1996), wineries 
simultaneously apply exchange protection mechanisms along the continuum to protect 
exchange relationships.  
 
However, Wilson (1995) suggests that constructs/governance frameworks may be active or 
latent depending on whether the manager is satisfied with the governance framework or not. 
For example, he asserts that cooperation and commitment are likely to be active constructs or 
governance structures when the competitive abilities of partners are being enhanced by being 
in a relationship. He places this in the latter part of the relationship development process. 
Wilson (1995) argues that latent governance structures are still important because changes in 
the environment may activate them. The current research looked at the relationships in cross-
section, and as is the case with cross-section studies, this limited the observation of the 
relationships to the point and time of data collection (Ruester, 2010). This meant that the 
research could not determine the stages at which the exchange protection qualities of agency, 
relational and the legal system are most likely to be active and when most likely to be latent, a 
limitation that may require dynamic analysis in future studies. What is apparent, however, is 
that the relationships between contracting and the exchange protection frameworks were 
significant and assumed the expected positive signs, which suggests that the protection 
frameworks encourages contracting. Further, the independent samples t-tests and H2b have 
supported the current research‟s view that the New Zealand legal system is more efficient 
than the South African legal system, a situation which may result in wineries employing the 
four exchange protection frameworks in different ways. For example, the South African 
wineries are expected to rely more on relational norms to protect exchange relationships than 
the New Zealand wineries (Woldie, 2009). This view was indeed supported by the results. For 
 136 
South Africa, the trust construct had the highest beta coefficient (  =0.748), followed by 
incentives (  =0.463). The legal system had the second lowest coefficient (  =0.294), just a 
bit higher than monitoring (  =0.271). Following Peterson et al.,’s (2001) and Webster‟s 
(1992) continuums, this would suggest that at the time of data collection, trust or norms were 
the most important contributor to contractual performance in South Africa with incentives 
being the second most important and the legal being among the least important. Thus, while 
all the frameworks provided some form of exchange protection, trust was contributing more 
to contractual exchange protection in South Africa than all other frameworks. In New 
Zealand, the legal system had the highest influence in contracting decisions (  =0.631), 
followed by incentives (  =0.411) and trust is the least contributor (  =0.280). Hence as 
expected, companies are more likely to rely on the threat of litigation as an exchange 
protection mechanism in a credible legal system than in a less credible legal system. Firms 
operating within a credible legal system know that they may not get away with non-
compliance. This provides added exchange protection. On the other hand, firms operating 
within a less credible legal environment know that they may get away with non-compliance 
and this reduces the legal system‟s ability to deter non-compliance. This shows that while 
relational norms, monitoring, incentives and the legal system support contracting in New 
Zealand, the legal system provides the highest support to contracting. This view is supported 
by the outcome of a recent case in which Goldridge Estate Vineyards, one of New Zealand‟s 
bigger wine producers took Kakara Estate to the High Court in Auckland following the 
latter‟s termination of its supply contract with Goldridge owned company, Hillersen Vineyard 
Contracting (Krause, 2010a). Goldridge sought and was granted interim halt to Kakara 
terminating the grape supply and vineyard management agreements (Krause, 2010b). This 
shows that the New Zealand legal system swiftly enforced the contract, which is in line with 
the research results that suggested wineries in the country view the legal system as the most 
important contributor to exchange protection.   
It has to be pointed out however, that the fact that trust is the most important construct in 
protecting exchange relationships in South Africa (a country with a relatively weak contract 
enforcement framework) and the legal system is the most important framework in New 
Zealand (a country with a strong contract enforcement framework), does not necessarily 
imply that norms substitute for the legal system and vice versa. Hypothesis one results 
showed a positive and significant relationship between contracting and the legal system and 
trust in both countries which suggests that the two simultaneously contribute to contracting 
decisions, except that trust seems to play a more prominent role when the legal system is 
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weak and the court enforcement mechanism seem to carry more exchange protection burden 
when the legal system is strong. This view is in line with Yang, Zhou and Jiang (2010) who 
state that in the absence of formal controls, trust looses its structural foundation and provokes 
partner opportunism. They argue that while formal controls secure the proper behaviours of 
each transaction party, trust facilitates detailed processes with fewer transaction costs. Hence, 
formal contracts and norms work together. 
 
The analysis of the spot market regression results also points to the complementarity between 
contracting and other exchange protection frameworks (H2a and H3). H2a showed that the legal 
system encourage spot market/arms-length transactions. H3 results demonstrated that trust 
encourage spot market transactions. Recall that it has been stated that wineries and growers in 
South Africa and New Zealand are closely linked by the fact that they belong to a single 
industry organisation in each country. One of the main objectives of the umbrella wine 
organisations is to drive and promote quality within the two countries‟ wine industries, which 
aligns the interests of the industry players. Further, growers are directly dependent on 
wineries for a market of their product. They are essentially captive suppliers of wineries due 
to lack of substitute uses of their grapes (see analysis of H3 results). This suggests that instead 
of a traditional spot market, the governance mode with the least bilateral dependence for the 
wine industry is best represented by Lambert et al.,’s (1996) arms-length arrangement, where 
wineries and growers without close relationships may have engaged in some form of trade in 
the past and also stand a good chance of transacting again in the future. Webster (1992) sees 
arms-length arrangements as the start of a relationship based on trust and credibility and 
argues that such relationships cannot be viewed as free of trust. The existence of trust between 
industry players, no matter how small, may therefore encourage growers to honour their 
existing contractual obligations to wineries. Further, on the basis of the fact that wineries 
belong to the same organisation whose values are shared by growers and wineries, this 
research has argued that arm-length arrangements within the wine industry represents some 
form of artificial contractual relationships that is enforced by collective belonging to the 
organisation. Hence, the positive relationship between spot market/arms-length transactions 
and the legal system (H2a) and trust (H3) can safely be interpreted to imply a positive 
relationship between the artificial contract (arms-length transactions) and the legal system and 
trust. This therefore supports the overall argument of this research that contracting is 
supported or complemented by other exchange protection frameworks. 
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Further, the analysis of the vertical integration regression also gave credence to the above 
argument. The results showed a negative relationship between vertical integration and the 
legal system (H4). This shows support for the argument that the legal system encourages 
contractual arrangements because a negative relationship with vertical integration suggests 
that the legal system keeps transactions within the market rather than pushes them into the 
internal organisation within the firm. The market entails both contractual and spot market 
arrangements. Since it has been argued that the spot market represents artificial contracting 
due to the closeness of growers and wineries, the market represents a range of contractual 
relationships with different levels of complexity.  This however does not mean that vertical 
integration does not have a role to play in protecting exchange relationships. The discussion 
on the grape sourcing strategies has shown that vertical integration is mainly driven by the 
desire to control the production of good quality grapes. This was confirmed by H8, which was 
a control hypothesis. This hypothesis envisaged a positive relationship between item 
criticality as a measure of the importance of the quality of sourced grapes (Fraser, 2005) and 
vertical integration. Thus, the framework for this research argues that vertical control is 
chosen when contracting cannot achieve the desired results, such as the high quality 
standards.    
 
The above discussion therefore shows that contracting, be it arms-length artificial contracts or 
formal contracts between growers and wineries, is supported and complemented by the key 
exchange protection mechanisms of monitoring, incentives, norms and the efficacy of the 
legal system. These other exchange protection mechanisms therefore encourage contractual 
relationships in both countries. This shows that incomplete contracts are used because they 
are complemented by the added exchange safeguards associated with other exchange 
protection mechanisms such as the agency theory (monitoring and incentives), relational 
exchange theory (norms such as trust) and the efficacy of the legal system. This goes a long 
way in explaining the continued use of the TCE incomplete contracts despite their 
vulnerability to ex post opportunism and therefore helps achieve the first and second objective 
of this research, which was to integrate the TCE, agency theory, relational exchange theory 
and the legal system and explain why firms use incomplete contracts. The discussion further 
confirms that the stronger New Zealand legal system protects exchange relationships better 
than the weaker South African legal system. This is so because countries with good contract 
enforcement offer better protection to specific investments than countries with weak legal 
systems (Nunn, 2007). On the other hand, firms internalise activities that are too strategic to 
be contracted out. That is, vertical integration is more a matter of capabilities of the contracted 
 139 
firm than the behaviour of the contracted firm. Behavioural issues such as opportunism may 
be addressed through a multi-paradigm contract but this contract cannot control for genuine 
lack of capabilities of the contracted firm. As such, when firms believe they are the best at 
undertaking a given task, they internalise that task. 
6.4 Implications 
6.4.1 Theoretical Implications 
The current research has made three theoretical contributions to the exchange literature, all 
largely concerned with protecting exchange relationships from trading partner(s)‟ 
opportunism. These are: (a) the development of a multi-paradigm framework that this 
research believes offers better protection to exchange relationships than any theory in 
isolation (chapter three), (b) the explanation of the continued use of incomplete contracts 
despite their vulnerability to hold up and (c) the size - vertical control relationship and TCE 
and (d) incorporating the importance of the legal system into the mainstream exchange 
theoretical framework.  
6.4.1.1 The Development of a Multi-Paradigm Exchange Framework 
TCE asserts that due to bounded rationality, contracts are incomplete and this exposes 
exchange relationships to hold up by opportunistic agents (Williamson, 1985). Because of this 
contractual exchange threat, TCE predicted that transactions would be protected through 
vertical control. However, as earlier indicated, contracts are still widely used (Fraser, 2005). 
This research has also investigated the governance strategies of wineries in South Africa and 
New Zealand and confirmed the use of contracts in the two countries. It is against this 
background that the current study set out with the key objective of explaining why contract 
use is prevalent despite its vulnerability to holdup. The search for an explanation started with 
an intensive review and interrogation of other exchange theories, agency theory and the 
relational exchange theory. In addition, the role of the legal system in protecting exchange 
relationships was investigated through the review of the literature and its transaction 
protection qualities were identified which led to its integration into the development of the 
multi-paradigm framework.   
 
The extensive review of these other theories together with the legal system revealed that these 
exchange protection frameworks have important exchange protection qualities. While TCE 
emphasised contractual complexity as a way of protecting transactions, agency theory 
emphasised monitoring of and the provision of incentives to agents to achieve goal alignment 
between the agent and the princiupal, and relational exchange theory emphasised the 
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development of trusting relationships between exchange partners. The legal system was found 
to protect exchange relationships through legal enforcement in case agents renege on their 
contractual obligations. This suggested that all these frameworks had a common goal, which 
is protecting exchange relationships. Based on this realisation, the current research integrated 
the TCE incomplete contracting schema with the agency theory monitoring and incentive 
provision, relational exchange theory norms such as trust as well as the court contract 
enforcement mechanism and developed a multi-paradigm exchange framework that has 
elements of all the four exchange protection frameworks. The main strength of the new 
framework is that it exploits the exchange protection mechanisms of all these frameworks. 
That is, it makes use of contract complexity, monitoring, incentives and the threat of judicial 
litigation. The framework reproduced below. 
 
Table 6-2: The multi-paradigm exchnage protection framework (reproduced) 
 Transaction Cost 
Theory 
Agency Theory Relational   
exchange theory 
Legal System Multi-Paradigm Exchange 
Framework 
Objective: Reduce actors‟ 
opportunism.  
Reduce agent‟s 
opportunism.  
Reduce actor‟s 
opportunism  
Enforce 
agreements 
Offers a multi-variable 
protection of exchange 
relationships  
Modalities of 
achieving the 
objective: 
Complex 
contracting to try 
to capture as 
many 
contingencies as 
possible. 
Goal alignment 
(incentives and 
monitoring) to 
ensure similar 
goals 
Building of norm 
based 
relationships to 
reduce the 
incentive for 
cheating. 
Punishing for 
contract 
violation, even 
if it means force 
(fiat). 
Integrated approach 
encompassing, complex 
contracting, goal 
alignment, trust and court 
contract enforcement to 
provide a holistic 
approach to exchange 
protection.  
Behavioural 
assumptions: 
Actors are self 
centred and are 
always ready to 
cheat and deceive 
in their quest to 
meet their self 
interest. 
Principals and 
agents are self 
centred and thus 
have conflicting 
goals. Agents risk 
averse and 
principals are risk 
neutral. 
Trading partners 
are cooperative 
and have common 
goals. E.g. both 
want to engage in 
future 
transactions. 
Actors are self 
centred; hence 
the need for a 
third party to 
control their 
opportunistic 
tendencies. 
Trading partners may be 
both self-centred and 
common goal oriented. 
Thus, no single approach 
is enough to address 
opportunism, hence the 
need for an integrated 
approach. 
Theoretical 
Focus 
The Transaction The contract Mutual exchange 
relationship 
The contract Exchange environment. 
That is, the transaction, 
contract and relationship.  
Nature of 
relationships 
Arms length for 
non asset specific 
transactions. 
Otherwise 
adversarial 
relationships 
requiring strategic 
interventions such 
as complex 
contracting and 
vertical control. 
Adversarial 
relationships 
requiring an 
optimal contract 
that aligns 
principal and 
agent‟s goals.  
Cordial 
relationships 
based both on past 
interactions and 
expected future 
interaction and 
mutual benefit. 
Adversarial 
relationships, 
hence the need 
for third party 
enforcement. 
Relationships can either 
be cordial, adversarial or 
have elements of both, 
requiring an integrated 
approach (strategic, goal 
alignment, mutual norms 
based and third party 
enforcement) to address 
opportunism. 
Time 
Dimension: 
Short term for non 
asset specific 
transactions and 
long term for 
asset specific 
transactions. 
Ex ante – with all 
incentives and 
monitoring tools 
agreed before 
signing the 
contract. No ex 
post re-
negotiations. 
Long term – with 
relationships built 
over time and 
expectations for 
continuation of 
the relationship.  
Instantaneous. 
I.e. when the 
principal calls 
for contract 
enforcement. 
This assumes an 
efficient legal 
system 
Short and long term. The 
integrated approach 
ensures that appropriate 
tools are used as and 
when the need arises. 
That is, it moderates both 
ex ant and ex post time 
dimensions.  
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The framework adopts Larbert et al.,’s (1996) arms-length governance mode when 
transactions are free of specific assets. Once transactions involve specific assets or exchange 
hazards, companies use the multi-paradigm contract to protect exchange relationships. This 
contract is more resilient than TCE incomplete contract. That is, companies safeguard 
exchange relationships through the TCE incomplete contract which specifies duties and 
obligations, agency theory monitoring and incentives mechanism, relational theory norms and 
commitments as well as the efficacy of the legal system. Thus, because of the added 
safeguards provided by other frameworks, companies can effectively control exchange 
partner(s)‟ opportunistic behaviour through contracts. Vertical control is used when 
companies believe that potential contractors cannot meet the required product quality 
standards, in this case good quality grapes. That is, they integrate when they believe that they 
are better off exploiting their existing capacities rather than use the market (Diez - Vial, 
2009). They do not necessarily integrate to control opportunism; they integrate to ensure 
certain standards are achieved and also exploit their superior internal capacities. Thus, vertical 
integration is more of a response to concerns about contractors‟ capabilities rather than 
controlling for trading partner(s)‟ deliberate intentions to mislead or take advantage of the 
contracting partner(s).   
 
While the generalisation of the results of the current study may be questionable due to the 
study‟s narrow focus on the wine industry, it is believed that the above multi-paradigmic 
framework is applicable to many industries such as information technology and automotive 
industry. A review of the literature (Harmancioglu, 2009; Kingsley & Fethullah, 2010) 
suggests that the findings of the exchange protection studies from these industries could be 
improved by evaluating their phenomena of interest through the theoretical lens of the multi-
paradigm framework.  
 
For example, Harmancioglu (2009) examined control mechanisms used to manage the risks 
associated with outsourcing within the information technology sector. The premise of 
Harmancioglu‟s (2009) study was that buyers within the technology industry face market 
uncertainties associated with rapidly changing technological environment and hence 
environmental hostility (TCE environmental uncertainty) and lack of technological experience 
on the part of the buyers relative to suppliers (agency theory information asymmetry). The 
study concluded that buying firms could reduce market uncertainties within the information 
technology industry by putting in place coordination and monitoring measures to prevent 
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supplier opportunistic behaviour (such as the expropriation of buyer‟s technological and 
commercial secrets). However, this study neglected the role of relational norms and the legal 
system in protecting information technology relationships, and thus failed to benefit from the 
exchange protection qualities of these two exchange protection mechanisms. Thus, if it were 
to be applied to Harmancioglu‟s (2009) study, the multi-paradigm framework developed for 
the current research would not only protect information technology relationships through 
appropriate TCE and agency control mechanisms but also through building socio-economic 
relationships between technology buyers and suppliers as well as relying on the threat of court 
enforcement in case of transactional opportunism. This suggests that the new framework can 
also be applied to the information technology industry. 
 
Another study by Kingsley and Fethullah (2010) used TCE and resource view of the firm 
theories to investigate how suppliers within the automotive industry determine which 
distribution and logistics services to provide internally and which to outsource. The results 
lent support to the applicability of the resource-based and TCE constructs to the distribution 
and logistics services within the automotive industry. A better understanding of the 
distribution and logistics outsourcing decisions within automotive industry would be achieved 
by extending the theoretical lens of the study to include the role of relational norms and the 
enforceability of the outsourcing agreements by the courts. This would be achieved by 
investigating the decisions through the multi-paradigm exchange protection framework 
developed for the current research.  
 
The current research has therefore not only made a theoretical contribution through the 
development of a multi-paradigm exchange protection framework that is believed to offer 
better exchange protection than any theory in isolation. It has also developed a framework that 
may be applied to different industries. As shown in the above discussion, the use of the 
theoretical lens of the multi-paradigm framework may have improved the understanding of 
their phenomena of interest of various studies focusing on different industries. 
 
6.4.1.2 Explanation of the Continued Use of Incomplete Contracts Despite 
their Vulnerability to Hold Up 
To the best of the researcher‟s knowledge, no study has attempted to offer a theoretical 
explanation of why contracts are still widely used despite their vulnerability to opportunism. 
This research has attempted to fill this gap. The research proposed that contracts are used 
because they are not as vulnerable as TCE envisages. The argument is that exchange 
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vulnerabilities associated with incomplete contracts are reduced by the transaction safeguards 
offered by agency theory monitoring and incentives mechanism, relational exchange norms 
(trust) and the contract enforcement mechanism of the legal system. That is, contracts are not 
just a series of duties and obligations, but also include exchange protective qualities of the 
other exchange mechanisms. Thus, the added exchange protection qualities of other 
mechanisms help companies to substantially reduce exchange hazards associated with 
incomplete contracts. This then allows companies to use the exchange incomplete contracts 
with substantially reduced fear of opportunism. Hence, the real contract that companies use 
take the following form: Specified duties and obligations complemented by incentives and 
monitoring, norms such as trust (norms are relied upon more heavily when the legal system is 
weak) and the contract enforcement mechanism of the legal system.  
6.4.1.3 Size - Vertical Control Relationship and TCE 
TCE envisages that large firms are more likely to do everything themselves as a way of 
reducing per unit cost of production (Williamson, 1975). Thus, diseconomies of scale limit 
integration (Williamson, 1974). However, the current research‟s findings show that, on the 
contrary small wineries are more integrated than large firms (H7). For example, 76.5 percent 
and 55.4 percent of all New Zealand and South African small wineries were found to be 
strongly vertically integrated respectively. Hence the current research‟s results on the effect of 
size on vertical integration have implications for TCE. The current research has identified 
quality control as one of the main reasons for vertical control in the two countries. It has also 
been shown that the literature identifies circumstances under which small firms may become 
more integrated than large firms. These include, when vertical control offers the advantages of 
better exploitation of existing capabilities (Diez - Vial, 2009) and when, due to resource 
constraints, small firms may not be as effective in controlling exchange partner opportunism 
as large firms (Nooteboom, 1993). TCE should therefore reconcile the size determinants of 
vertical integration of small and large firms.  
6.4.1.4 Incorporating the Legal System into the Mainstream Organisational 
Economics and Exchange Theoretical Framework  
The legal system has been recognised as important for protecting exchange relationships 
(Arrighetti et al., 1997; Woldie, 2009). However, studies investigating the role of the legal 
system can be divided into two main streams. Those concerned with alternative protection 
mechanisms of companies operating within a weak legal framework (Reuer & Arino, 2007; 
Vinogradova, 2006) and those concerned with how strong legal frameworks encourage 
investments in specific assets relative to weaker legal systems (Nunn, 2007). These studies 
motivated the inclusion of the legal system in this research. However, these studies did not 
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attempt to provide a theoretical basis to the exchange protection qualities of the legal system, 
and the researcher is not aware of any study that has attempted to integrate the legal system 
into a theoretical exchange framework. It is against this background that this research 
incorporated the legal system into its multi-theoretical framework. Within this framework, the 
legal system is not treated as a stand-alone exchange protection mechanism but rather as part 
of a broad theoretical structure. In other words, the removal of the legal framework from the 
multi-theoretical framework would weaken its ability to protect exchange relationship, and 
the legal framework would not be as effective in protecting exchange when isolated as it does 
when part of the multi-theoretical exchange protection framework.  This was confirmed 
through post hoc analysis where hypothesis one was re-run without the legal system variable. 
The results showed that the model explanatory power fell from 36.1 to 34.1 percent and 34.3 
to 30.8 percent for New Zealand and South African respectively, which suggested that in both 
countries, the removal of the legal system affected the ability of the model to explain 
contracting. The reduction is however small in both countries, suggesting that the legal 
system is a part of a range of exchange protection mechanisms that companies use to protect 
their exchange relationships. 
6.4.2 Managerial Implications 
This research has made three main managerial contributions to the exchange literature. These 
are: (a) the importance of a balanced multi-faceted governance strategy, (b) the importance of 
a multi-theoretical approach to contracting and (c) The importance of considering the 
effectiveness of contract enforcement mechanisms in the partner(s) country if trading partners 
are based in different countries.  
6.4.2.1 The Importance of a Balanced Multi-faceted Strategy 
One of the key findings of this research is that each of the three governance strategies of spot 
market, vertical control and contracting has a unique role to play in the coordination of 
transactions. Each may be used under different situations, either to mitigate some risk or 
enhance balanced exchange management. That is, managing a portfolio of relationships. 
 
For example, vertical control was found to mainly help wineries mitigate the risk of low grape 
quality and grape availability, all of which may negatively affect the wineries‟ marketing 
strategies. Sourcing grapes through contracts helped wineries minimise capital costs and 
mitigate climatic risk by transferring the risk to the growers. It also ensured supply of grapes 
from different climatic and soil types and this helped them produce different varietals. The 
spot market played an important part of meeting unforeseen grape shortages as well as wine 
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blending. This combination of governance strategies has implication for managers. It 
highlights the importance of being open to implementing all the three governance strategies as 
a deliberate management practice that leverages on the benefits associated with all the three 
governance strategies and knowing when to implement them and for what purpose.  
6.4.2.2 The Importance of a Multi-Theoretical Approach to Contracting 
Of the three main governance strategies, this research has mainly focused on contracting.  A 
multi-theoretical framework that, this research argues provides better exchange protection 
than any theory in isolation was developed. The framework highlights the importance of 
having an all encompassing theoretical approach to protecting exchange contractual 
relationships from opportunism. That is, managers should complete their contractual 
relationships with their agents by building socio-economic based relationships with their 
trading partners and clients, especially in countries with poor legal systems. This may help 
because contractual relationships that used to require continuous monitoring may not need the 
same level of intensive, costly effort and incentives if more reliance is placed on the efficacy 
of the legal system and trust to enforce. This means that managers can rely on a form of 
mutual obligation monitoring to ensure performance. There may also be a need to provide 
incentives to trading partners to ensure they act in the best interest to the contractors. 
However, managers need to be conscious of the cost implications of all these strategies. They 
should also be conscious of the fact that these control mechanisms may not be applied 
uniformly across different business case scenarios. Managers should therefore employ 
combinations of mechanisms that are appropriate to each unique situation. Thus, due to 
environmental uncertainty, each governance situation is distinctive, and this perhaps has lead 
to more confusion in the area of exchange governance research and practice than any other 
single factor.     
6.4.2.3 Consideration of the Effectiveness of the Contract Enforcement 
Mechanism in the Partner(s)’ Domicile Country 
The South African (SAWIS, 2009) and New Zealand (NZWINE, 2009) data does not show 
grape imports. This suggests that grape demands in the two countries are satisfied by 
domestic grape supply. However, as circumstances change, there may be a need to import 
grapes, although this seems unlikely in New Zealand in the short and medium term due to 
concerns about possible over supply within the wine industry (Deloitte & NZWINE, 2010). 
But should the need for importing grapes arise, managers should consider importing from 
countries with strong contract enforcement mechanisms. This will help them ensure improved 
cross border exchange protection because strong legal systems provide better exchange 
protection than weak legal systems (H2b). Following Webster‟s (1992) governance continuum, 
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stronger legal systems will result in speedy development of mutual dependence and even 
strategic relationships between inter-country partners, and hence improve the security of cross 
border transactions. Strong legal systems will speed up the benefits of a multi-paradigm 
contract because it would substantially increase the trust and confidence of both parties with 
regard to the continuity of the relationship, increase the long term orientation of the 
relationship and hence safeguard transactions against opportunistic behaviour (Yang et al., 
2010).           
6.4.3 Governmental Policy  
In addition to the managerial implications, results of this research have implications for 
government policy. Governments should be encouraged to establish credible legal systems 
that provide effective exchange protection. This would improve the efficiency of domestic 
trade because companies would confidently trade amongst themselves without the fear of 
opportunism. Developed legal systems would also offer countries competitive edge over their 
competitors because, knowing that strong legal systems offer better exchange protection, 
foreign investors would more keen to invest in countries with strong legal systems than 
countries with weak legal systems (Lerner & Schoar, 2005).    
6.5 Limitations 
Like all research projects, this thesis has some limitations that future research should 
concentrate on. Three main limitations have been identified. These are: (a) issues related to 
methods, (b) limited focus on the winery-grower dyad and (c) limited generalisation of the 
results.   
6.5.1 Issues related to construct Measurements 
This research adopted constructs from earlier studies and adopted or modified them for the 
current research where possible. The rationale for adopting previously used measures or 
constructs was that they have been successfully used before, indicated to this research that 
they may be suitable for use. As expected, the scales performed well in terms of their 
reliability and validity tests, with the lowest, which was also the only one below 0.8 recording 
0.754 and many in the upper 0.8 and 0.9 categories. This however did not imply a flawless 
instrument validity testing process. 
The validity tests resulted in the monitoring variable loading on one factor for both South 
Africa and New Zealand and went on to perform better than other constructs on the reliability 
test. The fact that this variable performed well in both countries suggests that items making it 
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did not create major ambiguities within the two countries‟ wine industry. The Incentives 
construct also loaded on one factor for South Africa. However, this was not the case with 
other constructs. While items that were intended to measure a given construct loaded on one 
factor and thus satisfy the research that the construct has been adequately captured, at most 
two items from each of these constructs loaded on other factors, and were subsequently 
dropped from further analysis.  
This represented a limitation in the measurement of constructs because it indicated that the 
original set of items that was meant to measure a specific construct may have actually 
represented more than one dimension of that construct. For example, the original item 
criticality construct was captured through eight items. Exploratory factor analysis resulted in 
the first six items loading on one factor and items seven and eight loading on a separate 
factor. The first six items were mainly related to chemical and flavour/taste qualities such as 
acidity and sugar content. Items seven and eight mainly captured the physical quality of 
grapes such as physical damage and disease damage. While this research dropped the physical 
quality measure from further analysis, it does not mean that this attribute is not important for 
the analysis. Dropping the physical quality measure was therefore a limitation in that it denied 
the research the ability to assess the role of different aspects of grape quality on governance 
decisions. This calls for further refinement with a view of breaking them down into more 
specific sub constructs. 
6.5.2 Limited Focus on the Winery – Grower dyad 
This research confined itself to understanding the exchange relationships between grape 
growers (input suppliers) and wineries (input users) and did not incorporate other role players 
within the wine value chain such as distributors and final consumers. The literature (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Ritter, Wilkinson, & Johnston, 2004) suggests that while relationships with 
suppliers of strategic inputs can be an important and durable source of competitive advantage, 
other relationships within the value chain such as with distributors are equally important.  
This research has mainly focused on the relationship between input suppliers and input users. 
It did not explore the dynamics of exchange protection along the entire value chain such as 
between manufacturers and distributors. This is particularly important in that this research 
found that wineries in South Africa and New Zealand belong to national bodies, which 
suggests possibilities for other inter-firm dynamics that this research did not capture. Further, 
growers are generally locked in their relationships with wineries due to lack of alternative 
buyers, which further reduces the dynamics that may be observed in other industries.  
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Another limitation related to the focus on the grower-winery is that information was sourced 
from wineries only without growers‟ input. The analysis may have therefore been biased 
towards the wineries and the incorporation of growers‟ views could possibly alter the findings 
of the current research. 
6.5.3 Lack of detailed Triangulation 
This research relied primarily on the responses to a survey data derived from key informants, 
as is typical for a quantitative study of this type. The data were further triangulated through 
deriving constructs and comparing results with the literature and also industry association 
reports and media. Hence, triangulation was constrained to a degree as there were no 
secondary interviews, a fact that may lead to key informant bias. Key informants should be 
selected on two main criteria; first, they must occupy roles that make them knowledgeable 
about the phenomenon under study, and secondly, be willing to communicate with the 
researcher. Key informants are considered most reliable when dealing with smaller 
organisations as it is expected that senior managers in small organisations/firms tend to make 
most of the important decisions and be familiar with all the major aspects of the business. We 
note that in the two samples, the smaller wineries dominate, and hence we expect to receive 
reasonably reliable data even though a single key informant was used. Yet, further research 
may have to undertake secondary interviews in addition to the key informant and also consult 
individual company documents to gain a richer picture.  
6.5.4 Limited Generalisation of the Results   
Generalisation of the findings is a desirable quality for any research. Hence it is almost a 
given inevitability that all research findings will raise questions concerning the degree to 
which such findings could be generalised. This research has developed multi-theoretical 
exchange protection framework that is believed to be generalisable to all industries. It went on 
to develop instruments and used them to empirically test the framework on the South African 
and New Zealand wine industries. However, the results of the current study cannot be 
generalised because the study focused on only one sector within only one industry.   
6.6 Directions for Further Research 
This research provides useful avenues for further research. These avenues arise from the 
findings of the research as well as its limitations. These can be grouped into two main 
categories of (a) methodological issues (b) replication of multi-theoretical framework in 
different countries and industries. 
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6.6.1 Methodological Issues 
Further methodological research opportunities may be divided into instrument refinement and 
the adoption of a case study approach. 
6.6.1.1 Instrument Refinement 
As observed in Chapter five and in the limitations section above, apart from the monitoring 
constructs that loaded on one factor for both countries, and the incentive construct for South 
Africa, other constructs loaded on two or three factors. Loadings on more than one factor 
meant that the items making the constructs could potentially be broken into two sub 
constructs. The factors loaded with less than three items were subsequently dropped from the 
research because they did not meet the minimum required number of items.  
This did not mean that the underlying construct making these factors did not have relevance to 
this research. It simply meant that the study had to settle for the construct with more 
correlated items. Further research may therefore make a contribution to the exchange 
literature in general and to the wine industry in particular by identifying items related to those 
within the dropped factors and improve and extend this research. One example from this 
research may help clarify the research opportunity provided by instrument refinement. A total 
of four out of six items that constituted the legal system loaded on one factor for New 
Zealand. Items one and two that loaded on another factor seemed more aligned to the judicial 
systems‟ moral standing such as fairness and impartiality, whereas and the other items seem 
to be aligned towards judicial systems‟ effectiveness such as speed of resolving disputes, cost 
effectiveness and ability to enforce decisions. Further research may therefore benefit from 
identifying more items that are related to the moral standing of the judicial system, develop a 
separate construct using these items and then incorporate it into the analysis of governance 
structures alongside the judicial systems‟ effectiveness construct that used for this research.  
6.6.1.2 Application of the Case Study Approach 
This research used a mail survey (cross-section approach) to collect data and econometric 
analysis to arrive at the results. Wislon (1995) argues that cross section studies do not provide 
insights that emerge from looking at the process relationship development. The mail survey 
has therefore not afforded this research the opportunity to study and observe the dynamics of 
firm relationships. As such, other important insights into how firms use the different 
governance forms studied in this research may have been overlooked. Further research may 
benefit from complementing econometric analysis with case studies as this may provide a 
richer perspective of the firms‟ governance strategies (Ruester, 2010).  
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6.6.2 Replication of the Multi-Theoretical Framework in Different Situations  
This research developed and tested the multi-theoretical exchange framework on the wine 
industry in South Africa and New Zealand. There were two main reasons why the two 
countries were chosen. Firstly, they are both producers of wine which allowed for a direct 
comparative study. Secondly, South Africa had a weaker legal environment than New 
Zealand and this allowed testing for the implications of a weaker and stronger legal 
environment on exchange performance. However, there is room for applying the theoretical 
framework to different situations. For example, research may include both the input suppliers 
(e.g. growers) and input users (e.g. wineries) instead of focusing on the wineries only as this 
research has done. Research may also study the whole value chain from growers to customers 
and address questions such as within which part of the chain does the multi-theoretical 
framework better protect exchange relationships? Is it between input suppliers and input users 
as tested for this study, or between suppliers and distributors, or between distributors and 
retailers? There is also an opportunity to test the multi-theoretical framework on different 
sectors with a view to assess its applicability to different industries and between industries. 
Further, the two countries studied for this research have many winery regions. This presents 
an opportunity to apply the multi-theoretical framework at each country‟s regional level with 
the key objective of understanding the regional differences in governance choices and their 
respective determinants between regions.  
6.7 Summary and Conclusions 
The exchange literature is rich with theories that have been used to guide the governance of 
transactions. These include TCE (Williamson, 1985), agency theory (Bergen et al., 1992; 
Eisenhardt, 1989) and relational exchange theory (Macaulay, 1963). This research is therefore 
just a small contribution to a large and well developed field. However, it is hoped that the 
realisation that these theories complement each other in protecting exchange relationships and 
the addition of the legal system to exchange protection theorising will add further value to this 
body of literature.  
This research started with a review of literature that revealed that TCE contracting framework 
exposes transactions to opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Despite this, incomplete contracts 
were found to be still widely used (Dawes et al., 2009; Fraser, 2005). This research therefore 
set off with key objective of developing an improved exchange framework that protects 
exchange relationships better than TCE incomplete contracts. The framework was to be used 
to explain the use of incomplete contracts despite the limitations. However, before that, the 
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research had to first establish whether or not contracts are used within the South African and 
New Zealand wine industries. The findings showed that wineries employed the three 
coordination measures of the spot market/arms-length, contracts and vertical control to source 
their grapes. Such an integrated strategic focus allowed the wineries to exploit advantages of 
sourcing grapes from the spot market such as meeting the unexpected shortages and also 
allowed them to benefit from, among others risk mitigation through contracting and ensured 
access to quality grapes through vertical control. This helped achieve the third objective of 
this research, which was to investigate and explain the grape coordination measures in the two 
countries.  
The research also made some theoretical contributions by developing a multi-paradigm 
exchange protection framework that integrates the exchange protection qualities of 
incomplete contracting (TCE), monitoring and incentives (agency theory), relational norms 
(relational exchange theory) as well as the legal system. The new framework is believed to 
offer better exchange protection than any exchange protection mechanism does in isolation. 
The development of the multi-paradigm framework was on its own an achievement of the first 
objective of this research, which was to develop a multi-paradigm governance framework 
through the integration of TCE, agency theory, relational exchange theory and the contract 
enforcement mechanism of the legal system. The framework was used to offer an explanation 
for the continued use of incomplete contracts despite their vulnerability to ex post 
opportunism, hence addressing the second objective of this research. The explanation given is 
that companies complement incomplete contracts with exchange protection qualities of other 
mechanisms such as monitoring, incentives, norms and through the legal system. Thus, other 
exchange mechanisms provide added safeguards to incomplete contracting and hence explain 
the use of incomplete contracts despite their limitations. The new framework is also believed 
to be generalisable to other industries such as information technology and the automotive 
industry. To demonstrate the applicability of the new framework on other industries, previous 
exchange protection studies were reviewed and opportunities for improving the understanding 
of the target studies‟ phenomenon of interest were identified.  
 
Further theoretical contribution was made to the TCE view on the size determinants of 
vertical control. Whereas TCE envisages that large firms are more likely integrate as a means 
of exploiting scale economies (Williamson, 1975), the current research results suggest that 
small firms are more integrated than large firms (H7), and the major reason for such 
integration is probably to ensure better exploitation of existing capabilities (Diez - Vial, 2009) 
and save on transaction costs that may be better absorbed by large firms than small firms. 
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TCE should therefore reconcile the size determinants of vertical integration of small and large 
firms.  
 
Another important theoretical contribution was achieved by incorporating the legal system 
into mainstream exchange theorising. Not only has the current research shown that the legal 
system protects exchange relationships (H1 and H2a), it has also shown that a more credible 
legal system better protects exchange relationships than a less credible legal system (H2b). On 
these bases, the current research incorporated the legal system into the multi-paradigm 
exchange protection framework. 
 
Further, the research has made important managerial contributions. Managers have been 
advised to be open to using the three governance strategies of spot market, vertical control 
and contracting as each of these strategies has a unique role to play in the coordination of 
transactions. A related managerial contribution that the current research made is specific to 
contracting. Managers have been advised to complete their contractual relationships by 
building socio-economic based relationships with their trading partners and clients, especially 
in countries with poor legal systems. This approach is believed to reduce the need for 
intensive and costly monitoring effort and incentives because more reliance would also be 
placed on the efficacy of the legal system and trust to enforce contracts. 
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     Appendix A 
Study Questionnaire 
This questionnaire consists of is composed of 7 short sections. The sections address different 
aspects of the key parameters that are considered important in the grape coordination process. 
It will take AT MOST 15 MINUTES to complete the questionnaire. 
 
 
RESPONDENT ANONYMITY 
 
All questionnaire responses will be treated anonymously and no reference will be made to 
specific information provided by individual respondents. 
 
 
RESEARCH FEED BACK 
 
 
Summary results will be sent to interested respondents. If interested, please indicate by 
ticking (√) yes in the statement below. 
 
I would like to be sent summary results of the study  Yes No 
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Section 1: Grapes Supply Chain 
 
The purpose of this section is to gather information about the winery‟s ways of making 
grapes available. 
 
1. Given the grape sourcing strategies through the spot market, contract, and growing of 
own grapes or a combination of the three in different proportions; which strategy or 
combination of strategies best describes how you source grapes for your winery and in 
what proportions? Please tick (√) the appropriate proportions/ percentages accounted 
for by the respective sourcing methods for the last immediate season;   
 
Sourcing Strategy Percentage of grapes sourced through different methods 
 0 - 19 20 - 39 40 - 59 60 – 79 80 – 100  
Spot market      Should 
add up to 
100% 
Contract      
Grow own grapes      
 
2. Please provide main reasons for the dominant strategy above. 
(a) __________________________________________________________________ 
(b) __________________________________________________________________ 
(c) __________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Please tick (√) what you consider to be the approximate distance of your main sources 
of grapes from the winery. This applies to even when grapes are sourced internally. 
  
Source Distance (Km) 
 0 - 4 5 - 10 11 - 50 51 - 100 > 100 
Spot market      
Contract      
Grow own grapes      
 
Section 2: Contract Information (applicable to contract growers only). 
 
This section seeks to gather information on the nature of the contract(s) between the 
winery and grape grower(s). 
 
4. How many contract growers do you have? __________________ 
 
5. Please tick (√) what you consider to be the best description of the type(s) of contract(s) 
with your grower(s);    
 
Formal detailed 
Contract 
Less detailed memorandum of 
understanding  
Unwritten mutual 
understanding  
   
 
6. Please tick (√) the best description of the average duration of all your contracts;  
 
Less than 1 year 1-2 years 2- 3 years More than 3 years (Please specify) n/a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
 
 
 
Section 3: Quality Issues 
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This section seeks your opinion on grape quality related issues.  
 
 
7. Please tick (√) the column that best expresses the importance of the following grape 
quality variables to the quality of your wine;   
 
 
Item 
Code 
Grape Quality 
Measure 
Not important 
at all 
Not so 
important 
Neutral Fairly 
Important 
Very 
Important 
IC1 Baume/Brix 
(Sugar content) 
     
IC2 Titratable Acidity 
or Total Acidity 
(TA) as % of 
volume. 
     
IC3 Colour       
IC4 Flavour      
IC5 Tannins      
IC6 MOG (Material 
other than grapes) 
     
IC7 Physical Damage      
IC8 Disease Damage      
IC9 Other (Please 
specify) 
_____________ 
     
 
 
8. Tick (√) the column that best describes the extent to which your contract(s) with 
grower(s) specify the penalties/bonuses for the achievement of the following grape 
quality variables;  
 
Item 
Code 
Grape Quality Variable Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
Inc1 Baume/Brix (Sugar content)      
Inc2 Titratable Acidity or Total 
Acidity (TA) as % of volume.  
     
Inc3 Colour       
Inc4 Flavour      
Inc5 Tannins      
Inc6 MOG (Material other than 
grapes) 
     
Inc7 Physical Damage      
Inc8 Disease Damage      
Inc9 Other (Please specify) 
_____________________ 
     
 
 
Section 4: Winery’s relationship with Grower(s) or Own vineyard. 
 
The following statements have been designed to obtain information about your relationship(s) 
with your grape grower (s) or with own vineyard. 
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9. Please tick (√) the column that best expresses your opinion about the extent to which 
representatives of your winery are involved in each of the following activities in the 
contracted grower or your own vineyard(s) or both; 
 
Item 
Code 
Activity (Items) Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
Mon1 Pruning      
Mon2 Canopy Management      
Mon3 Trellis System      
Mon4 Vine Density      
Mon5 Water and Irrigation      
Mon6 Fertiliser Programme      
Mon7 Ground Cover      
Mon8 Weed Control      
Mon9 Pest/Disease Control      
 Other (please specify)       
 
 
10. For each statement please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree by ticking 
(√) the appropriate column.   
 
Items Statement Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
T1 Even when the grower/vineyard gives 
us an unlikely explanation, we are 
confident that they are telling the truth. 
     
T2 The grower/vineyard has often 
provided us information that has later 
proven to be inaccurate. 
     
T3 The grower/vineyard usually keeps the 
promises that they make to our firm. 
     
T4 Whenever the grower/vineyard gives 
us advice on our business operations, 
we know that they are sharing their 
best judgment. 
     
T5 Our organization can count on the 
grower/vineyard to be sincere. 
     
T6 Though the circumstances change, we 
believe that the grower/vineyard will 
be ready and willing to offer us 
assistance and support. 
     
T7 When making important decisions, the 
grower/vineyard is concerned about 
our welfare. 
     
T8 When we share our concerns with the 
grower, we know that the 
grower/vineyard will respond with 
understanding. 
     
T9 In the future, we can count on the 
grower/vineyard to consider how their 
decisions and actions will affect us. 
     
T10 When it comes to things that are 
important to us, we can depend on the 
grower‟s/vineyard‟s support. 
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Section 5 - Legal System  
 
This section seeks your opinion about the performance of the New Zealand court system in 
resolving business disputes.  Your opinion is sought even if you have never had a business 
dispute. 
 
11. For each statement about the court system in New Zealand, please indicate the extent 
to which you agree or disagree;       
 
Item 
Code 
Statements (Items) Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
L1 The courts are fair and impartial      
L2 The courts are honest/uncorrupt      
L3 The courts are quick at resolving 
business disputes 
     
L4 The courts are affordable       
L5 The courts are consistent      
L6 The courts enforce their decisions       
 
Section 6: You and the Winery 
 
 
This section seeks to gather information on the respondent and the winery.  
 
12. Please tick (√) the boxes applicable to you; 
 
Your gender            
 
Your age group    - 35 - 45 - 55 er 55 
 
Your highest Viticulture 
qualification 
  
Bachelors        
Degree 
Degree 
Other 
(specify) 
 
________ 
 
Number of years with the 
Industry 
    
 
Your Job Title  
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13. Please tick (√) the boxes applicable to this winery and fill the blank spaces 
appropriately; 
No of years 
in operation 
< 1 yr 
 
1 to 5 yrs 
 
5 yrs < to 10 yrs 
 
> 10 yrs 
 
Main wine 
Varietals 
Sauvignon 
Blanc 
 
Chardonnay 
 
 
Pinot Noir 
 
 
Merlot 
 
 
Other (please specify) 
__________________ 
 
 
Geographical 
Region Bay 
 
 
Ownership 
structure 
Sole 
ownership 
 
 
Partnership 
 
 
 
Family owned 
 
 
 
Controlling 
interest 
 
 
Non 
controlling 
interest    
 
 
Turnover of last full year; 
__________________________( NZ $M)    
 Please specify year __________________ 
 
Volume of wine produced in the last full year; 
____________________ (million Litres).  
Please specify year __________________ 
 
Source of 
Grapes (% of 
total grape 
requirement) 
Spot market. 
 
(%) _______ 
Contract. 
 
(%) ______ 
Grapes produced by 
winery for own use. 
% _____________ 
Should add up to 
100% 
 
 
Section 7: Any Additional Comments 
 
If you have any comments or would like to share information not addressed in the 
questionnaire, please feel free to provide written details below or contact Mokaedi M. 
Monnane on: 0212069506; or monnane.monnane@lincolnuni.ac.nz 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire 
 160 
     Appendix B 
Linearity Tests 
B.1 Linearity Tests (South Africa) 
                                              Model 1  Model 2 
 
                                                Model 3            Model 4 
 
 
Model 5 
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B.2 Linearity Tests (New Zealand) 
                     Model 1             Model 2 
 
 
Model 3    Model 4 
 
Model 5 
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     Appendix C 
Normality Tests 
C.1 South Africa 
                    Model 1        Model 2 
 
 
 
                   Model 3   Model 4 
 
                                                     Model 5 
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C.2 New Zealand 
                   Model 1   Model 2 
 
                   Model 3          Model 4 
 
 
                                                   Model 5 
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     Appendix D 
Error Term Homoscedasticity Tests 
D.1 South Africa 
                    Model 1           Model 2 
 
 
                     Model 3             Model 4 
 
Model 5 
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D.2 New Zealand 
 
                         Model 1           Model 2 
 
Model 3   Model 4 
 
Model 5 
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